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ABSTRACT
Just-in-Time (JIT) supply calls for frequent, small deliveries, which arrive on 
time, with the quantity and quality required. For JIT to be effective there should be a 
cooperative relationship between the buyer and the supplier. They should work 
together to enhance their competitive positions in the market place. This study 
extends the quantitative models published in the literature to provide more realistic 
models for JIT operations and evaluates the costs and benefits o f JIT partnerships to 
help in the negotiation process between the partners.
We provide a new model for the optimization of the joint total relevant cost 
o f the buyer and supplier in the typical JIT scenario where the buyer’s order is 
delivered in multiple shipments and the supplier’s production lot size is an integer 
multiple o f the shipment size. The new model provides more flexibility and cost 
saving for a JIT environment. It determines jointly the optimal values o f the three 
decision variables: the shipment size, the number of shipments of an order, and the 
number of shipments per production lot size.
JIT supply requires flexible resources because of the random changes in 
customer demand. We provide a new model to quantify the advantages and costs of 
maintaining flexible resources by the JIT supplier. To avoid the high cost o f flexible 
resources, in several cases in practice either the buyer or the supplier holds safety 
stock to provide the appropriate customer service level. This is the stage o f transition 
to real JIT supply. Only the case where the buyer is holding safety stock was 
examined previously, we consider the case where the supplier is responsible for 
holding safety stock. Our safety stock model provides a valid approximation without
xi
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the knowledge o f the distribution pattern o f the random customer demand as long as 
the pattern o f production follows the demand pattern according to the JIT supply 
agreement.
In order to aid the buyer and supplier in negotiation o f a contract and 
improving the JIT partnership, the proposed models determine the optimal order 
quantity, shipping quantity, number o f deliveries, and safety stock for the buyer or 
the supplier individually as well as jointly under different scenarios. In each case, the 
study compares the optimal ordering policy o f the dominating party to the joint 
optimal ordering policy. The savings and losses for each party are computed and 
analyzed providing the quantitative support for negotiation, compromise, and 
compensation.
This study integrates operations management models both with cost 
accounting information systems using Activity Based Costing (ABC) and with 
management information systems using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). To 
provide accounting data, the study specifies the cost activities, cost drivers and 
traceable costs o f the buyer and supplier. We explore the costs and benefits that are 
experienced through the exchange of information between the buyer and the supplier 
in a JIT environment.
xii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Managerial Aspects
Aggressive domestic and international competitors, high input factor prices, 
shorter product development life cycles, technology growth, and customers 
demanding better quality at lower prices have increasingly put pressure on 
manufacturing and purchasing managers. Globalization requires communication and 
coordination across time zones and locations. Time stresses drastically reduce 
reaction time, driving business to Just-In-Time (JIT) inventory, orders, scheduling, 
payments, manufacturing, and distribution (Yager, 1999). In such an environment, 
companies must build and maintain partnerships with suppliers who have the best 
overall value. Information technology (IT) enables the speedy adaptation necessary 
to accommodate these rapid changes. A strong linkage between companies and their 
suppliers is a prerequisite for high quality, manufacturing flexibility, and 
responsiveness to an ever-changing customer demand. In practice, however, supplier 
value is all too often defined solely in terms o f quoted prices, without regard to the 
significant costs associated with ordering, receiving, and holding inventories and 
safety stocks.
Cooperative relationships represent a  purchasing philosophy that expands the 
relationship with a supplier beyond that typically found in traditional purchasing 
methodologies. A partnership involves such elements as long-term contracts, a 
reduced number o f supply sources, exchange of inventory and production 
information, and a high degree of mutual trust between the two parties. The
l
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relationship is long-term in nature and involves close collaboration and mutual 
commitment.
Traditionally, buyer-supplier relationships have been adversarial. Buyers 
focus on obtaining the lowest priced, high quality products available and suppliers 
try to produce a product that meets customer specifications at the least possible cost. 
A lack o f trust in a particular supplier leads the buyer to spread out the risk using 
multiple sourcing, which may depress the price o f materials by playing off one 
supplier against the other. Such a practice may have a short-term or immediate 
advantage in obtaining cheaper parts and materials. At the same time, the supplier 
who provides the lowest price to get the bid may be willing to sacrifice quality and 
delivery reliability, two factors that are more critical to delivering value ultimately to 
the customer. Poor quality materials can lead to higher costs later as a result of 
spoilage, rework, and customer returns. On the other hand, late deliveries can result 
in stockouts and delivery problems. Therefore, this approach, although beneficial in 
the short-run, is wasteful over the long run (Aderohunmu, 1995).
Multiple sources are costly to maintain, simply because of the repetitive 
nature o f the bidding process. The price-driven tactics o f competitive bidding force 
the supplier to base their decision on short-term rather than long-term consideration, 
and often the outcome will be a higher product cost to the supplier and ultimately a 
higher price for the buyer (Landeros, 1989). Moreover, investment by the supplier in 
research and development and process improvement is usually limited to that which 
can be economically justified within the duration o f the contract (Hahn, 1986).
2
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therefore, these adversarial buyer-supplier relationships are characterized as 
uncertain and unpredictable.
One of the key business issues for modern corporations is the need to 
compress the time required to cycle orders, which involves procurement, production, 
and distribution activities. The Just-In-Time (JIT) philosophy applied to logistics 
involves minimizing the time required to source, handle, produce, transport, and 
deliver materials and to meet (or exceed) customer service requirements with 
appropriate consideration given to costs. One of the main pillars o f JIT purchasing is 
selecting and maintaining long term contracts with a few, reliable and high quality 
suppliers. A desirable condition in long-term purchasing agreements in the JIT 
manufacturing environment is the frequent delivery o f small quantities which arrive 
on time, with the quality and quantity required. From the standpoint o f both the 
buyer and the supplier, the partnership is planned to be a long term, ongoing 
relationship. This relationship has been viewed by a number o f practitioners and 
academicians as one key element in preparing the buying and supplier firms for the 
demands of world class competitiveness (Treleven, 1988).
To ensure close buyer-supplier relationships, a strong communication system 
should be in place. According to Heids and Miner (1992) sharing information is 
important to the success o f these long-term relationships. An electronic data 
interchange (EDI) system or an internet connection is an excellent way to link the 
operations o f the buyer and the supplier. Moreover, a cost accounting information 
system that provides information about the cost o f activities and products is needed 
to enhance the performance of a JIT partnership. A new cost accounting system
3
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known as Activity Based Cost System (ABC) has been often used. In the following 
sections, we first look at the concept o f JIT partnerships and then examine the 
buyer's and supplier's perspective on cooperative relationships. We identify the 
benefits and the pitfalls o f such a relationship. ABC and EDI will also be discussed 
as tools for successful implementation o f a JIT partnership. Finally, we present the 
research objectives, contributions o f the research, and the organization of the 
dissertation.
1.2 The Concept o f  JIT Partnership
JIT Partnership can be defined as the extent to which there is mutual 
recognition and understanding that the success of a JIT manufacturer and its 
suppliers depends in part on the other firm, with each firm working together and 
providing coordinated efforts to achieve desired outcomes from the JIT exchange. 
This definition was adopted from the definition o f a distributor and manufacturer 
working partnership. (Anderson and Narus, 1990). In a JIT system, inventory is 
viewed as a necessary evil, frequently concealing inefficiency or poor quality. Thus, 
each department in a multi-step production process maintains a buffer stock just in 
case there is an interruption o f the flow of materials from upstream departments. The 
JIT system allows these buffers to be reduced, theoretically to zero. In addition, the 
increased flexibility, or improved responsiveness of the JIT system is supposed to 
allow a reduction in, or elimination o f finished goods inventories.
From the production and operations prospective, the concept of JIT is to 
produce the necessary units in the necessary quantities at the necessary time 
(Monden, 1981). Monden classified production control systems in two general
4
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categories: push or pull system. Traditional production systems, such as material 
requirements planning (MRP), utilize a push system. Push systems project material 
requirements from the beginning stage o f production to subsequent stages according 
to a predetermined plan. While traditional systems can provide economies o f scale 
and reduce possible production disruption due to machine breakdown, poor quality 
items, worker absenteeism, and late deliveries are the main disadvantages o f this 
system together with high inventory costs associated with waste.
The JIT production system, on the other hand, utilizes a demand-pull concept 
o f production control. Each production stage withdraws just the right amount o f parts 
from preceding stage, when they are needed (Walleigh, 1986). Suppliers are viewed 
as starting workstations or extended factories located away from JIT manufacturing 
firms. In this way, incoming materials , work in process (WIP) inventories, and 
finished goods can be eliminated or reduced to a minimum. Elimination o f buffer 
stocks and tight coupling o f production lines require JIT deliveries from suppliers, as 
well as synchronization of production stages.
1.3 The Buyer's Perspective in Cooperative Relationships
This section explains why a buyer would be interested in developing close, 
long-term relationships with suppliers. We outline the benefits and identify the 
pitfalls.
1.3.1 Single Sourcing vs. Multiple Sourcing: the Trade-Offs.
Costs are very important ingredients o f both internal strategic analysis and 
external competitive advantages. According to Michael Porter (1996), cost 
leadership can be achieved only when a company has the lowest cost position in a
5
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particular industry. A typical purchasing department has been trained to reduce the 
costs o f components going into the final product. Its main objective is to negotiate 
the lowest price from vendors. This strategy focuses on quantity discounts and 
playing one supplier against the other to gain the lowest possible price. But, quantity 
discounts create excess inventory costs, and the exploitation of supplier competition 
results in adversarial relationships with suppliers.
Purchasers perceive multiple sourcing as a wise strategy, because if one 
supplier is unable to provide the parts by the due date, another supplier may be able 
to meet the date. Also, buyers believe that competition between multiple suppliers 
will result in the lowest price and highest quality products with the least variation 
(Ranney and Carlson, 1988). As a result, buyers regard competition to be positive. In 
the short run the buyers' perception may be correct; however, in the long run 
suppliers will be unable to change their cost structures to reduce costs and improve 
quality. Competition based entirely on cost may force the suppliers to cut comers 
and produce parts as cheaply as possible. In the short run, the suppliers may use 
inferior raw materials and components to remain profitable. Buyers will be unaware 
of this short-run strategy, because the suppliers' operations are a black box in 
adversarial relationships order goes into the box, the product comes out, and the 
buyer does not know what happens in between. Experience shows that long-run 
cooperative relationship costs can be reduced and product quality can be maintained 
or even improved (Ellram, 1995). Cutting inventory cost is the underlying motivation 
for establishment of this partnership.
6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reducing lead times is one way that buyers can cut inventory costs. A 
number o f papers describe purchasing strategies that reduce lead times by splitting 
orders between various vendors (see for example, Hong and Hayya, 1992). Since the 
focus in a JIT setting is to have smaller orders delivered frequently, the buyer might 
use several suppliers. Each supplier would be responsible for delivering a shipment 
at regular intervals. With multiple suppliers, the number o f actual orders placed may 
not increase, since the same orders would have to be placed irrespective o f supplier 
numbers. The shipment costs may rise with shipments from many different locations. 
With different suppliers, the variability o f component quality may increase due to 
differences in processes and equipment. Managing multiple suppliers may be more 
difficult than simply working closely with one. However, if the buyer invests the 
time necessary to make these relationships highly cooperative and long term, many 
of these problems will disappear. Many synergetic benefits can be experienced with 
these partnerships.
As mentioned earlier, long-term buyer-supplier relationships may result in 
many synergetic benefits. Suppliers may be more willing to provide flexible delivery 
schedules, to deal with unusual requests, to help with the customer’s product design, 
and to emphasize the supply o f quality parts. To offset the potential risks o f working 
closely with a supplier, buyers must take special care to select suppliers who will 
work well with them. An empirical study by O ’Neal (1987) on the implementation o f 
JIT in the automotive industry found that the single-sourcing approach is being used 
more frequently and that buyers are selecting suppliers with more care.
7
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1.3.2 Competitive Advantages for the Buyer
Buyers that work to establish cooperative buyer-supplier relationships can 
gain a competitive advantage. Lyons (1990) outlines the main advantages and 
disadvantages for the buyers and suppliers who enter into partnerships. Buyers will 
experience reduced manufacturing and labor costs, improved quality, and enhanced 
control through predictability. Quality will improve because the supplier, most o f  the 
time, is more technically oriented than the buyer and items will be closer to 
specification, since there are only a few key suppliers for a given product. 
Purchasing will be easier to manage because the buyer would need to focus on fewer 
suppliers and fewer transactions. The use o f electronic data interchange (EDI) 
system further simplifies and enhances buyer-supplier communications.
In addition to that, buyers can assure fair pricing, because the cost structure 
of a supplier can be revealed and price reductions can be included in the contracts. 
Sriram (1990) states th a t" the long term-collaborative relationships offer cost saving 
and more flexible use of assets, without fear of nonperformance or opportunistic 
behavior by suppliers".
The buyer may decide not to manage its own inventory; the buyer can simply 
allow the supplier to be responsible for timely replenishment (Brown, 1994). The 
buyer can provide suppliers with its requirements and allow them to determine how 
much to send and how often to send it. This approach further reduces the usual order 
placement requirements o f the buyer and increases the supplier’s manufacturing 
options.
8
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1.3.3 Possible Drawbacks for the Buyer
As with any strategic choice, these cooperative partnerships may have certain 
problems. The buyer may become too dependent on suppliers and may lose essential 
core skills to suppliers. Indeed, the supplier may gain enough of those skills to be 
able to compete with the buyer in its own market. In addition, the buyer may need to 
be concerned about reduced supplier competition. In the long run, these relationships 
may become barriers to competition thereby reducing the number o f suppliers in the 
market. As a result, the buyer may become increasingly dependent on the supplier. 
Finally, since the search for potential suppliers is very important in a cooperative 
environment, the costs o f supplier selection and maintenance may increase.
1.4 The Supplier's Perspective in Cooperative Relationships
This section explains many o f the benefits that a supplier may gain from 
entering into cooperative agreements with buyers; the possible disadvantages are 
also discussed.
1.4.1 Advantages for the Supplier
Several studies show that one of the major motivators for suppliers to 
implement JIT partnerships is to secure a reliable market. Long-term contracts 
guarantee business as long as the supplier meets the delivery terms. Some studies 
found (Ellram, 1995) that the average number of years that a partnership is expected 
to last would be 8 years and 16 years from buyer and supplier perspectives, 
respectively. It is not surprising that suppliers are hoping the partnership will last 
longer than buyers do because the supplier is entering the partnership to secure 
reliable markets and to improve forecasts of demand requirement. Long-term
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
contracts provide greater demand certainty, larger market share, and an incentive to 
invest in product /cost improvement programs over a longer term. Moreover, by 
signing a long term contract, the supplier can stabilize its short-term production 
schedule, and can also have a strong basis for planning long term capital expenditure 
that may improve cost efficiency and permit further price reduction.
The relative demand certainty allows the suppliers to dedicate a portion o f the 
firm's resources to meet this demand. By doing so, suppliers will benefit by having 
fewer slack resources. This security for the supplier justifies investments that result 
in a reduction o f production and setup cost. On the other hand, the long-term nature 
o f this strategy provides the buyer with leverage in controlling prices, quality, 
delivery lead-time, and an overall lower cost per unit.
Moreover, suppliers who become involved in these long-term relationships 
will have strengthened buyer support (Ellram, 1995). Research and development 
becomes more focused because the supplier will know exactly what the buyer needs. 
The supplier may have inside information about influential people in the buyer's 
organization and about their future buying decisions. Such information can give the 
supplier a competitive advantage when attempting to secure additional contracts with 
buyers. Suppliers will also experience a reduction in the variability o f the buyer's 
orders, which yields easier production scheduling (Turnbull, 1992)
Champan and Carter (1990) show that a strong relationship exists between 
the supplier's inventory level and its manufacturing lot size. Suppliers hold larger 
inventory quantities when their manufacturing lot sizes are large. They do not ship 
the entire lot to the customer, but hold on to part of it to meet future orders. To avoid
10
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the disadvantage o f having to hold inventory to meet the buyer's delivery schedule, 
the vender should concentrate on modifying its production plan. With the proper 
changes, the supplier should be able to schedule production so that it can complete a 
batch of components according to the buyer's demand pattern. I f  the buyer and 
supplier are linked via an EDI system, as in many cooperative relationships, the 
supplier can directly monitor the buyer's inventory level and schedule production 
based on the observed inventory depletion rate. The use o f EDI in such a partnership 
will be explored in a subsequent section.
By gaining access to information about the buyer's inventory level, a supplier 
can become more aware of and more responsive to the buyer's needs. Direct 
monitoring o f the buyer's inventory level can reduce supplier lead-times for those 
components. Production scheduling can be smoother with fewer disruptions due to 
fluctuations in buyer's demands. Without this information, a supplier must increase 
the amount o f finished goods inventory, increase the production capacity, or forego 
sales when they are unable to meet demand (Primrose, 1992).
In addition to improved demand information, the supplier's competitive 
position may also be improved just by being a partner. Partnering builds customer 
loyalty and raises the entry barriers for other supply sources. Raising the barriers to 
entry sustain the supplier's profit margin. If  other firms can easily enter a market, the 
current profit margin realized by supplier could diminish. Therefore, if the firm is a 
strong partner to the biggest buyers, other companies may be deterred from 
competing in that market. Partnerships may help the supplier establish global 
operations. Suppliers can seek buyer partners in other areas o f the world where they
11
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are interested in doing business. Often, it is difficult to establish operations in a 
foreign country, but by partnering, the supplier can develop contacts to helping 
understanding local customs and regulations (Primrose, 1992).
All o f the benefits mentioned will result in long term cost saving. Suppliers in 
such cooperative alliances experience benefits unattainable in short-run, lowest price 
competition. In the long run, it will be less expensive for suppliers to retain existing 
customers than to develop new customers. The supplier's marketing research can be 
decreased because much of the information about future buyer needs and rival firms 
can be obtained from the buyer-partners. The cost o f holding inventory will go down 
since the uncertainty in demand partners will be moderated.
1.4.2 Possible Disadvantages for the Supplier
Suppliers are perceived to be at a considerable disadvantage in partnerships. 
The supplier could be at a buyer's mercy if  the relationship is not mutually beneficial. 
The supplier could be requested to disclose its cost structure, which could cause 
concern about proprietary information being leaked to competitors. Once the 
supplier's cost structure has been revealed, the buyer could use the information to 
take advantage of the supplier either by asking the supplier to accept a smaller profit 
margin or by using the information to get a lower price from a competitor.
Suppliers involved in partnerships may need to held additional inventory to 
meet the buyer's delivery requirements, especially if the buyer does not help the 
supplier revising its system to meet shipment dates in a reasonable manner (Cheng, 
1993). When a supplier establishes an exclusive relationship with a buyer, the 
company is usually required to sign a contract. This contract describes the types of
12
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services the supplier agrees to provide and describes the penalty if it is unable to 
meet the promised obligations. To ensure that no penalties are incurred, the supplier 
may have to make an extra effort to meet that buyer's demand. The supplier may 
have to interrupt its production schedule to make the necessary products, hold extra 
inventory, or expedite the buyer's orders. These actions all come at an extra cost to 
the supplier, for the supplier may have to backorder production for other regular 
customers, incur overtime costs to meet total demand, or pay for extra storage for 
products that are produced in advance. All these issues are important in modeling the 
costs and benefits of cooperative relationships.
1.5 Joint Benefits o f  Adopting JIT bv the Buyer and the Supplier
Costs are very important ingredients of both internal strategic analysis and 
external competitive advantages. According to Michael Porter (1996), cost 
leadership can be achieved only when a company has the lowest cost position in a 
particular industry. When the buyer and supplier enter into a JIT partnership, both of 
them benefit from cost reduction.
In a study (Ellarm, 1995) that surveyed the purchasing organizations o f more 
that 300 Fortune 500 firm’s purchasing organizations found the main reasons buyers 
and suppliers enter into a partnership. The reasons, buyer’s and supplier’s 
perspective are ranked Table 1.1. The study found out that the average number of 
years that a partnership is expected to last would be 8 years and 16 years from buyer 
and supplier perspective, respectively. It is not surprising that suppliers hope the 
partnership will last more than buyers do because the supplier is targeting from the
13
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partnership to secure reliable markets and to improve forecasts o f demand 
requirement.
Table 1.1
Main Reasons Buyers and Suppliers Entered into Partnership
Buyers Perspective Suppliers Perspective
1. Obtain a better price or minimize total 
cost for the purchase items
Secure reliable market for this item
2. Secure a reliable source Desire to influence customer quality
3. Desire to influence supplier'quality Support customer JIT initiative
4. Desire to improve delivery schedules Desire to improve forecast of 
requirement
5. Desire to influence /gain access to 
supplier’s technology
Reduce ongoing administrative 
procedures and costs for ordering, 
invoicing, etc.
The most interesting difference between buyers and suppliers partnering 
impetus relates to the pricing aspect of the partnering the arrangement. Price/total 
cost was the key driver for buyers to form the partnership. However, suppliers appear 
not to be as concerned with the price received as they are with having reliable 
demand, influence on customer's quality, improving JIT, and obtaining better 
requirements forecasts. Even though, the supplier must meet the buyers frequent 
delivery policy, there will be an additional inventory holding cost to the supplier for 
keeping safety stocks. Hence, suppliers are seeking a long-term contract with buyers 
to compensate for their losses.
1.6 Activity Based Costing System and JIT Partnership
One of the major problems associated with JIT models that are developed in 
operation management is the lacking of appropriate cost data to quantify the costs 
and benefits of implementing a JIT partnership. In most cases, a traditional costing 
system has been applied to collect such data. Since this method does not have the
14
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ability to keep track of all cost items that are associated with inventory costs, new 
method emerged in the early 90’s called activity based accounting system (ABC).
Activity-Based Costing, as the name suggests, traces the cost to the cost 
objects (products, customers, etc.) through activities. This is in contrast to traditional 
cost accounting, which traces costs directly to products. Activities, rather than 
products, consume resources and the demand for those activities in the 
manufacturing process determine how the costs are allocated to the individual cost 
objects. Resources include all the costs recorded by the accounting system in 
carrying out daily business, such as salaries, materials, overhead (rent utilities, 
insurance, advertising, etc.). Activities are procedures that are carried out in order to 
manufacture a product or provide a service. The business process can be broken 
down into activities. Typically, activities are grouped by function and the grouping is 
referred to as an activity center. Cost objects are the final result o f the business 
process.
Using an ABC will improve information about the cost o f activities, because 
activities are poorly defined in a traditional cost system. Traditional cost systems use 
only unit level cost drivers. In the opposite, ABC reports more accurate product costs 
because it uses several different types o f cost drivers. It allows decision-makers to 
accurately trace overhead and to determine the real causes o f overhead. This 
information can be used to eliminate or improve activities that consume excessive 
amounts o f overhead. Under the JIT philosophy, there are some activities that are 
unnecessary to do, such as, to inspect the parts when they are delivered by the 
vendor, and to place the parts on the shelf in the stockroom. Eliminating these
15
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activities reduces the overall cost and the cost o f the products that no longer use 
these activities. ABC provides a good estimate o f the cost o f eliminated activities. 
The cost o f inspection activity, for example, is likely to be identified separately. If 
inspection activity is eliminated, the ABC system will reveal both the overall 
reduction in cost and the specific source of the cost reduction. On the other hand, a 
traditional cost system is unlikely to reveal the potential cost savings that come from 
eliminating activities. The cost savings are typically buried in large overhead pools 
that do not reveal the source o f cost reduction. Therefore, improved information 
about the cost o f activities and products facilitates the cost reduction objectives of 
continuous improvement by allowing managers to stimulate the cost consequences of 
decisions that change the performance of the use o f activities. In summary, ABC is 
superior to the traditional costing system in reporting the cost consequences of these 
actions (Turney, 1991). We will examine the impact of ABC on JIT models, more 
specifically, the effects on the cost parameters and the negligence o f indirect costs of 
inventory are considered in subsequent chapter.
1.7 Electronic Data Interchange for Information Exchange
To ensure buyer-supplier partnership, a strong communications system 
should be in place. An Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system is an excellent way 
to link the operation of the buyer and supplier. An EDI system is a formal 
computerized link between the buyer and the seller facilitating business 
communications and transactions. Functional areas, such as engineering, production, 
logistics, purchasing, and sales, can be cross-linked via the EDI system. The benefits 
of EDI include: reductions in paperwork, personnel, inventory costs, and order lead-
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time (Wang and Seidmann, 1995). Basic order placement and payment transactions 
can be dramatically simplified with this system. Not only will an EDI speed up 
operations in purchasing and delivery, it will dramatically reduce errors. Error 
reduction can save the time spent correcting them and the money spent on clerical 
costs and overcharges (Sadhawani and Sarhan, 1987).
Although the initial investment such a system is large, the long-term cost 
savings and reduced planning complexities will ultimately offset the expense 
(Anvari, 1992). An EDI system can relay valuable inventory information from the 
buyer to the supplier by providing access to the buyer’s inventory monitoring 
system. The supplier should be able to schedule its production more effectively by 
observing changes in the buyer’s inventory level. The supplier’s objective may be to 
complete the buyer’s order in time for shipment and consequently avoid holding 
excess components to meet the buyer’s future delivery schedule. Wang and 
Seidmann (1995) show that when the benefits the buyer experiences from the 
installation of EDI systems are high it is in the buyer’s interest to subsidize the 
supplier’s adoption of an EDI system. The use o f an EDI system and the 
establishment o f a cooperative buyer-supplier partnership make the implementation 
o f a JIT delivery schedule much easier. The use of EDI systems to link the supplier 
and buyer will be explored further in subsequent chapters.
1.8 Research Objectives
The objectives o f this study are: 1) To extend the quantitative models 
published in literature, so that they can be used by the buyer and supplier in 
negotiation and cooperation in a JIT partnership, 2) To provide numerical solutions,
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sensitivity analysis, and managerial analysis o f the JIT partnership models under 
different scenarios for decision makers, 3) To provide accounting data that specifies 
the cost activities, cost drivers, and traceable costs o f the buyer and supplier, and 4) 
To explore the costs and benefits that are experienced through the exchange of 
information between the buyer and the supplier in a JIT environment.
1.9 Contributions o f the Research
Economic order quantity models, which are adjusted for multiple deliveries 
(Pan and Liao, 1989, Ramasesh, 1990, Fazel 1997, and Kim and Ha, 1998) or 
consider the cooperation between the buyer and supplier (Banerjee, 1986, Goyal, 
1988 and Miller and Kelle, 1998) have been published in the literature. The JIT 
philosophy emphasizes both of these elements. All o f the proposed models published 
in the literature have addressed two scenarios. The first scenario, where the order 
quantity equals the production lot size. More specifically, the number o f shipments 
per order is equal the number o f shipments per production lot size. The second 
scenario, where the shipment size equals the production lot size. We provide a new 
model for single sourcing where the buyer’s order is delivered in multiple shipments 
and the supplier’s production lot size is an integer multiple of shipments assuming 
the number o f shipments per buyer’s order quantity can be different from the number 
of shipment per production lot size for the supplier. This new extension is more 
realistic and it can provide more flexibility in choosing the appropriate lot size for 
the supplier. We expect that it can result in a cost savings overall. These models 
consider a deterministic environment. Under JIT supply, ideally, the buyer and 
supplier operate in a deterministic environment, neither the buyer nor the supplier
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has to hold safety stock. There is always uncertainty in the customer’s demand, but 
flexible resources and short production and supply lead times enable the required 
service level to be met in this case without holding safety stocks. In practice, 
however, the appropriate flexibility and capacity are not available or they are too 
expensive to maintain. We call this stage the time o f transition to JIT supply. For this 
stage, either the buyer or the supplier has to hold safety stock to provide the 
appropriate customer service level. Only the case where the buyer is holding safety 
stock was examined previously (Kelle and Miller, 1998). We provide a new case 
where the supplier is holding safety stock in the transition stage to JIT. In the spirit 
o f JIT, the study finds the minimum safety stock needed in order to protect against 
shortages that may be caused by delivery delays or excess demand. The safety stock 
that is required to provide the appropriate customer service level depends on the 
number o f shipments and on the shipment size. The proposed models determine the 
optimal values of the three decision variables, the shipment size, the number of 
shipments and safety stock jointly.
In order to aid the buyer and supplier in negotiation o f a contract in a JIT 
partnership, the proposed models determine the optimal order quantity, shipping 
quantity, number o f deliveries and safety stock for the buyer and the supplier 
individually as well as jointly under different scenarios. In each situation, we 
consider three typical cases in our managerial analysis which are: supplier’s 
dominance where he chooses large production lot sizes and shipment sizes; buyer’s 
dominance where he chooses frequent shipments of small size; the case where the 
buyer and supplier have equal power in negotiation. In each case, the study compares
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the optimal ordering policy o f the dominating party to the joint optimal ordering 
policy and provides a quantitative tool for negotiation between the parties. The 
savings and losses for each party are computed and analyzed providing the 
quantitative support for negotiation, compromise, and compensation.
One of the major problems associated with JIT models that are developed is 
the lack o f  the appropriate cost data to quantify the costs and benefits o f 
implementing a JIT partnership. To provide accounting data for evaluating the costs 
and benefits o f JIT partnership, in the study specify we the cost activities, cost 
drivers and traceable costs o f the buyer and supplier using an Activity Based Costing 
System (ABC). We explore the costs and benefits that are experienced through the 
exchange o f information between the buyer and the supplier in a JIT environment.
1.10 Organization o f  the Dissertation
The study consists o f six chapters: Chapter 1 is an introduction, discussing 
the purpose of the study and the basic managerial problems. Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature on the relationship between buyers and suppliers in a JIT 
environment including the EDI and the ABC literature. In Chapter 3, quantitative 
models are presented that extend the results o f deterministic and safety stock models 
found in the literature. We quantify the major costs and benefits resulting from 
entering a JIT partnership. The models are presented from the buyer’s and supplier’s 
perspective and the joint benefits of a partnership are quantified. Chapter 4 presents 
numerical solutions, examples, and sensitivity analysis followed by a managerial 
analysis o f the JIT partnership in different situations. The results of numerical 
investigations on the effect o f different factors, estimation errors, and the tendencies
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in a JIT partnership are then summarized. Chapter 5 examines the impact of ABC 
and EDI on JIT models through the cost parameters. We show how critical the 
assumptions o f a cost accounting system are to the formulation o f JIT partnership 
models. The study examines how the impact o f JIT on these activities can be 
evaluated based on ABC. To provide accounting data, the study specifies the cost 
activities, cost drivers and traceable costs o f the buyer and supplier. The study 
further examines the case where the buyer and supplier are in a cooperative 
relationship with JIT deliveries and an EDI or internet connection. Chapter 6 offers 
concluding remarks and discusses the limitations and future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the potential costs and benefits o f buyer- 
supplier relationships from a qualitative managerial point o f view. This chapter 
reviews the literature on JIT partnerships and other related subjects such as ABC and 
EDI. The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 1, reviews the descriptive 
and survey-based literature on JIT partnerships. Section 2 deals with quantitative 
papers related to JIT Partnerships under different situations. The results of 
cooperative buyer-supplier models toward JIT are summarized in Table 2.1. The 
reviews o f  ABC and EDI literature related to JIT are presented in Section 3 and 4 
respectively. Finally, Section 5 provides some comments on the available literature 
on JIT partnership and suggests research opportunities.
2.2 Review o f  Descriptive and Survey Based Literature in JIT 
Partnership
Many papers discuss the costs, benefits and implementation o f JIT 
Partnerships. Such as Champan and Carter (1990), Sriram (1990), Primose (1992). In 
a study (Ellarm, 1995) that surveyed more that 300 Fortune 500 firm’s purchasing 
organizations found the main reasons that buyers and suppliers enter into JIT 
partnerships from each one’s perspective and ranked them. She found that price/total 
cost was the key driver for buyers to form partnerships. However, suppliers appear 
not to be as concerned with the price received as they are with having reliable 
demand, influence on the customer's quality, improving JIT, and obtaining better 
requirements forecasts. Billesbach, Harrison, and Croom-Morgan (1991) compare
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JIT Purchasing activities in the U.S. and the U.K., whereas, Giunipero and Keiser 
(1987) compare JIT in manufacturing and non-manufacturing environments with the 
use o f a case study.
Ramaparu, Mehra and Frolick (1995) summarized the general results o f this 
type o f  research in an overview of 105 in JIT adoption studies, in which all o f the 25 
empirical papers listed were surveyed studies. The general results from the review of 
these studies are that the successful JIT implementation factors included buyer- 
supplier partnerships, management commitment, and production strategies.
2.3 Review o f the Quantitative Literature
Most of the models that quantify the benefits o f buyer-supplier cooperation 
use the basic Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) relationship as a foundation for 
model building. This section will review three scenarios: first, the cooperative 
models without JIT partnership; second, JIT partnership models that considers only 
the deterministic situation; finally, JIT models that extend the deterministic case by 
incorporating the safety stock into the model.
2.3.1 Cooperative Models Without JIT Partnership
In traditional buyer-supplier relationships, buyers periodically send orders to 
suppliers. Buyers may order their economic order quantity (EOQ), which balances a 
buyer's inventory holding costs with its ordering costs. When the buyer's ordering 
cost is low, implementing an EOQ solution will result in frequent orders o f small 
quantities. Suppliers, on the other hand, face a different economic balance. They 
must balance setup costs and the cost of holding finished goods to meet the buyer's 
demand. When suppliers' setup costs are high, an economic balance would call for
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large production runs. If the buyer is the more powerful partner, the supplier holds 
excess inventory or does many setups to satisfy the buyer's orders. If the supplier is 
the more powerful partner, the buyer will be forced to place larger orders and 
therefore hold more inventories.
Goyal (1976) combines the buyer and supplier inventory costs and he 
formulates a joint model to reflect the combined costs of the two parties. The model 
finds order placement interval for the buyer, which minimizes the joint variable cost 
per unit time. Goyal shows that, in isolation, partners will minimize their own 
individual variable costs. The sum of the variable costs in these independent plans is 
higher than the sum of the variable costs in the joint solution.
Banerjee (1986a) develops a joint economic lot size (JELS) model. His paper 
discusses a buyer supplier relationship, where the order quantity is the one that results 
in lower joint costs. This joint model is a combination of the two parties' EOQ 
models. Depending on which party received the cost benefit when optimizing through 
price reductions by the supplier or through price incentives established by the buyer. 
Banerjee proves that the JELS solution results in a lower system-wide cost than either 
individual optimal solution. In another paper, Banerjee (1986b) studies the pricing 
decision of a supplier interested in obtaining a specific profit on its product. If the 
supplier wishes to meet a given profit goal, it must set a price that encourages the 
buyer to place orders of the proper size. Again, this model is based on an EOQ 
formulation. However, this model requires the supplier to estimate accurately the 
buyer's holding and ordering costs, and these costs must be known to set the 
appropriate price. The model ignores the joint benefit issues that occurred from the
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cooperative relationship; it only specifies a supplier's strategy to reach a particular 
profit from a given buyer. Also, the model does not include shipping cost hence, it 
assumes to be constant.
Goyal (1988) provides a more general joint economic-lot size model than the 
one presented in Banerjee (1986a). He allows that the producer could produce in lot 
sizes o f nQ, where Q is the buyer's order quantity and n is an integer. The model is 
shown to provide a lower or equal joint total relevant cost as compared to the model 
o f  Banerjee. Once again, one o f the major limitations o f this model is the assumption 
o f deterministic demand and lead times, where as in real life, both of them are 
random variables.
Some attempts have been made to establish a link between EOQ models and 
the JIT philosophy. D’ouville et al. (1992) develop an economic production quantity 
(EPQ) model. Their model is based on the premise that the production rate and 
production run length (replenishment time) can be determined by the vendor and that 
the manufacturing lot size is simply the product o f the production rate and the 
replenishment time. Instead of the usual choice o f a production quantity size, the 
vendor can choose the production rate and the length o f the production run 
independently. This model shows that the total holding cost goes to zero as the 
production rate approaches the demand rate and the replenishment time becomes 
longer. Under the D'ouville et al model, the buyer experiences JIT, but the supplier is 
dedicated solely to meeting the buyer's demands.
Goyal and Golpalakrishnann ,(1993) criticize the D'ouville et al. (1992) 
paper. They show that controlling the production rate and the production run length
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was not the way to reduce the lot size. In fact, the supplier should control the 
production rate and lot size in order to institute a JIT setting with the EPQ model. 
The production run should not be treated as an independent variable, as in D'ouville 
et al. (1992), because run length is determined by lot size and the production rate. 
The authors develop a model providing the optimal production rate given different 
cost ratios. From the optimal production rate, the optimal lot size can be determined.
2.3.2 JIT Partnership Models under a Deterministic Environment
There are few quantitative JIT purchasing models available in the literature. 
Pan and Laio (1989) develop a single EOQ type model for a JIT delivery system. In 
a traditional EOQ model, it is assumed that the demand rate is known and constant, 
the unit cost is independent o f the order size, there is a constant rate o f items from 
inventory, and orders are received instantaneously. In order to determine the optimal 
order quantity, the sum of the ordering and holding costs are minimized. Pan and 
Liao extend this model, to the situation where the order is split into equal parts. It is 
assumed that there is a long-term partnership between the buyer and supplier, and 
that the number of deliveries does not affect the ordering cost.
Ramasesh (1990) extends this model by adding a shipping cost to the total 
relevant cost and suggests that it “will enable us to achieve savings in cost and 
motivate our move toward the ultimate form of JIT purchasing.” These models 
consider multiple deliveries o f an order, but they only consider the purchaser’s costs 
and no co-operation, which should be emphasized in JIT purchasing.
Golhar and Sarker (1992), develop an inventoiy model from the supplier's 
point o f view. Their model considers inventory both on the raw material side and on
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the finished goods side. The model is unique in the sense that it looks at shipment 
size, the number o f shipments during the inventory cycle, and the number of 
shipments during the production run. Two different solutions are given: one where 
the length o f the production run and the cycle time are integer multiples o f the time 
between shipments, and a second where the time between shipments is not 
synchronous with the production run length or cycle length. Shipment cost was not 
considered in the model, therefore, their results indicate that the inventory costs of 
the company decrease linearly with shipment size. Sensitivity analysis shows 
reductions in setup costs and holding costs result in nonlinear fractional savings in 
total costs. Therefore, potential investments in new processes and technologies to 
reduce either setup or holding cost can be evaluated by calculating the corresponding 
expected percentage decrease in total costs.
Aderohunmu et al. (1995) examines a JIT co-operative batching policy with 
an open exchange of information between the buyer and the supplier. Banerjee and 
Kim (1995) include the raw material supply in the producer’s and buyer’s total cost 
in an integrated co-operation model. Their model assumes that the demand rate, 
production rate, and delivery time is constant and deterministic.
Fazel (1997) formulates a mathematical model that compares the annual cost 
of inventory for JIT and EOQ purchasing. The model establishes an upper limit for 
the purchase price o f any item under JIT, above which JIT will be more costly than 
EOQ. The idea is that, the determination o f price level provides a basic ground for 
negotiation between buyer and supplier.
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Kelle and Miller (1998a) provide a JIT joint economic order quantity model 
that can help in quantifying the compensation level in the negotiation process. The 
proposed model minimizes the sum of the total relevant costs for the buyer and the 
supplier, as a compromise in contract negotiation. I f  the supplier and buyer are 
equally strong, the joint order quantity can be used as compromise. When we have 
unbalanced power between parties, the weaker party can encourage the other party to 
agree to the joint optimal order quantity by offering compensation for the loss he will 
incur. These models consider only the deterministic situation, which is unrealistic, 
especially during the transition to JIT.
Seung and Dac (1998) develop an integrated JIT lot-splitting model that 
determines the optimal order and shipping quantities over a finite-planning horizon. 
There model focused on the integrated total relevant costs of both buyer and supplier 
and shown that the policy o f frequent shipment in small lot size result in less total 
cost than single shipment policy. Similar to Kelle and Miller (1998a) the model was 
limited to a relatively simple JIT environment, single buyer single supplier, under 
deterministic conditions for single product.
2.3.3 JIT Partnership Models under an Uncertain Environment
There are very few quantitative JIT purchasing models available in the 
literature that considers random demand and random lead-time with multiple 
deliveries because o f the difficulty in developing mathematically tractable models. 
Kelle (1984) provides models to find the minimum safety stock for a prescribed 
service level where the multiple delivery times are random and the demand is 
deterministic. Kelle and Schneider (1992) extend the above results to model the
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multi-stage production process. They approximate the minimum work-in-process 
inventory target level needed to provide a prescribed service level. Chapman (1992) 
presents a procedure for the effective use o f inventory in a risk-averse JIT 
implementations and for systematic process improvements to allow moving toward 
the “ideal” JIT environment. The procedure described allows a manufacturing firm 
to pursue the highly beneficial continual process improvement associated with JIT 
but allows that activity to occur without the customer-service or processing -  
interruption risks associated with the identification of the process problem in a JIT 
setting. Pagell et al (1998) present three case studies o f companies in the same 
studies to validate the relationship between uncertainty, flexibility and safety stock in 
the context of JIT environment. The results indicate the complex interdependency o f 
the various factors involved. Using an EOQ-based model, Natarajan and Goyal 
(1994) concluded that safety stocks are still necessary under JIT. This result is 
derived from the fact that JIT Purchasing increases the number of orders placed per 
period and thus the number o f possible stockouts increases. The authors concluded 
that organizations might need to consider safety stock levels as lot sizes fall under a 
JIT system. Kelle and Miller (1998b) extend the deterministic JIT buyer-supplier 
model by incorporating the safety stock expression as given in Kelle (1984) into the 
joint total relevant cost. Three models were presented considering random delay in 
shipment, random yield and random demand rate. The first model assumed that the 
optimal safety stock depends on the decision about the order quantity and number o f 
shipment. Thus, in calculating the optimal quantity (Q) and number o f shipment (n), 
the safety stock must be considered also. The authors extended the first model by
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considering the case where we have delay in delivery. Quality problem can also 
arise. This model based on the assumption that the effective quantity may be reduced 
because of defective items that cannot be used. The first two models presented in 
Kelle and Miller (1998b) have assumed that the demand rate is deterministic. The 
authors present and extension to the second model where this assumption is relaxed 
to assume that the demand rate is random at the time of the contact. These models 
will be discussed and analyzed in detail in Chapter 3.
2.4 Review o f ABC Literature Related to JIT Partnership
The Concept of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) has been prevalent in 
accounting journals since the late 1980s when it was defined and popularized. Since 
then, hundreds of articles have been written on the subject, mostly in business 
journals, the majority of them being either of a descriptive nature or case studies. 
Relatively few articles have explored the implications o f ABC on areas outside 
product costing and process improvement and even fewer have ventured outside the 
field of accounting to look at the effect o f  ABC on Operations Management models.
In the early 1980s articles began to appear in the literature highlighting the 
problems with the traditional product costing and formalizing the concept o f ABC. 
Miller and Vollman (1985) describe a “ hidden factory” that incurs overhead costs 
that are not controlled by the cost accounting system. They suggested using a driver 
other than volume to allocate overhead. Brimson (1986) noted that most accounting 
systems did not provide the information necessary to manage automated 
manufacturing systems and Seed (1984) described changes needed in cost
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Table 2.1
Models for Buyer-Supplier Cooperation Toward JIT
References Findings
Goyal 1976 An order placement interval for the buyer to 
minimize joint variable costs per unit time
Kelle 1984 A minimum safety stock for a prescribed service 
level where the multiple delivery times are random 
and the demand is deterministic.
Banerjee 1986a A joint economic order quantity between the buyer 
and supplier
Banerjee 1986b A price at which the buyer purchases the supplier's 
EOQ
Goyal 1988 A modified version of a joint economic lot-size 
model that allows the producer to produce in lot 
sizes o f nQ instead o f lot-for lot bases.
PanandLaio, 1989 Develop a single EOQ type model for a JIT delivery 
system
Ramasesh, 1990 Extend Pan and Laio (1989) by adding the shipping 
cost to the total relevant cost.
D'ouville, Willis, and Huston 
1992
An optimal production rate and run length for the 
supplier to meet a JIT schedule
Kelle and Schneider 1992 Extend Kelle (1984) results to model the multi-stage 
production process. They approximate the minimum 
work-in-process inventory target level needed to 
provide a prescribed service level
Golhar and Sarker 1992 An optimal finished goods batch size for the supplier 
given raw material and the finished goods inventory 
costs, ra te , and the shipment size
Goyal and Golpalakrishnan 1993 Optimal production rate and lot size for the supplier 
to meet a JIT schedule.
Natarajan and G oyal, 1994 Provide the legitimate reasons for holding a safety 
stock under JIT environment.
Aderohunmu, Mobolurin and 
Bryson 1995
Examine a JIT co-operative batching policy with an 
open exchange information between the buyer and 
the supplier
Banejrjee and Kim 1995 Integrated cooperation models that include the raw 
material supply in the manufacturer's and buyer's 
total cost.
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Table 2.1 (Contd.)
Models for Buyer-Supplier Cooperation Toward JIT
Fazel 1997 A mathematical model has been developed 
to compare the annual cost o f inventory for 
JIT and EOQ purchasing
Kim and Ha, 1998 Develop as integrated JIT lot-splitting 
model over a finite-planning horizon.
Miller and Kelle 1998 A JIT joint economic order quantity model 
has been presented that quantifies the 
compensation level in the negotiation 
process.
Pegell et al 1998 Validate the relationship between 
uncertainty, flexibility and safety stock in 
the context of JIT environment.
Kelle and Miller 1998 Incorporating a safety stock into 
deterministic JIT buyer-supplier models.
accounting systems in order to provide more reliable product cost information in
advanced manufacturing environments.
Cooper and Kaplen (1988a) discuss the distortion o f product costs by the 
traditional cost accounting systems used by several manufacturing firms (this paper 
is based on information gained from studying more than 20 firms). Mecimore and 
Bell (1995) describe the evolution o f ABC from a product-costing focus to a process 
and business unit focus and eventually to a company-wide focus. Hardy and Hubbard 
(1992) contrasts traditional cost accounting with ABC, discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of both systems, while Bonsack (1991) shows that standard costing and 
ABC are compatible.
Needy and Malzahn (1993) use simulation models to identify the conditions 
under which strategic decisions and resulting performance are differ for traditional 
cost accounting and ABC. Babad and Balachandran (1993) provide an optimization 
model that balances savings in information processing costs with loss o f accuracy.
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In recent years numerous case studies have been published describing the 
implementation and impact o f ABC on organizations: Mays and Sweeny (1994), 
Mangan (1995) and Bharara and Lee (1996). Cooper (1991) describes a seven-step 
plan for implementing ABC systems and Sherman (1994) suggests a method to 
identify activities and drivers for ABC implementation. Except in the material 
management area, some authors have written articles describing ABC and its use in 
different areas o f management. Pirrong (1993) describes the use o f ABC in service 
industries. Lawson (1994) studies the use o f ABC in hospitals. Roth and Sims (1991) 
apply ABC to warehousing and distribution; Lewis (1991) applies it to marketing.
2.5 Review o f EDI Literature Related to JIT Partnership
One of the main tools that facilitate to work under the environment of JIT 
partnerships is Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). It can be defined as " the inter- 
organizational, computer-to-computer exchange o f business documentation in 
standard, machine processable format (Emmelhainz, 1993). The research on EDI and 
JIT can be divided into two broad categories: 1) descriptive in nature where they 
address the importance of sharing information between a buyer and supplier utilizing 
EDI; 2) research based on management survey data, where they address the costs and 
benefits o f implementing EDI. In this section, I review studies o f both types.
Many researchers consistently recommend various aspects o f communication 
for successful JIT partnerships ( Coyle, Badri, and Langley, 1996, Carter and Ferrin, 
1995). These include open and frequent sharing of information, sharing o f sensitive 
and confidential information, and information concerning the supplier’s production 
related issues. Others (Bowersox et al. 1989,La Londe and Cooper 1989) have
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suggested that state o f the art management information systems and information 
technology applications to JIT partnership functions are vital to a firm’s success. 
More specifically, EDI has the potential to significantly enhance a firm’s 
competitiveness.
Wang and Seidmann, (1995) state the benefits o f EDI, which include: 
reductions in paperwork, personnel, inventory costs, and order lead-time. Anvari, 
(1992) concludes that, although the initial investment in such a system is large, the 
long-term cost savings and reduced planning complexities will ultimately offset the 
expense. Wang and Seidmann (1995) show that when the benefits the buyer 
experiences from the installation o f EDI systems are high, it is in the buyer’s interest 
to subsidize the supplier’s adoption of an EDI system.
Newman (1988) argues that the sharing o f information with suppliers should 
be the same, as it would be shared internally, because suppliers are regarded as an 
extension o f the JIT manufacturer’s operation. Discussions and sharing information 
in the areas o f  delivery schedule, usage o f purchased parts, quality, design, 
production process, and production activities are essential for JIT working 
partnerships. In this way, suppliers are able to coordinate their production planning 
processes with JIT manufacturers. Mohr and Spekman, (1994) state that “By sharing 
information and being knowledgeable about each other’s business, partners are able 
to act independently in maintaining the relationship over time”. In fact, information 
sharing between buyers and suppliers is important to develop and maintain trust. 
Sharing this type o f information requires trust between the firms. Mohr and Nevin, 
(1990) found if distrust or conflict is present; the open communication might convey
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coercive power, which leads to a deleterious relationship. Empirical studies have 
shown that poor communication and feedback is one of the most important barriers 
in JIT working partnerships, and many JIT implementation problems can be 
overcome by improving communication between JIT suppliers and buyers (Celley et 
al., 1987; Lascelles and Dale, 1989).
2.6 Research Opportunities in the Existing Models
In general, most o f the research relating to the buyer-supplier JIT partnership 
has been focused in two directions. The first direction is descriptive in nature, 
concerning with the perception o f buyers and/or suppliers. The second direction of 
research has focused on quantifying the benefits and cost savings that would result in 
a partnership. Most o f the models that quantify the benefits of buyer-supplier 
cooperation use the basic Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) relationship as a 
foundation for model building. [For example, (Goyal, 1976 and 1988), (Banerjee, 
1986), (Joglekar, 1988),(D'ouville et al_ 1992), (Golher and Sarker, 1992), (Goyal 
and Golpalakrishnann, 1993), (Banerjee and Kim, 1995), (Fazel, 1997), and (Miller 
and Kelle , 1998) ].
All o f the proposed models published in the literature have addressed two 
scenarios. The first scenario is where the order quantity (Qb) is equal the production 
lot size (Qs). More specifically, the number o f shipments per order (n) equals the 
number of shipments per production lot size (m). In the second scenario, the 
shipment size (qe) is equal the production lot size (Qs). In other words, m=l. No one 
has addressed the case where the number o f shipments per order buyer’s order 
quantity is different from the number o f shipments per supplier’s production lot size,
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hence m >l. This new extension is more realistic and it can provide more flexibility 
in choosing the appropriate lot size for the supplier. We expect that it can result in a 
overall cost savings.
Another shortcoming of the previously published models that quantify the 
buyer’s and supplier’s JIT partnership is the assumption of deterministic demand and 
lead times. There is always uncertainty in the customer’s demand, but flexible 
resources and short production and supply lead times enable the required service 
level to be met in this case without holding safety stocks. In practice, however, the 
appropriate flexibility and capacity are not available or is too expensive. Therefore, 
either the buyer or the supplier has to hold safety stock to provide the appropriate 
customer service level. Only the case where the buyer is holding safety stock was 
examined (Kelle and Miller, 1998). All other models fail to consider an 
approximation for a safety stock that is necessary to ensure the required service level 
of supply. No research thus far provides a model for the case when the supplier is 
responsible for holding safety stock to provide the service level required by JIT 
partnership.
Another major problem associated with JIT models previously developed is 
the lack o f cost data needed to quantify the costs and benefits o f implementing JIT 
partnership. Several authors discuss the advantages of Activity Based Costing (ABC) 
over traditional accounting. The main issue that has been revealed from previous 
research is that ABC can satisfy the data requirement o f the quantitative models. To 
the best o f my knowledge, no research thus far examines the impact o f ABC on JIT
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models. In particular, no literature is available that would specify the cost activities, 
cost drivers and traceable costs of the buyer and supplier under JIT partnership.
Most o f the previous models consider only the cost o f manufacturing setup, 
inventory holding, and ordering, however, transaction costs especially ordering costs 
will change after establishing partnerships. The use o f an EDI or internet connection 
can dramatically reduce the time and costs involved in placing orders and making 
payments. Therefore, once the partnership is functioning, the ordering costs for the 
buyer (other than shipping costs), would be close to zero. Inventory holding costs 
could be reduced because fewer inventory items will be in the system. Lower levels 
o f inventory may also mean less scrap and rework, fewer inspections, less 
obsolescence, improved inventory control and management. This would result in 
more flexibility and quality improvement and other improvements. Therefore, from 
practitioner’s point o f view, realistic quantitative models should consider the 
synergies resulting from cooperative relationships under a JIT environment.
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CHAPTER 3 
MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
3.1 Introduction
JIT philosophy calls for small delivery quantities, which arrive on time, with the
quantity and quality required. For JIT to be effective there should be a cooperative
relationship between the buyer and the supplier. They should work together to enhance
both their positions. There are few quantitative JIT models available in the literature. All
of these models are based on economic order quantity type models, which are adjusted
for multiple deliveries or consider the cooperation between the two parties. For example
(Pan and Liao, 1989), (Ramasesh, 1990), (Golhar and Sarker, 1992), (Aderohunmu et al.,
1995), (Banerjee and Kim, 1995), (Kim and Ha, 1998), and (Miller and Kelle, 1998).
The study extends the above results for different JIT scenarios. A new model is
constructed considering a deterministic JIT environment (Model 2, described in Section
3.4.2) as an extension to Miller and Kelle (1998) model. We assume that the buyer’s
order quantity, Qb, is delivered in n shipments o f size q = Qe/n. The supplier’s
production lot size can also be an integer multiple of the shipment size , Qs = mq , and m
can be different from n . Only the cases o f m=l and m = n were examined previously in
the literature. We expect that this new extension can result in substantial cost savings by
allowing more flexibility for the supplier to choose the appropriate production lot sizes.
The proposed model determines the optimal values o f the three decision variables, the
shipment size ,q, the number of shipments of an order n, and number o f shipments per
production lot size ,m.
Under these assumptions, ideally, the buyer and supplier operate in a
deterministic environment, so therefore, neither the buyer nor the supplier has to hold
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safety stock. There is always uncertainty in the customer’s demand, but flexible 
resources and short production and supply lead times enable the required service level to 
be met in the case o f  perfect JIT supply without holding safety stock. Usually in practice, 
however, the appropriate flexibility and capacity are not available or are too expensive to 
maintain. We call this stage the time o f transition to JIT supply where safety stock must 
be held to provide the appropriate service level.
We extend the deterministic JIT approach by incorporating into the model the 
safety stock expression in Kelle (1984) and Kelle and Schneider (1992) into the joint 
total relevant cost and thus derive the optimal order quantity and number o f shipments 
under different scenarios. The study considers the situation when the supplier is not 
reliable, or is unable to provide small, frequent deliveries on time with established 
quantity or quality levels. The study incorporates the safety stock into the model under 
the situation o f "not quite JIT" where the buyer and supplier are in transition to JIT 
supply and either the buyer or the supplier holds a safety stock. Only the case where the 
buyer is holding safety stock was examined previously by (Kelle and Miller, 1998). We 
provide a new case where the supplier is holding safety- stock under transition to JIT 
(Model 4, described in Section 3.4.3). In the spirit o f JIT, the study finds the minimum 
safety stock needed in order to protect against shortages that may be caused by delivery 
delays. The safety stock that is required to provide the appropriate customer service level 
depends on the number of shipments and the shipment size. The proposed models jointly 
determine the optimal values o f the four decision variables: the order quantity, the 
shipment size, the number o f shipments and the safety stock.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In Section 2, first, we addresses the optimal ordering and shipment policy of the 
buyer and the cost savings achieved by receiving JIT supply. Then, we apply the results 
o f Miller and Kelle (1998) for the case when the buyer has to hold some safety stock to 
ensure an appropriate service level for its customers. In Section 3, we deal with the 
optimal production policy of the supplier and quantify the supplier’s advantages and 
costs o f a JIT delivery requirement promised by the supplier to the buyer. Next, we 
examine the effect o f decreasing uncertainty on the cost of the supplier through focusing 
on the production related costs. Finally, we provide a new model for the case when the 
supplier holds safety stock to ensure timely delivery to the buyer according to the JIT 
supply contract. Section 4, provides the joint optimal ordering, production, and shipping 
policy that minimizes the total relevant costs o f the two parties involved. The four 
models presented here consider four different scenarios.
3.2 Quantifying the Costs and Benefits o f  the Buyer Adopting JIT Supply 
Two models are presented in this section each representing a different approach 
to quantifying the costs and benefits o f the buyer adopting JIT supply. The first one uses 
the deterministic approach as a foundation for model building. The second model 
incorporates safety stock held by the buyer.
3.2.1 Deterministic Model for the Buyer’s Optimal JIT Policy
The buyer’s major quantifiable benefit from JIT delivery is the low inventory 
level that results in savings in inventory holding cost and increased flexibility as a result 
o f receiving small-lot shipments. Additional benefits include less spoilage, less 
obsolescence, and other factors that are difficult to quantify, but can be considered as a 
part o f the holding cost factor. On the other hand, the buyer may realize an increase in
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receiving cost o f shipments due to more frequent deliveries. This includes all the costs 
that are associated with small lot shipment such as (a) freight, (b) sampling/quality 
control, and (c) receiving, handling and storage under the umbrella o f receiving costs. 
Also, a loss o f discount rates may be incurred.
Our goal is to quantify the above savings and extra costs for the buyer. First, we 
extend the traditional economic order quantity model (EOQ) for JIT systems that 
consider a known, constant demand rate for a product. The total relevant cost for the 
buyer is expressed as the total cost o f ordering and holding inventory as given by 
Baneijee (1986a). The difference is that this model is adjusted for multiple deliveries of 
an order, which is typical for JIT, a shipping cost has been added as in Ramasash (1990). 
Also, we add a new cost parameter that will consider the managerial concern o f having 
an ordering quantity, which is too large. The new cost parameter will be discussed later 
in this section.
The following assumptions and notation for the buyer are proposed:
Bl). The demand for the product is known and
D: denotes the expected annual demand o f the product considered.
B2). The buyer can decide the following two quantities:
the order size Qb, (or contract quantity), that is delivered in small shipments, and 
n: the number of shipments o f an order during a contract period.
To simplify the quantitative analysis, we assume that the delivery quantities are 
the same size, q = Qa/n.
B3). The following cost factors are used in the quantitative model:
Cb: purchasing cost o f a unit of the considered product for the buyer,
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Ab: total fixed cost o f a purchase order,
rB: inventory holding cost factor, the proportion o f dollar value o f the stock of the 
buyer,
Zb: receiving cost per shipment for the buyer.
With the above notation, the annual ordering cost for the buyer can be expressed 
in the usual way by
COb = Ab (D/Qb) (1)
The annual receiving cost for the buyer is
CRb = Zb (D/Qb). (2)
This cost consideration makes traditional large orders and shipments economical, 
but it may result in very large holding costs. The inventory holding cost of the cycle 
stock can be expressed by
CHB=rBCB(QB/2). (3)
Therefore, the total relevant cost for the buyer is
TRCb(Qb) = Ab (D/Qb) + ZB (D/QB) + rB CB (Qa/2) (4)
This model considers only a single delivery for each order. Implementing JIT, 
which involves n deliveries of an order, the total inventory cost is
TRCb (Qe,n) = AB (D/QB) + rB CB (QB/2n) +  ZB (nD/QB) (5)
There is a significant reduction in inventory holding cost, which results from 
implementing JIT. The cost saving in inventory holding can be expressed as
ACHB(inventory) = [rB CB (Qb/2)] - [rB CB (QB/2n)] = rB CB Qb (n-1 )/(2n) (6)
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Assuming that the buyer will pay at least a part o f the shipping and receiving 
cost, the buyer will recognize a significant increase in this cost due to multiple deliveries. 
The cost increase in receiving and shipm ent can be expressed as
ACRb = [ZB (nD/Qe) ] - [ ZB (D/Qb)] = Zb D (n-l)/QB (7)
The total relevant cost of the buyer expressed in (5) can be rewritten in the
form:
Xjri)
Qs
TRCB{QB,n) = - ^ + QBY{n) (8)
with notation
X(n) = D (AB+ZBn) (9)
Y(n)=^£*  (10)
2 n
For a given n, the optimal value o f Q b can be expressed, by taking the derivative 
o f the cost function (8) with respect to Q b , and setting it equal to zero, yielding the 
following expression
^ (w)=a / ¥ t  = l2”D(AB+Zsn)~ ( i i )
V Y(n) V r BCB
To find the optimal n, we can substitute QbO1)  in the cost function (8), providing the 
buyer's annual relevant cost as a function of n.
TRCB(n)=2J (X  (ri)Y(N)) = (12)
V 2 n
This is equivalent to finding the n, which minimizes
[TRCB (,n)} = 2DABrBCB+2DZBrBCB (13)
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Ignoring the terms which are independent of n, one can reduce the minimization 
problem to that o f minimizing 
2 DABrB(C B +LB
n
From the expression above, it can be seen that the optimal n for the buyer is 
infinity. It shows that Q b also approaches infinity as n goes to infinity. This result is not 
surprising, since the cost model (5) results in a lower cost as the order quantity, Q b , 
increases and the shipment quantity, q=QB/n, remains unchanged. The annual ordering 
cost is decreased, but the receiving and inventory holding cost are unchanged. This result 
has not yet been published in the quantitative literature, however, it supports the 
tendency in practice, o f having very long purchase order contracts in JIT supply 
agreements to save on ordering costs without increasing the holding costs. The cost 
improvement is marginally decreasing as the order quantity increases. For the order 
quantity, there is a reasonable, managerial limit where the loss o f flexibility, and 
concerns o f product changes and long commitments outweigh the annual ordering cost 
decrease. Therefore, we introduce a new cost parameter that will consider the managerial 
concern o f having an order quantity Qb which is too large. We assume that the part o f the 
order quantity that is not delivered to the buyers is a commitment that must be bought in 
the future. This commitment results in a loss o f flexibility for changes in the order 
quantity. Although, it is a small disadvantage compared to the saving in inventory 
holding cost, still, it is important if  very long commitments are considered. For the sake 
of simplicity, a linear approximation for the pattern o f Lb has been used in the model. 
We propose the following new cost parameter:
B4). Lb : additional cost o f losing flexibility per unit ordered but not delivered.
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The annual additional cost of losing flexibility is
CLb = LbCb(Q b/2) (15)
Since the rate o f Qs/n = q is the shipment size, we can deal with the optimal 
shipment size. The new total relevant cost o f the buyer, including L b , can be
TRC(q,ri)=— AB + r- ^ + - Z B+ ^ £ ^  (16)
nq 2 q 2
expressed as a function of the shipment size q
It can be expressed, similar to (8), in the form
T R C (q ,r i )= ^  + qy(n) (17)
<1
With notation
r a \
x(ri)=D A r _— +zB
\  n J
(18)
y ( p )  = r B f ' A ± L BC j l  (19)
Similar to (11), for a given n, the optimal value o f the shipment size, q, can 
expressed as
2D (A
\
^ + Z B
^ > ) = J i T T = V e r r  (20)I y(f*) | f  BCB + LBCBn
This value is well defined for any n value and as n gets extremely large, the term 
As/n diminishes and the shipping cost, Z b , will act as an ordering cost in the traditional 
economic order quantity.
Substituting q (n) in the cost function (18) provides the minimal joint total cost as 
a function o f n
45
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TRC B (n)=2^J x  B(N) y  B(n)) (21)
Relaxing the integer requirement on n, we can find the optimal n by minimizing
min xB(ri),yB(ri) =D Ajjf v gC b Bn
2
r B^ -'B LBC 
2
(22)
which yield
= — +nV+Const, 
n
(23)
with notation
(24)
2
and
y _  DZgLgCg (25)
2
Thus, the optimal number o f deliveries can be found by taking the derivative of 
(23), setting it equal to 0, and expressing n as
This n* is generally not integer. Substituting the two integer values surrounding 
n* into the cost function (5), we can get the best integer value of n that provides the 
overall (global) optimal integer because o f the convexity o f the cost function.
3.2.2 Incorporating Safety Stock at the Buyer
We incorporate safety stock into the model under three situations. First, in a 
traditional buyer supplier relationship (no JIT), the buyer holds finished goods safety 
stock to provide an appropriate customer service level considering the demand 
uncertainty and possible shipment delays. In the second case, when the buyer and 
supplier move toward JIT purchasing, we assume that the vendor tries JIT deliveries but
(26)
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capacity, scheduling, transportation or quality problems may occur. These problems can 
cause material supply shortages and a small amount o f material safety stock is needed to 
protect against possible delays. Third, we present the case where the buyer and supplier 
are operating in JIT agreement. The supplier is responsible for timely shipments and the 
supplier has to hold safety stock to ensure the appropriate delivery under any 
circumstances.
3.2.2.1 Safety Stock in Traditional System (no JIT)
As a result o f the demand uncertainty and possible shipment delays, the buyer 
holds a safety stock to provide an appropriate customer service. We introduce the 
following notation for the quantitative models of safety stocks, in addition to the notation 
o f Section 3.2.1:
a : the required service level, the probability of no stockout
Sb: the quantity of safety stock held at the buyer
K: safety factor that depends on the customer service level, a
L: known constant lead-time of the supply to the buyer
ctd: standard deviation o f daily demand
r: inventory level at which an order is placed (reorder point)
dLD : random variable representing demand during lead-time
Pld: average demand during the lead-time
ctld: standard deviation o f the demand during the lead-time
The reorder point is
r = hld + SB (27)
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We use the common approximation that the demand during the lead-time is 
normally distributed with expected value o f p l d  and standard deviation ctld- Hence, the 
service level a , the probability o f no shortage is
r MLD\= a  (28)P(r>dLD=<p 
which yields
r=K°'LD'*' Mld=S Mdl (29)
with notation
<?r \a )= K  (30)
Where <}> denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution, and (j)'1 denotes its inverse.
For independent daily demand
cr =<t d4 l  (31)LD D
Which is a common approximation for the standard deviation of lead-time 
demand. Based on the above expression, we approximate the safety stock as
SB = K cjld (32)
A common safety stock approximation can be used for the case o f random lead- 
time by incorporating the following additional two parameters 
Pl: average lead-time from the supplier to the buyer,
a t: standard deviation of the lead-time, 
dr: average daily demand.
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The necessary safety stock which provides a service level a  can be approximated, 
assuming independent demand in the subsequent periods of the lead-time, by
S B = K j { MLcrZ+d2rCTl) (33)
In several practical cases, there is an autocorrelated demand that requires the 
autocorrelation coefficients to be included into the model. Estimating the autocorrelation 
coefficients, and handling the more complex expression makes the model analytically 
intractable and so it is not used in most applications.
Under a JIT environment, both the average lead time and the variability o f the 
lead time can be reduced considerably using frequent small shipments. Denoting the 
safety stock under JIT by Sjn, the cost saving in holding safety stock can be expressed 
as
ACHB(safety stock) = [rB CB (SB)] - [rB Cb (Sjit) ]  = tb  C b(Sb-Sjit) (34)
3.2.2.2 Safety Stock under the Transition to JIT
The ultimate goal o f the buyer in JIT is that the supply arrives in small, frequent 
deliveries, on time, according to the request of the buyer. However, many times the 
supplier is unable to deliver frequent shipments on time as a result of capacity, 
transportation problems, machine breakdowns, or production scheduling problems that 
cannot be solved at that time. This situation can be called imperfect coordination, which 
is typical during the transition to JIT.
Kelle and Miller (1998) presented an approximation for the minimum safety 
stock required providing the necessary service level under the situation of having random 
delays in shipments. This approximation will be incorporated into our inventory models.
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The safety stock, required to provide the necessary service level, depends on the 
shipment frequency, among other things. Thus the consideration o f a safety stock 
changes the optimal shipment policy. In the spirit o f JIT, we find the minimum safety 
stock, combined with the best shipment frequency for the buyer.
In order to derive the approximation for the required safety stock, in addition to 
the assumptions B l) to B3) used in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.1, we introduce the following 
assumptions and notation:
B4). The demand has a known average rate, dr. First, we assume that the demand 
follows a uniform pattern. We extend this assumption later to the case where the 
demand rate is changing according to the customer's request which is unknown at 
the time of safety stock planning.
B5). The order quantity, Qb, is delivered in n shipments o f equal size, q = Qe/n in the 
time interval o f the order contract, denoted by (0,T), where T = Qb /dr.
B6). The shipment times are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random 
variables in (0, T), arranged in ascending order tj<  t2< ... <tn. First we assume that 
the shipment times are uniform random variables in (0, T). We extend this 
assumption later to general i.i.d. random variables. The critical assumption is that 
the supplier tries to follow the pattern o f the demand according to the JIT supply 
agreement, but because o f production, capacity, or transportation problems there 
are random disturbances in the shipment times.
Based on the above assumptions, we present the following model described in 
Kelle and Miller (1998) to approximate the situation. Their approximate for safety stock
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will be included in our cost model. First, for known demand rate , dr, the cumulative 
demand in the period (0,t) can be described as
F(t)= drt for 0 < t < T  (35)
The cumulative delivery in period (0,t), is an increasing step function, G„(t), with 
the step size o f the shipments q = QbAi, at n uniformly distributed random delivery times 
ti< t2< .<tn in (0, T). Gn(t) is given by the following expression:
0 if 0 < t< t,
G„(t) = - kq if t* < tk+1, k = l,2 ,...,n  -1 (36)
nq = QB i f t n< t < T
Gn(t) will approach the uniform pattern o f F(t) according to the JIT coordination 
between the supplier and the buyer. The required service level, a , is the probability o f no 
stockout in an order period, and Sb denotes the safety stock that is to be planned at the 
ordering to provide the required service level.
For any t <T, there is no shortage in the time interval (0,t), if the safety stock plus 
cumulative amount delivered in period (0,t) is larger than or equal to the cumulative 
amount o f demand in period (0,t). This inequality must hold in each point o f the period 
[0< t  < T] to insure a continuous supply. With the above assumptions and notation, the 
no shortage requirement is
Sb + Gn(t) > F(t) for each 0 < t < T (37)
So, the service level, the probability o f  no shortage, can be expressed as
P (SB)= Prob [SB + Gn(t) > F(t) f o r O < t < T ]  (38)
Considering that T = Q e/dr, F(t) can be normalized
F(t) = drt = QB t/T = Qb F*(u) with u = t/T (39)
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where F*(u) = u in (0,1), F*(u) = 0 for u<0, and F*(u) = 1 for u >1. Thus F*(u) has the 
same properties as the distribution function o f a random variable U, where U is a 
uniformly distributed on (0,1).
Since q = QB/n, G„(T) can be normalized, similarly as with F(t), in the following
form
Gn(t) = Q b G*n(u) with u = t/T (40)
Where
0 if 0 < u < t , / T = u j ,
G*(u) = >k/n if  t*/T=Uk<u< *k+I = tk+1/T, k = l ,2 , . . . ,n -1 (41)
[ l  if  t n/T = u * < u < l
and u*i< u*2< ....<  u*n can be considered as a random, ordered sample of a uniform 
distribution on (0,1). Thus G*n(u) has the same properties as an empirical distribution 
function o f U, where U is a uniformly distributed on (0,1).
Substituting Sb = QbMb in (38) , we have the equivalent service level expression 
P (Q bM b) =  Prob [Q bM b + Q b Gn*(t/T) > QBF*(t/T), for 0<t<T] (42)
Using the notation u = t/T
Pa (Mb)= Prob (Mb + G*n(u) > F*(u), for 0<u<l) (43)
Finding the safety stock, S b  = Q b M b  , that provides the required service level, a , 
we must solve the following equation for M b
Pa (M b ) =  a  (44)
In expression (34), we have a cumulative distribution function, F*(u), and an
empirical distribution function, G*n(u), o f the same uniform random variable U on (0,1).
The exact distribution, Pa (MB), is expressed by Bimbaum and Tingey (1951).
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Pa(M) = a  = 1 -  £ nM a
rn'
J j
J— M r
n
i +m b -J -  
n j
\ " - j
(45)
Equation (44) can be solved numerically for M using expression (45), but it is a 
tedious procedure for practical application and numerical analysis. Therefore, we want to 
provide a simple approximate expression for Pa (Mb). Based on asymptotic theory of 
empirical distribution functions (Wilks, 1967):
Prob (Vn[F*(u) - G*n(u)] < y, for all 0<u<l} —» l-exp{-2y2}, as n —>oo (46)
The above probability is equivalent to
Prob (F(t) - Gn(t)] < y/Vn, for all 0<t<T} (47)
and it is also equivalent to
Prob {QeF(t) - QsGn(t)] < yQs/Vn, for all 0<t<T} (48)
Using the notation Mb = yQB^/n, we have y = Mb Vn/Qe that can be substituted
in (48) to get the asymptotic relation
P o (M b ) —> l-exp[-2 M b n /QB2 ] as n —> oo (49)
For large n values, we can consider the asymptotic expression (49) as an 
approximation
Pa (Mb ) *  l-exp[-2n (Me 2 /QB2)] (50)
From the service level requirement o f expression (44) using the above 
approximation, we get the following simple approximation for safety stock
2 n
1 -a
(51)
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Expression (51) will be included in formulating the cost function of the buyer in 
Model 3 where described in Section 4.3.3. The above results are derived under the 
assumption that F*(u) is the distribution function and G„*(u) is the empirical distribution 
function of the uniform random variable, U. Since expression (46) and asymptotic 
relation (47) are based on order statistics u*i< u*2 < •••< u*„ (distribution-free statistics) 
the above results are valid for any random variable (Wilks, 1962), not only the uniformly 
distributed U. The only requirement is that F*(u) is the cumulative distribution function 
and Gn*(u) is the empirical distribution function o f the same random variable, U. That 
means F*(u) can be any nondecreasing function in 0<u<l, with the property o f F*(0) = 0 
and F*(l)=l. The pattern of F*(u) defines a random variable U. As long as the random 
shipment times follow the same pattern, the empirical distribution function, Gn*(u) can 
be assumed to belong to the same random variable, U, and the above statements are 
valid.
In the case o f a JIT agreement, -we can assume that the pattern o f the delivery 
follows the pattern of demand: in high-demand periods more frequent deliveries are 
requested, in low-demand periods the buyer requests less frequent deliveries. The 
supplier tries to deliver according to the buyer’s request. Thus, we can consider the 
cumulative demand as the cumulative distribution function and the cumulative delivery 
as the empirical distribution function o f  the same random variable, U. Since we don’t 
need to specify the distribution of U, that means, no specific information of the pattern of 
the variable demand is required. Thus, as an extension of the model, we can assume that 
the demand pattern is not uniform and can even be unknown at the time of safety stock 
planning. This is the main advantage o f the model because, in practice, typically we do
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not know the demand pattern ahead o f time, still as long as coordination exists between 
the buyer and supplier, the assumptions are realistic. This is the case for JIT supply.
The expression (51) shows that the required safety stock will increase as the 
order size, Q b, and service level, a , are increasing. In addition, the required safety stock 
is decreasing with an increase in the number o f shipments, n. This relation shows the 
advantage o f JIT. The asymptotic approximation in (50) and (51) can be very inaccurate 
for small n. The error o f approximations and there correction will be discussed in details 
in the next chapter. We provide a new correction factor where is based on regression 
analysis (described in Section 4.3.2.1)
3.3 Quantifying the Costs and Benefits o f Adopting JIT by the Suppliers
Several studies show that one o f the major motivators for the suppliers to 
implement JIT partnerships is to secure a  reliable market. Long-term contracts guarantee 
business as long as the supplier meets the delivery terms. Also, long-term contracts 
provide greater demand certainty, larger market share, and an incentive to invest in 
product /cost improvement programs over a longer term. Providing a JIT supply means 
additional costs for the vendor. The major sources o f cost increase are the increased 
setup cost, additional inventory holding costs and transportation cost due to the buyer's 
frequent delivery policy.
First, we examine the effect o f decreasing demand uncertainty on the cost o f the 
producer through focusing on the production related costs. We introduce a new model 
that quantifies the advantages and the costs o f  maintaining flexible resources. In the next 
part, we examine additional inventory-related costs o f the supplier. The last section will 
discuss our new model for the supplier’s safety stock, which incorporated into the
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supplier cost model. The previous quantitative models have been failed to deal with 
supplier safety stock under JIT delivery requirement.
3.3.1 Reduction in Production Costs
The relative demand certainty allows the supplier to dedicate a portion o f the 
firm's resources to meet this demand. By doing so, the supplier will benefit by having 
fewer slack resources. This security for the supplier justifies investments that result in 
reduction o f the production and setup cost. First, we examine the effect o f decreasing 
demand uncertainty on the cost o f the producer through focusing on the production 
related costs. To quantify the reduction in production cost, we have the following 
assumptions and notations concerning the supplier.
51). The annual demand consists of two parts:
Dc = the fixed contracted annual demand, and
Dr= random part o f the annual demand, normally distributed with expected value 
p. and standard deviation a.
52). The vendor has dedicated and fixed production resources denoted by 
R<i = annual production capacity o f dedicated production resources,
Rf = annual production capacity o f flexible production resources.
53). We have the notation
P = the annual production quantity (the actual annual volume sold),
We assume that the random part o f the annual demand is normally distributed. 
Thus, the total annual production quantity, P, is also normally distributed with expected 
value,
56
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E (P)=Dc + M, and standard deviation, a . We assume that the dedicated resource is set at 
the level o f expected production, E (P).
S4). The following cost factors are considered,
Vd = unit production cost with dedicated resources,
Vf = unit production cost with flexible resources, 
u = unit cost o f unused dedicated production resources.
We assume that the unit cost with dedicated resources is less than with flexible 
ones. If  the dedicated resources are not used they have extra costs, while unused 
flexible resources can be utilized in other production areas without major 
additional costs.
Our goal is to express
Cp = the expected total unit cost o f production, including unused production 
resource cost.
If the annual production quantity is larger than the amount o f dedicated resources 
(P > Rd), the total cost o f producing P units a year is
v(P) = vd Rd + vf (P - Rd) (52)
If the annual production quantity is larger than the amount o f dedicated resources 
(P < Rd), the total production and unused capacity cost is
v (P) = vd P + u (Rd - P) (53)
We can express the expected unit production cost, Cp , by integrating the unit
production cost function, v (P)/P, according to the normal density function (with
expected value, E(P), and standard deviation, a) .
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( 54)
Where cp denotes the standardized normal density function.
Based on the above simple model, we can express the decrease in the unit cost of 
production depending on the decrease o f demand uncertainty. In other words, we can 
express the savings that can be achieved by decreasing the demand uncertainty through 
buyer-supplier cooperation. This is one part o f the additional wealth generated by the 
cooperation between supplier and buyer. A numerical investigation will be presented and 
the results will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.3.2 Inventory Related Costs
When the supplier is implementing JIT, additional inventory costs are incurred. 
In this section, we examine the additional inventory-related costs of the supplier. These 
are the increase in set-up cost, additional inventory holding cost, and increased shipment 
cost. First, we extend the traditional economic order quantity model (EOQ) for JIT 
systems that consider a known, constant demand rate for a product. The total relevant 
cost for the supplier is expressed as the total cost o f setup and inventory holding costs as 
given by Banerjee (1986a). The difference is that this model is adjusted for multiple 
deliveries o f an order, which is typical for JIT, the supplier’s holding cost is also altered, 
as given by Golhar and Sarker (1992), for a JIT supply system, and a shipping cost has 
been added as in Ramasash (1990).
To quantify these costs, we introduce the following additional assumptions and 
notation for the supplier
S5). We assume that the supplier is producing the item with
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pr = production rate expressed on daily basis and 
Qs = production lot size, 
q = shipment size required
m= the number o f shipments per lot, where (Qs = mq)
S6). The supplier has the following cost factors 
As = setup cost for the supplier (producer), 
rs = inventory holding cost factor ($/$/year),
Cs = variable cost of the finished product for the supplier,
Zs = supplier’s costs related to each shipment to customer.
The annual shipment cost is directly proportional to the annual number of 
shipments, D/q
First, we consider the case where the supplier’s lot size, Qs, is equal to the 
required shipment size, q (the case of m =1). In this case, the total inventory for the 
supplier is calculated in a different way from the buyer. Once the supplier has shipped 
the lot to the buyer the inventory for the supplier becomes zero until the start o f the next 
production run. The average inventory will still be Qs/2, but the supplier will hold that 
inventory for only a fraction, (dr/pr), o f the year. Therefore, the total inventory holding 
cost for the supplier is
Zs (D/q) (55)
The annual setup cost can be expressed as
As (D/Qs) (56)
S (57)
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So the total relevant cost with a single delivery for each order is:
T n r ' — a ^  _  r '  Q  r , rr ^TRC x — A s ~z. ^  s * "  :
2Pr
( 5 8 )
This model considers only a single delivery for each order. The annual setup cost 
can be reduced, if the lot sizes are larger than the shipment sizes. In this case, however, 
additional inventoiy holding cost applies to the finished goods that are not shipped 
instantly. Consider the case whea a large lot size is more economic and it is chosen as an 
integer multiple of the shipment size
Qs = mq (59)
which means the annual number o f setups is m times less than the annual number of 
shipments.
During the implementation o f JIT, which involves multiple deliveries o f the 
orders, the inventory holding cost o f the cycle stock can be expressed by using the 
expression published in Joglekar (1988) as
r vC d . 1 2 d+   - )2 p r m mp r
The total relevant inventory cost for the supplier is
(60)
TRC s (Q s , /m) — A s + rs C s
P r  m  mP  r
+ z, Dm
~q 7
(61)
It can be expressed in the following form (similar to costs expressed in (6))
TR C ,< Q „m )= ^-+ Y(m )Q ,
Qs
(62)
With notation:
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X{m)=D\ - J -+ Z , 
m
Y(m )=^& -[m (pr- d r)+2dr- p r] 
P r
(63)
(64)
For a given m, we can express the optimal value o f Qs, by taking the derivative 
o f the cost function (61) with respect to Q s, and setting it equal to 0, as
l^ ( m )  
Y  (m) 1
2 D p r
m
+ Z ,
rs C s (m -  md r - 1  + 2 d  r )
(65)
To find the optimal m, we can substitute Q*s(m) in the cost function that 
provides the buyer's annual relevant cost as a function of m, where m  is an integer
ri?Q (m )=2V (^(m )r(m ))
2, 2D rs C s (—— + Z S) 
m
m (P r ~ d r ) + 2 d r - p ,  
P r
(66)
If we relax the integer requirement on m, we can approximate the optimal m for 
the supplier by finding the m which minimizes the TRCs(m). This is equivalent to 
finding the m, which minimizes
(TRCS )2 = Min— + Vm + Cont. 
m
where
y  _  2 D f s Y s  ( .P r  ~  d r ) and U =
P r
2DrsCsAs (2dr p r) 
P r
(67)
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Thus, the optimal number o f deliveries can be found by talcing the derivative of 
(67), setting it equal to 0, and expressing m as
Substituting the two integer values surrounding m back into the total cost 
expression (66), we can find the optimal integer m that provides the overall minimum 
cost because of the convexity o f the cost function. For 2dr < pr the equation (68) has no 
real solution. Considering that the cost function is a decreasing function o f m in this 
case, we can conclude from that the optimum is
(68)
m = 1 if 2dr< pr. for Zs >0 (6 9 )
For this case, the optimal production lot size is
(7 0 )
and the optimal total relevant cost is
TRC]= p D Pr(As+Zs)rC sd J Pr (7 1 )
if  2dr < pr-
Similarly, we can find the optimal m, for the case of Zs = 0, by minimizing
DA sCsr j _ 4 . (7 2 )
2 L Pr m mpr
That is equivalent to minimizing
(7 3 )
m
It provides a similar result as in the case where Z s > 0 , that the optimal
m=l for 2dr < pr (74)
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However,
m —» oo for 2dr > pr .(75)
3.3.3 Incorporating Safety Stock at the Supplier
Here we consider the situation, when the supplier relies on keeping a safety stock 
of finished goods on hand to meet the buyer's shipment request, on time, according to the 
JIT delivery agreement. No quantitative models have been published yet dealing with the 
supplier safety stock under JIT delivery requirement. This is typical in the transition state 
to JIT, that the supplier can have capacity, flexibility, quality, or scheduling problems 
preventing the on time delivery. In addition to the same assumptions used in section 
3.2.2.2, we have the following additional assumptions and notation:
S7). The shipment size q = Qe/n and the production lot size Qs = mq (k = n/m). The 
cumulative amount, Hk(t), produced in the interval (0,t), is a non-decreasing 
function o f t for ( 0 < t < T). The setup times are independent identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables arranged in ascending order si< S2<....<Sk. 
The cumulative production, Hk(t), can be expressed as a step function:
S8). The random setup times follow the same distribution, U, as the delivery 
requirements o f the supplier.
As in the buyer’s model earlier, we assume that the cumulative delivery 
requirement to the buyer is an increasing step function, G„(t), described according to 
(29). We assume that G„(t) and Hk(t) have the same pattern, since the pattern of the 
supplier’s
0
H k(t)=- imq
kmq=QB
ifO<t<sx
i f  s < t < s M, i = 1,2, 1
i f  sk <t<T
(76)
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production will approach the pattern o f the delivery requirements o f the buyer according 
to the JIT coordination between the supplier and the buyer.
The required service level a  is the probability o f no stockout in an order period, 
and Ss denotes the safety stock that is to be planned at the beginning o f the contract to 
provide the required service level for the buyer.
There is no shortage in (0,T), if  the safety stock at the supplier plus the 
cumulative amount produced in period (0,t) is larger than or equal to the cumulative 
amount o f supplies required by the supplier up to time t to the buyer. This inequality 
must hold for each t in the period (0, T) to insure a continuous supply.
With the above assumptions and notation, there is no shortage in the buyer’s 
supply if
So, the probability that the supplier does not have a shortage in the contract 
period (0,T) is
Ss +Hk(t) > G„(t) for each 0 < t < T (77)
Pa (Ss) = Prob [Ss +Hk(t) > G„(t) for 0 < t < T] (78)
Substituting Ss = QbMs we have
Pa (QbMs)= Prob (QsHk(t/T) < QbMs + QBGn(t/T) for 0<t<T) (79)
Similarly to the procedure followed in normalizing G*n(t) for the buyer (Section
3.2.2.2), we can normalize Hk(t) in the following form (with u = t/T): 
Hk(t) =  QBH*k(u) (80)
i f  0< w<5,
H*k( u ) = i / k  i f  si/T=u*<u<u+*i=sM/T ,i  = \ ,2 , . . . ,k - l  (81)
1 i f  s k / T=u*k <u< 1
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Where u*i < u * 2  < ... < u*k can be considered as a random, ordered sample of the 
random variable U. To find the safety stock that provides the required service level, a , 
we have to solve the equation
P« (Ms)= Prob (H*k (u) < Ms + G*„ (u) for 0<u<l) = a  (82)
In this form of equation (82), we can see that we have two cumulative sample 
distribution functions, H*k(u), and G*„(u), o f the same random variable U (with sample 
sizes o f k and n).
The exact distribution, Pa (Ms), can be found in Gnedenko (1951), in the case 
when the number o f production batches, m, and the number o f deliveries, n, are equal
Pa(c/n)= 1-
r2n '  
» + l + c  
'2 n \  
n I
(83)
In the case where the number of deliveries n is greater than the number o f 
shipments per lot, k, the exact distribution, Pa (Ms), is found in Koroliuk (1955):
c + 1
p . (c /n )= i-  2  a i ^ E .
sp + s-c - 1 '  k+ n + c-sp —s''
k - s
(c+l) <>s£k ( k+n^  
k
(84)
Expression (83) and (84) can be solved numerically for Ms, but it is a tedious 
procedure in practical applications. Therefore, we want to provide a simple approximate 
expression for Pa (M„). Based on the asymptotic theory o f  empirical distribution 
functions (Smirnov, 1939; Wilks, 1967):
Prob {VMs[Hm(u) - G„(u) > y for all 0<u<l}—>l-exp{-2y2}, if  Ms—»co (85)
For large n values, we can consider the asymptotic expression (85) as an approximation
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From the service level requirement of expression (70) using the above 
approximation, we get the following simple approximation for safety stock
Since Ss = QbMs, from expression (87), we have the following simple 
approximation for the safety stock
Expression (88) will be included in formulating the cost function of the supplier
required safety stock will increase as the order size Q b increases. In addition, the 
required safety stock increases with the decrease in the number o f shipments (n) and the 
customer service level (a). The relative error of the approximation will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.
In the case o f JIT supply agreement, for the same reasons presented previously, 
we can assume that the pattern o f production follows the pattern of delivery requests. 
This way, H*k(u), and G*n(u) can be assumed to be the empirical distribution function 
of the same random variable U, with sample sizes k and n. Pa (M) is an order statistic 
since it is a function o f ordered random variables, u*i< u*2< .. .< u*„ distributed according 
to the same random variable U. Thus, the above results are valid for any distribution, U, 
considered (Wilks 1962). We are not restricted to the uniform distribution.
(87)
(88)
in Model 4 where described in Section 4.3.4. The above expression shows that the
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3.4 Quantifying the Joint Costs and Benefits o f  Adopting JIT bv the 
Buyer and the Supplier
In a typical JIT environment, a buyer gives his engineering specifications with 
demand data to a potential supplier. The supplier responds with a bid price. The buyer 
then visits the supplier’s plant to go over the bid in detail. Often the buyer and the 
supplier agree to adjust the specifications in a way that will lower the cost and increase 
the quality. This approach eliminates the annual competitive bidding process for both 
parties and establishes a long-term relationship. Their effective long-term relationship 
will eventually make any practice o f frequent delivery in small lot sizes beneficial to 
both parties. In this scenario, it is reasonable to determine the order quantity and delivery 
schedule based on their total relevant joint cost rather than buyer’s or supplier’s 
individual costs. This idea o f joint optimization for buyer and supplier was initiated by 
(Goyal 1976) and later by (Baneijee, 1986). Recently (Miller and Kelle, 1998) 
considered the total relevant joint costs for the case where the production lot size is equal 
to the shipment size, hence, m =1. In this section, we consider the joint cost of the buyer 
and supplier in different models under different circumstances. In the first model, we 
formulate the deterministic case assuming that the supplier’s production lot size is equal 
to the shipment size ,hence, m=n . Using total joint relevant cost in model 1 as given in 
(Miller and Kelle, 1998) we add the shipping costs for the supplier and consider the 
additional cost o f losing flexibility for the buyer. Since only the cases o f m=l and m=n 
were examined previously, we extend the model to the case where the supplier’s 
production lot size is an integer multiple o f the shipment size and m can be different 
from n in the second model. We expect that this extension can result substantial savings, 
since the supplier’s production lot size, Qs=mq, can be closer to its individual optimum
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by the appropriate choice o f m. The previous models in the literature allowed only the 
cases o f m=n and m =l.
Next, we extend the deterministic JIT approach by incorporating safety stock in 
the model, based on the assumption that during the transition to JIT, the buyer and 
supplier will agree to cooperate but problems with timing or quantity o f deliveries can 
occur. The case where only the buyer is holding safety stock has been examined by 
(Kelle and Miller, 1998) . In the third model, we present the case where the buyer is 
holding safety stock by applying the results of (Kelle and Miller, 1998) and adding the 
shipping costs for the supplier and considering the additional cost o f losing flexibility for 
the buyer. Model 4 is a new model that considers the case where the supplier is holding 
safety stock.
3.4.1 Model 1: Deterministic Case with Equal Number o f  Setups and 
Deliveries
For this jo in t model o f the buyer and supplier, we have the  following assumptions: 
J l) .  We consider one supplier (producer of an item), one buyer (the retail shop for the 
item considered), and the customers (the final consumers of the item).
J2). The supplier has a JIT delivery agreement with the buyer to provide the required 
total order quantity in n shipments of equal shipment sizes at times according to the 
buyer’s request. The supplier’s production lot size Qs is equal to the shipment size (we 
extend this assumption in the next section).
J3). The buyer orders a large quantity Qb to be delivered in n equal shipments. The 
shipment times are scheduled according to the request o f the buyer at times when it is 
needed by the customers.
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J4). The average demand rate o f the customer’s demand, dr is constant and known by 
the buyer.
J5). Neither the supplier nor the buyer holds safety stock 
Using the same notation as in previous sections where:
Ab: total fixed cost o f  a purchase order,
rB: inventory holding cost factor, the proportion o f dollar value o f the stock o f the buyer,
ZB: receiving cost per shipment for the buyer.
Lb : additional cost o f  losing flexibility per unit ordered but not delivered 
pr = production rate expressed on daily basis and 
As = setup cost for the supplier (producer), 
rs = inventory holding cost factor ($/$/year),
Cs = variable cost o f the finished product for the supplier,
Zs = supplier’s costs related to each shipment to the customer.
The joint total relevant cost of the buyer and supplier, in the deterministic case, when no 
safety stock is considered, is a function o f q and n
JTRCD(q,n) = 4 D +r C q \Z  D L BCBntla B ^ ' b'-B _ B +
A D _ nqAs — +rsCs- l f j dr 1 , 2 * 0nq 2 q 2 nq 2 y. Pr n nPr) <1
(89)
Where the first term is the buyer's ordering cost, holding costs, receiving and 
handling cost and losing flexibility cost according to expression (6). The second term is 
the supplier's setup cost, holding cost and shipping cost as expressed in (61). This is an 
extension o f Banerjee's model (1986), considering multiple deliveries and shipment cost.
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The joint total relevant cost o f the buyer and supplier can be expressed as
(90)JTRCD{ q ,n ) = ^ - + y j (ri)q
where
Xjiri)=— AB +— AS + DZB +DZS 
n n
yA*)= r qCB Bn | r s^ ~'s
ndr , 2 d r
— L — 1 +  
v Pr Pr )
(91)
(92)
2 2
For a  given n, we can express the joint optimal value o f qj, by taking the derivative 
o f the cost function (90) with respect to qj, and setting it equal to 0. This yields 
the following expression
_ jXj(n)
h M  ■
2D
n
CAB+As + nZB+nZs)
(r BCB +LBC Bn)+r SC ( ndr , 2 d r n ----------- L - l + — -
(93)
P r Pr
Substituting q (n) in the cost function (79) provides the minimal joint total cost as 
a function o f n
JTRC j(n)= 2^x j(n)y j(ri)) (94)
Relaxing the integer requirement on n, we can find the optimal n by 
minimizing
Y
Xj(n),yj(n) =
which yields
— AB-\— A B +DZ b+DZ b 
n n
r bP b+LbCBn  ^ rsCs ( ndr  ^  ^ 2dr
2 2 I p r p r
(95)
DAp r B^B , rs^s f.2 J - P r V . DA„ rB(~'B . rS^S ( 2d r ~ P r ) ]
n 2 r 2 I  f t  J j + n 2 2 f t  JJ
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n + const. (96)
= — h n V +Const, 
n
with notation
(97)
and
(98)
Thus, the optimal number o f deliveries can be found by taking the derivative of
(96), setting it equal to 0, and expressing n from the equation as
This n* is generally not integer. Substituting the two integer values surrounding 
n* into the cost function (84), we can get the best integer value of n.
3.4.2 Model 2: Deterministic Case with Different Number o f  Setups and 
Deliveries
Only the case where n=m and m=l has been examined in the literature. This 
model is considered to be a new extension based the spirit o f JIT partnership. Where the 
two parties can agree upon the shipment size q, and the buyer can choose QB=nq as the 
order quantity and the supplier can choose Qs=mq as the lot size where n and m can be 
an arbitrary integer. This assumption allows both parties to adjust their order size and lot 
size closer to their individual optimum providing a lower total cost. Thus, the
n *=-JU7v (99)
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J2*). The supplier’s production lot size can be an integer multiple o f the shipment size, 
Qs = mq. Thus, the number o f deliveries n o f a buyer’s order Qb= nq can be different 
from the number of setups.
The joint total relevant cost (JTRC) of the buyer and supplier can be expressed as 
in the previous section. The difference here is that we have three decision variables, q, n, 
and m.
with notation
JTRC(q,n,m)= +yj(n, m)q
Xj («, m )=-^AB + ^ A s + DZb +DZs 
n m
(100)
rBC +L CRn r C 
yj(n,m)= B B B + ~ ^JL
2 dmd
m  c- - l+-
 ^ Pr Pr
(101)
(102)
For a  given n and m, we can express the optimal value o f qj, by taking the 
derivative o f  the cost function (100) with respect to qj, and setting it equal to 0. It yields 
the following expression
i r B^B B n rs^s mdr . 2d m -------------- - - 1+ — -P r Pr J \
(103)
Substituting q (n, m) in the cost function (100) provides the total cost as a 
function o f n  and m
JTRCj (n,m) = 2^(xJ(n,m)yJ(n,m)) (104)
As in Model 1, by relaxing the integer requirement on n and m, we can find the optimal 
n and m by minimizing Xj(n,m) yj(n,m).
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As in Model 1, by relaxing the integer requirement on n and m, we can find the optimal 
n and m by minimizing xj(n,m) yj(n,m).
xJ(n, m)yj(n,m) = ^ ^ A B+ ^ A S+DZB+DZS
fr .C .+ L .C .n  r / J ,
j|_ 2 + ~ T
md 2d \ \
m ------- - 1 + — M I
P r  P r  ) \
which yields
D A j r ,C ,  . r , c j 2 d r p.-\ 1
n L 2 2 I  P r  J J
( 1 0 5 )
'LnCJDVn+ZJ
2
n+ r r.CS  S
[  2P,
P r ~ d r  
* P r  J
f T V ' 7  i ’’ ’ I L b C b D A s  n(D(Zb+Zs)) m +   —
r S C S D A * < J > r - d r )  m
*Pr
■Const.
n
= —  +—  +Un +U.m +U — +U — +Const. 
n m i %m en
with notation
(1 0 6 )
(1 0 7 )
l~r„C„ rJZ „ (ld  - p
r r  r 1f/ =DA„\-2—i1 B L— +— l ^ T J J
r  r aCa r J 2 j 2 d r- p r\ \U = D A ',\-£- s-+ -3-±
U> =
L bCbD(Zb+Zs
2
u 4 = \ ^ ( e ^  4 L 2 P \  P r  ■
'  1 
{D{Zb+Zs)) I
_ L bCbDAS 
5 2
tf6=
rSCSDAB(Pr~d r
2 P r
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<”» = • / a n d  m  * ( « ) = i u < + u 6ln
(108)
For the solution we need to use numerical methods, discussed in the next chapter.
3.4.3 Model 3: Transition to JIT When the Buyer Is Holding Safety Stock
The previous two models consider the case where, the buyer and supplier operate 
in a deterministic environment, neither the buyer nor the supplier has to hold safety 
stock. In fact, there is always uncertainty in the customer’s demand, but flexible 
resources and short production and supply lead times enable the required service level to 
be met in this case without holding safety stocks. Usually in practice, however, the 
appropriate flexibility and capacity are not available or too expensive to maintain. We 
call this stage the time o f transition to JIT supply.
In this transition stage, which can be long, safety stock has to be held to provide 
the appropriate service level. Therefore, we extend the deterministic JIT approach by 
incorporating into the model the safety stock expression in Kelle (1984) and Kelle and 
Schneider (1992) into the joint total relevant cost and thus, derive the optimal order 
quantity and number o f shipments under different scenarios. This model presents the 
situation when the supplier is not reliable, or is unable to provide small, frequent 
deliveries on time with established quantity or quality levels. The study incorporates the 
safety stock into the model under the situation of "not quite JIT" where the buyer and 
supplier are in transition to JIT supply and the buyer holds a safety stock. This case was 
examined previously by (Kelle and Miller, 1998). The difference is that this model is 
adjusted by adding the shipping costs for the supplier and cost of losing flexibility for the 
buyer.
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The first three assumptions are the same (J l, J2*, and J3) as in the previous 
section for Model 2. The last two assumptions (J4 and J5) are replaced by the following 
assumptions:
J4)*. The demand has a known average rate, dr. The demand rate is changing
J 5 )* . The shipment times are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random 
variables in (0, T), arranged in ascending order ti< t2< ... <t„ . The supplier tries 
to follow the pattern of the demand according to the JIT supply agreement, but 
because o f production, capacity, or transportation problems there are random 
disturbances in the delivery times 
J 6 ) . Safety stock will be held by the buyer to protect against any random delays in 
shipments.
In section 3.2.2.2, we derived the following simple approximation for the 
required safety stock, Sb, which provides the service level a
into the joint total relevant cost and derive the optimal order quantity and number of 
shipments, n. Using the previous notation, Qb = nq,
according to the customer's request which is unknown at the time o f safety stock
planning.
(109)
We incorporate the expected holding cost of safety stock 
Tb C b Sb ( 110)
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JTRC(q, n, m)=Xj n^’— + y(n ,m )q
q
(111)
where
xj(n, m) -  — Ab h— As  +DZB+DZS 
n m
( 112)
y /n ,  m) =  r B C B + L B C B n  , r S C S
md , 2d m -------- - /  + — £
Pr Pr
+rBCBn
In f  1 1V l - a )
2n
(113)
For a given k and m, we can express the optimal value of q, in a similar form to 
(103),
yielding the following expression
2D ( M + * l +z
n m B+ Z S  j
rs C s \ m - ^ - l  + ^  
Pr Pr
rBCBn
m f - L .
[ l - a
2n
(114)
Substituting q*j (n, m) in the cost function (111) provides the total cost as a function 
o f n and m
JTRCj{n, m ) -2  J(x j(n , m)yj(n, m))
= 2 ^ - A b+2-As +DZb+DZs '^
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rB^B+^ Bn . rS^S y rBCBn - (115)
\  /
For the solution we need to use a numerical methods, discussed in the next chapter. 
3.4.4: Model 4: Transition to JIT When the Supplier Is Holding Safety
Only the case where the buyer is holding safety stock has been examined 
previously by (Kelle and Miller, 1998a). We provide a new model where the 
supplier is holding safety stock under transition to JIT. In the spirit of JIT, the study 
derives the minimum safety stock needed in order to protect against shortages that 
may be caused by delivery delays. The safety stock that is required to provide the 
appropriate customer service level depends on the number o f  shipments and the 
shipment size. The proposed model determine the optimal values o f the three 
decision variables, the shipment size, the number of shipments and safety stock 
All assumptions are the same as for Model-3 except the last assumption (J6) which is 
modified as
J6)*. Safety stock will be held by the supplier to meet the buyer's shipment request, 
with the required service level, a ,  on time according to JIT delivery 
agreement.
The supplier’s required safety stock, to provide the required service level, is 
approximated according to section 3.3.3.1 as
Stock
(116)
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As in the previous section, the joint total relevant cost (JTRC) of buyer and 
supplier, including the expected holding cost of the safety stock of the supplier and 
(n=km where k is integer) can be expressed as
. xj(k,m)
where
JTRC(q,k, m)= + yj(m)q
<1
Xj(k,m)=-^-AB +—AS +DZb+DZs km m
y j ( m ) =  r B C B +k B £ B k m
(117)
(118)
r S C S 2kmr g f Z ^ I u Z q '\ 2\km  k )  \ l - a ) Pr Pr
(119)
For a given k and m, we can express the optimal value of q, in a similar form 
to (114), yielding the following expression
D_
bn (A B +kAB +kmZB+kmZs
2\km k )  \ l - a ) m ■
md 2dr
— - - 1  +  ---------
Pr Pr
(120)
Substituting q (k, m) in the cost function (117) provides the total cost as a function of 
k and m
JTRCj(k,m) = 2*J(x j(k,m)y j(k,m))
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m d .r  f . 2 d r  +  m     1-\---------------
P r  P r
For the solution we need to use numerical methods, discussed in the next chapter.
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(121)
CHAPTER 4 
NUMERICAL AND MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we discussed and quantified the potential costs and 
benefits o f a long-term relationship between the buyer and the supplier in a JIT 
environment. In this chapter we present numerical solutions, examples, and 
sensitivity analysis followed by a managerial analysis o f the JIT partnership in 
different situations.
In each situation, we consider three typical cases in our managerial analysis:
a.) supplier’s dominance, with large production lot sizes and shipment sizes;
b.) buyer’s dominance with small, frequent, timely shipments;
c.) buyer and supplier have equal power in negotiation.
In each case, we compare the optimal ordering policy of the dominating party 
to the joint optimal ordering policy and provide a quantitative tool for the negotiation 
between the parties. The savings and loss for each party are computed that provides 
the quantitative support for negotiation, compromise, and compensation.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, Section
4.2 considers the case where the buyer and supplier operate in a deterministic 
environment and neither the buyer nor the supplier has to hold safety stock. This can 
be the rare situation when the demand and supply are deterministic. In practice, there 
is always uncertainty in the customer demand. These demand fluctuations can be 
disregarded and no safety stock is required if the supplier has flexible resources and 
enough capacity to provide a reliable JIT supply. We call this situation as “perfect
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JIT supply”. The quantitative models for these situations have been formulated in 
Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Section 4.3 deals with numerical and managerial analysis for the case of 
uncertainty. First, we examine the effect o f increasing demand uncertainty on the 
required amount o f flexible resources and its consequence of increasing production 
cost. This is the numerical analysis of the model described in Section 3.3.1. In many 
cases, the suppliers don’t have enough flexible capacity to meet the randomly 
changing demand o f the buyer or it is too expensive. We call this stage as the time of 
“transition to JIT supply”. For this stage, safety stock is required to provide the 
appropriate customer service. The safety stock can be hold either by the buyer or by 
the supplier. We analyze both cases in the second part of this section. The 
quantitative models to the two cases have been formulated in Section 3.4.3 and 
Section 3.4.4.
Section 4.4 provides the numerical and managerial comparison of the four 
basic models: the two deterministic models (Model lfor the case n equals m and 
Model 2 for the case n not equal m); the two Uncertainty models ( Model3 for the 
buyer’s safety stock case, and Model 4 the supplier’s safety stock case.
The numerical analysis will seek the following values, where it is relevant:
The optimal shipment size for the buyer and supplier individually and jointly q*
Optimal number of shipments, n
Buyer’s optimal order quantity, Q*b
Supplier’s optimal production lot size, Q*s
Optimal number o f shipments per lot size, m
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Optimal safety stock held by the buyer, S*b 
Optimal safety stock held by the supplier, S*s
Optimal total relevant joint costs under the three typical cases (supplier’s dominance, 
buyer’s dominance, and buyer and supplier have equal power), TRC
For the sake of comparison we are going to use the same values as a base-
case example for the following parameters introduced in the previous section
D = 1000 unit/year (demand rate, dr = 1)
P = 2500 unit/year (production rate, pr=2.5)
Ab = $ 150/order (buyer's ordering cost)
As = $200/setup (supplier's setup cost)
Cb = $20/uint (selling price)
Cs = $ 10/unit (production cost)
tb = 0.25 (buyer’s annual inventory carrying cost rate )
rs = 0.35 (supplier’s annual inventory carrying cost rate)
ZB = $2/shipment (receiving cost for the buyer)
Zs = $3/shipment (supplier's cost related to each shipment to buyer)
Lb = 0.02 (cost of losing flexibility for the buyer)
4.2 Numerical and Sensitivity Analysis for the Case o f  no Safety
Stock
In this section we investigate two scenarios, in the first scenario we consider
the joint economic order model with constant demand rate and assume that each 
order is produced in one setup and delivered in one shipment. This is the base case of 
traditional supply with no JIT consideration. The scenario is extended to multiple 
deliveries of a purchase order and to production lot sizes o f a multiple of the
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shipment size. This is the typical JIT supply scenario for which the quantitative 
models are discussed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. First we illustrate the costs, 
tradeoffs, and managerial implications on a numerical example o f the base-case 
parameter values introduced in the previous section. We provide thereafter a detailed 
sensitivity and managerial analysis.
4.2.1. Case o f no JIT Supply
Using the total relevant cost expression (4) o f the buyer, the optimal order 
quantity is, Qb* = 263 and the optimal total relevant cost, TRCb (Qb) = $1157, for 
the buyer (the results are summarized in Table 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.1.). If 
the supplier has the lot size of 263, required by the buyer, the supplier’s cost is TRCs 
(Qb*) = $956. Therefore, the total system cost is $2113. Similarly, from the 
supplier’s total relevant cost expression, (54), we calculate the supplier's optimal lot 
size, Qs* = 538 and the supplier’s costs, TRCs (Q*s) = $754. If  the supplier is more 
powerful and forces the buyer to order in the lot size o f 538, the buyer's cost is TRCb 
(Q s*) = $1146. In this case, the total system cost is much higher, $2220.
Table 4.1
Optimal Ordering Policies and Relevant Costs for the Base-Case Parameters
with no JIT Consideration
Policy Buyer’s
Optimal
Supplier’s
Optimal
Joint
Optimal
Order Quantity 263 538 350
Buyer's Cost 1157 1466 1204
Supplier's Cost 956 754 825
Total Joint Cost 2113 2220 2029
Buyer's Loss 0 310 48
Supplier's Cost 202 0 71
Total Loss 202 310 119
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From equation (77), using one shipment to each order (n=l), we can get the 
optimal joint order quantity Qj* = 350. If the two parties accept the joint order 
quantity and lot size o f 350, the total costs for the buyer is TRCb(Qj*) = $ 1204, for 
the supplier, TRCs(Qj*) = $825, and the total system cost is the minimum, $2029. 
Thus, the total system cost can be decreased by $84 (5%) if the two parties are ready 
to switch from the buyer’s optimal policy to the joint optimal policy. Similarly, the 
total system gain is $191 (10%) by switching from the supplier’s optimal policy to 
the joint optimal policy.
Buyer's cost 
Supplier's cost 
Joint cost
600 - 
400 - 
200  -
0  " i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r ~ - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
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Order Quantity
Figure 4.1
Total System Costs and Individual Costs 
for the Buyer and the Supplier for Different Order Quantities
If  the strong buyer forces its optimal policy on the supplier, the supplier’s 
loss is $ 202 compared to its optimal cost. On the other hand, if  the strong supplier 
forces its optimal policy on the buyer, the buyer’s loss is $ 310. If  the buyer and 
supplier are willing to compromise and accept the joint optimal policy, the buyer’s
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loss and supplier loss are $ 48 and $ 71 respectively and that provides the best 
scenario with the minimal total loss o f $119. The information is summarized in 
Table 4.1. Figure 4.1 shows the cost function for the buyer, for the supplier, and for 
the total system. It demonstrates that the cost functions are convex and the lowest 
system cost occurs at Qj* = 311 between the two values o f Qb*= 214.5 and Qs*=
506.2.
Next we examine the three different scenarios in negotiation using the above 
numerical example.
a.) If the supplier is strong, the buyer has $ 310 (21%) loss compared to its optimal 
cost (see in Table 4.1) by using the supplier’s optimal lot size as order quantity. 
The buyer is willing to negotiate with the supplier for accepting smaller order 
quantities that would decrease the buyer’s cost. The closer the buyer can get to its 
optimal order quantity, the more is the inventory cost decrease for the buyer. The 
same time, however, the supplier has higher and higher costs (see Figure 4.1) that 
must be compensated by the buyer in the form of a higher purchase price or in 
the form of a premium. The buyer, knowing its own cost factors, can calculate 
the cost decrease due to decreased order quantity and can make an offer to the 
supplier. The supplier can also calculate its cost increase based on its own cost 
factors, and accept the offer or negotiate higher compensation. The tools, 
provided in Chapter 3, enable both parties to evaluate the different tradeoffs. As 
we can see from Figure 4.1, in each case there is a possibility to improve the total 
system cost by choosing a compromise in order quantity/ lot size. The best deal is 
the joint optimal order quantity that can be calculated if the two parties are ready
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to cooperate and share their information. Even though the supplier’s cost would 
be higher, the buyer can compensate it and still have lower total costs. In this 
example, the buyer’s would experience a 17%(Bben%) decrease in cost after 
compensating the supplier’s loss. The percentage benefit for the buyer, Bben%, 
is expressed in percent relative to the buyer’s original cost in Table 4.2
Table 4.2
Moving from Supplier’s Optimal to Joint Optimal
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 1466 754 2220
Joint Optimal 1204 825 2029
Cost Improvement 262 -71 191
Compensation -71 71 0
Buyer Benefit 191
Bben% 17%
b.) I f  the buyer is strong, the supplier will be urged to accept the buyer’s optimal 
order quantity. The supplier is willing to make some sort o f concession, such as 
price discount, to the buyer to encourage the latter to accept the joint order 
quantity. Table 4.3 shows the net gain that can be achieved by the supplier if  the 
buyer will agree to order the joint optimal order quantity. In this example, the 
supplier would experience a 9% decrease in a cost, this quantity, the supplier’s 
benefit, is denoted by Sben% and it is expressed in percent relative to the 
supplier’s original cost in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3
Moving from Buyer’s Optimal to Joint Optimal
Buyer's
cost
Supplier
cost
Total
cost
Buyer's optimal 1157 956 2113
Joint Optimal 1204 825 2029
Cost Improvement -48 131 83
Compensation 48 -48 0
Supplier Benefit 83
Sben% 9%
c.) If both parties are equally strong, they can agree to follow the optimal joint 
policy and share on the joint benefit which is in the range of 5.6% to 10.2% in this 
numerical example.
Now, we evaluate the tradeoff among system parameters (e.g., holding cost, 
setup costs, and ordering costs) o f the partners in greater detail and examine how 
these tradeoffs affect the joint optimum. Such study gives insight into how changes 
in the system parameters or error in parameter estimation affect the joint order 
quantity.
For the no JIT model we can express the buyer’s and supplier’s setup cost 
rate, ordering cost rate and holding cost rate, demand and production rate in the 
following ratios:
a  = A b/  A s, where 0< a  < oo (ordering costs vs. setup cost)
P = Cb/ Cs , where 0< p < oo (holding costs ratio), 
y = D/ P , where D < P (utilization rate),
Since we assume that the buyer’s purchase price Cb will always be greater
than the supplier's production cost Cs and if the holding cost rates are identical, the
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holding cost ratio will always be greater than one. For the sake o f simplicity, here we 
assume that the holding cost rates are the same and use rs = rs = 0.25
In Chapter 3 (assuming one single delivery for each order m=l), we have the 
joint total relevant cost
JTRC(Qj ) = Ag ~ -+ r C g ^ - + A S ~ ^ +rCs <•I22>
We rewrite equation (122) so that the costs are expressed in terms of the 
above ratios to yield:
JTRCiQj ) = ^  (1 + (! + “ ■) (123)
V.J a b *  “  L .b
After substituting a , P, and y into (123), we have the following expression:
j r a c ( a )  =  - ^ - ( i + - ) + ^ ^ - ( i + y ( - ^ ) )  0 2 4 )Qj a  2 p
In order to study the effects of the tradeoffs in holding, setup, and demand 
rates; we find the value o f Qj that minimizes (124)
'2 DA (1 + — )
Q j  =  ‘      O 2 5  )rC B
To determine how the joint solution varies with respect to the above ratios, 
we take the partial derivative o f (125) with respect to a , P, and y to yield
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9 a  2 a  a
(126)
(127)
a/jrf
(128)
Where C, represents the remaining positive constants unaffected by a change 
in the ratio under study. The sign o f partial derivative indicates how the joint solution 
varies with respect to the particular variable. Equation (126) indicates that the joint 
order quantity decreases when the ordering cost increases relative to the setup cost. 
Equation (127) suggests that the joint order quantity increase as the purchase price 
increases relative to the production cost, and equation (128) indicate that the order 
quantity decreases as the demand rate increases relative to the production rate.
To further illustrate the cost tradeoffs, we use the cost information from the 
example in section 4.2.1, for which a. = 0.75, P = 2, and y = 0.4. We have the joint 
optimal solution, Qj0* , o f 350 units, and the joint total costs, JTRC ( Qj0* ) , o f $ 
2029. Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the percentage costs changes, { JTRC (Qj*) -  
JTRC (Qj0*) } / JTRC (Qjo*) * 100%, and the joint order quantities at different 
levels o f a  , p , and y. The tables confirm the previously stated relationships 
between the joint order quantity and the ratios.
Understanding how these parameters affect the joint order quantity is 
important when companies are planning to make investment in process 
improvement. We see from the above analysis that if the suppliers want to increase 
the joint order quantity they can focus in reducing production costs or increasing the
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Table 4.4
Percentage Cost Changes at 0.5 y with Changes in a  and |B and the Joint Order
Quantity
0.5 a a 2 a
% Cost Qj’ % Cost Qj' % Cost Qj'
0.5 p 32.16 405.7 -2.8 360.7 -35.54 249.8
P 28.27 418.2 -5.13 372.3 -38.52 279.6
2 P 26.69 432.1 -7.80 383.9 -39.58 285.1
Table 4.5
Percentage Cost Changes at y with Changes in a  and P and the Joint Order
Quantity
0.5 a a 2 a
% Cost Qj ' % Cost Qj’ % Cost Qj'
0.5 p 49.96 405.9 12.54 365.1 -15.15 203.8
3 37.16 446.7 0.00 350 -22.54 229.8
2 P 29.28 455.7 -5.13 365 26.51 245.6
Table 4.6
Percentage Cost Changes at 2 y with Changes in a  and p and the Joint Order
Quantity
0.5 a a 2 a
% Cost Qj' % Cost Qj' % Cost Qj'
0.5 p 73.71 362.3 28.49 216.2 -15.15 175.9
3 49.97 397.9 10.54 276.1 -2.02 197.8
. . .  - ..2 P 36.16 466.7 6.8 331 -27.54 250.8
production rate. Investment can be made in new equipment, in eliminating waste in 
the production process or in improving the design for ease o f manufacturing. Buyers 
on the other hand, can decrease the joint order quantity by negotiating a better price
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from the supplier or by increasing the demand for the end product. The partners will 
want to increase or decrease the joint order quantity to move it closer to their 
individually optimal order sizes.
The faster the buyer’s order can be made and the closer the buyer’s ordering 
cost is to the supplier’s setup cost, the lower are the joint total relevant costs. In a 
cooperative relationship one way the partners can work together to improve the 
supplier’s production process is to increase the production rate and reduce setup 
times, thereby reducing setup costs. The holding costs do have effects on the total 
system costs, but the effects are not consistent.
4.2.2. Case o f  JIT Supply
In JIT supply, small frequent deliveries are required. We assume that the 
buyer’s order, Qb, is delivered in n shipments o f equal size q = Qs/n. The supplier’s 
production lot size can also be an integer multiple o f the shipment size, Qs = mq , 
and m can be different from n .
First, we consider a numerical example with the same parameters as in the 
previous section to compare the non-JIT case and two different JIT models. The first 
JIT model (Model 1 in Section 3.4.1), that was published by Miller and Kelle (1998), 
assumes that the supplier’s production size Qs is equal to the shipment size q. The 
second JIT model (Model 2 in Section 3.4.2), is our extension to the case where n 
and m can be different, thus allowing different order quantity and lot size. This 
additional flexibility may provide considerable cost savings.
We use the results o f Section 3.2.1 to find the buyer’s optimal policy. There 
we saw that the buyer’s total relevant cost is decreasing with increasing Qb and n,
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according to expression (5). This result shows the tendency o f JIT to have a long 
supply contract and deliver frequently in small shipment sizes, q. It can be seen that 
the optimal n for the buyer is infinity. This result has not yet been published in the 
quantitative literature, however it supports the tendency in practice o f  having very 
long purchase order contracts in the JIT supply agreements so saving on ordering 
costs without increasing the holding costs.
The cost improvement is marginally decreasing as the order quantity 
increases. For the order quantity, there is a reasonable, managerial limit where the 
loss o f flexibility, and concerns of product changes and long commitments outweigh 
the annual ordering cost decrease. We assume that the part of the order quantity that 
is not delivered to the buyers is a  commitment that must be bought in the future. This 
commitment results in a loss o f  flexibility for changes. Therefore, we introduced a 
new cost parameter in Section 3.2.1. that will consider the managerial concern of 
having too large order quantity Qb . We check the effect o f this new cost parameter 
with the other parameter changes in our sensitivity and managerial analysis.
From expression (81) and (85), we find the optimal values for shipment size, 
q, and the value of n respectively. These results have been published in the literature 
(Miller and Kelle, 1998). The difference is that we add the shipping costs for the 
supplier and consider the additional cost of losing flexibility for the buyer. The 
numerical and cost results for the base-cease parameter set described in Section 4.1 
are summarized in Table 4.7. Compared to the non-JIT policy results o f  Table 4.1, 
we see a large cost improvement resulted by switching to JIT policy. The cost
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improvement is 24.8% if the buyer’s optimal policy is followed, 8.3% if the 
supplier’s optimal policy is followed and it is 25.1% for the joint optimal policy.
From equation (85), we can get the optimal number o f  shipments n=m=16 
and the optimal shipment size q /  = 35. If  the two parties accept the joint shipment 
size, the total costs for the buyer is TRCB(qj') = $ 509, for the supplier, TRCs(qj*) = 
$ 1010, and the total system cost is the minimum, $ 1519. Thus, the total system cost 
can be decreased by $ 71 (5%) if the two parties are ready to switch from the buyer’s 
optimal policy to the joint optimal policy. Similarly, the total system gain is $ 516 
(35%) by switching from the supplier’s optimal policy to the joint optimal policy.
Table 4.7
Optimal Ordering Policies and Relevant Costs for Model 1 
Using the Base-Case Parameters
Policy Buyer's
Optimal
Supplier's
Optimal
Joint optimal
Number of shipment 
per order n
30 16
Number of shipment 
per lot size m
- 1 16
Shipment size q 28 539 35 .
Order quantity Qb 840 - 560
Production lot size Qs - 539 560
Buyer’s TRC 488 1281 509
Supplier’s TRC 1101 754 1010
Overall TRCJ 1589 2035 1519
Buyer's Loss 0.00 163% 4%
Supplier’s loss 46% 0.00 34%
Next we examine the new extension (Model 2) where we assume, that the 
buyer’s order, Q b , is delivered in n shipments o f equal size q = Qg/n. The supplier’s
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production lot size can also be an integer multiple o f the shipment size, Qs = mq, and 
m can be different from n.
If  the buyer is strong and forces its optimal shipment size and frequency to 
the supplier. The number o f shipment is 30 and the shipment size is 28. The 
numerical and cost results are summarized in the first column o f  Table 4.8. The 
buyer’s total cost is $ 488 and using the buyer’s optimal the supplier total cost is $ 
1101.
If  the supplier is strong, then the supplier can chose its best lot size as an 
integer multiple o f the shipment quantity, Qs = rnqs. In the numerical example, for 
the demand and production rate we have the relation 2dr < pr, thus m=l for the 
supplier’s optimal policy, and Qs can be expressed by (62). The numerical and cost 
results are summarized in the second column of Table 4.5. It shows that the optimal 
shipment size for the supplier is 539 and the supplier’s total cost is $ 754. The buyer 
must accept the optimal lot size of the supplier, Qs = qs as the shipment size, the 
buyer’s total cost is $ 1281.
For the joint optimal policy o f the two parties we use the results o f Section
3.4.2. From expression (81) and (85), we find the optimal values for shipment size, 
q, and the value o f n and m respectively using an iterative calculation. The optimal 
value of n and m are 23 and 12 respectively. The optimal shipment size q /  = 38. If  
the two parties accept the joint shipment size, the total costs for the buyer is 
TRCB(qj*) = $ 494, for the supplier, TRCs(qj’) = $ 982, and the total system cost is 
the minimum, $ 1476. Thus, the total system cost can be decreased by $ 114 (7%) if 
the two parties are ready to switch from the buyer’s optimal policy to the joint
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optimal policy. Similarly, the total system gain is $ 558 (27%) by switching from the
supplier’s optimal policy to the joint optimal policy.
Table 4.8
Optimal Ordering Policies and Relevant Costs for Model 2 
Using the Base-Case Parameters
Policy Buyer's
Optimal
Supplier's
Optimal
Joint optimal
Number of shipment 
per order n
30 - 23
Number of shipment 
per lot size m
- 1 12
Shipment size q 28 539 38
Order quantity QB 840 - 874
Production lot size Qs - 539 456
Buyer’s TRC 488 1281 494
Supplier’s TRC 1101 754 982
Overall TRCJ 1589 2035 1476
Buyer's Loss 0.00 163% 1%
Supplier’s loss 46% 0.00 30%
As in the previous section we examine the three different scenarios in 
negotiation, now considering the JIT supply case.
a.) I f  the supplier is strong, the buyer is willing to negotiate with the supplier for 
accepting the joint order quantity to minimize the loss that incurred by using the 
supplier’s optimal lot size as shipment quantity. The buyer’s compensation 
should be larger in this case than in the non-JIT case (Table 4-2), still the 
benefit for the buyer is larger. The buyer could have a cost decrease up to $ 559 
(44%) after compensating the supplier for its loss. The costs are summarized in 
Table 4.9 for the different cases including the percentage benefit for the buyer, 
Bben%.
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Table 4.9
Moving from Supplier’s Optimal to Joint Optimal
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 1281 754 2035
Joint Optimal 494 982 1476
Cost Improvement 787 -228 558
Compensation -228 228 0
Buyer Benefit 559 0 559
Bben% 44%
b.) Similarly, let examine the case where the buyer is stronger than the supplier. 
The supplier is willing to make some sort of concession, such as price discount, 
to the buyer to encourage the latter to accept the joint order quantity. The 
supplier could have a cost decrease up to $ 114 after compensating the buyer for 
its loss. So , the percentage benefit for the supplier ,Sben%, is 10%. Table 4.10 
shows that compensation amount and the net gain that can be achieved by the 
supplier is smaller in this case as in the case o f no JIT supply (Table 4.3). This 
numerical result seems to indicate thaf the joint optimal policy is close to the 
buyer’s optimal policy in the case o f JIT consideration. We will explore this 
issue later on in more details considering several different parameters.
Table 4.10
Moving from Buyer’s Optimal to Joint Optimal
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 488 1103 1591
Joint Optimal 494 983 1477
Cost Improvement -6 120 114
Compensation 6 -6 L 0
Supplier Benefit 0 114 114
Sben% 10%
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c.) If  the buyer and supplier willing are equally strong, they can agree to adjust 
their policy to the optimal joint policy and share the joint benefit. Only a very 
small gain (2%) can be achieved relative to the buyer’s optimal policy in this 
numerical example but the gain is larger (30%) relative to the supplier optimal 
policy. We will explore this issue later on in more details considering several 
different parameters. We note that the joint optimal policy is close to the buyer’s 
optimal policy o f frequent, small shipments, which also supports the advantages 
o f JIT deliveries.
After the numerical and managerial analysis o f the solution for the base-case 
set o f parameters we provide next a sensitivity analysis. We evaluate the effect of 
cost parameters giving insight into how the changes in the cost parameters or error 
in parameter estimation affect the joint optimal solution. Specifically, the changes in 
the joint optimal shipment size, qj, the total relevant cost for the joint optimal 
policy, TRCj, are considered first.
Next the effect o f  parameter changes on the cost savings achieved by using 
the joint optimal policy are investigated.
The buyer’s benefits, Bben% , expresses the percent cost improvement 
achieved by the buyer (after compensating the supplier’s loss) by switching from 
the supplier’s optimal policy to the joint optimal policy. Similarly, the supplier’s 
benefit, Sben%, expresses the supplier’s percent cost improvement by switching 
form the buyer’s optimal policy to the joint optimum. .
We modify the base-case parameter set, one parameter at a time. The number 
of the relevant cost parameters is large (11), thus we have considered only the
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single-factor effects. We figure out the percent increase or decrease in the joint 
optimal solution compared to the base-case solution by changing the cost 
parameters. We increase the cost parameters by 50% and 25% and decreasing them 
by the same rate. For the base-case parameters, the values for the optimal solution 
are q* = 38, TRC* = 1476, and the percent benefits are Bben* = 44% and Sben’ = 
10%. Table 4.11 summarizes the percentage increase or decrease in the optimal 
solution for different percent changes in the cost parameters.
Further analyses have been made to identify the cost parameters that have the 
most significant effect on the joint optimal solution. The numerical results reveal that 
the inventory holding cost for the buyer, rb, and the selling price, C b, are the most 
influential cost parameters on the joint optimal shipment size, qj. The two cost 
parameters, rb and C b have almost the identical effect on the shipment size q. If we 
increase either one of them, the shipment size qj will decrease. These results are 
available in previous research. The form of the relation is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
The regression analysis , based on a larger set of parameter changes, shows a 
quadratic relation between the change in rb and the resulting change in qji
qj% = 0.546 rb% -  0.6822 rb% -0.006 (129)
with R2= 0.998.
Also, we find that the setup cost for the supplier, As, and inventory holding 
cost of the supplier, rs, are causing the highest incremental changes in the joint 
optimal value o f the total relevant cost, TRCj. The two cost parameters have identical 
effect on the total relevant cost. The cost increase is close to linear with the increase 
o f the cost parameters as it is shown in Figure 4.3 for the case o f the setup cost ,As .
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Table 4.11
The Effect o f Cost Parameters on the Outcome Variables
As Ab rb rs Zb Zs Cb Cs Lb pr dr
-50%
qj 6% -6% 49% -3% -13% -19% 48% -3% -5% -7% 16%
TRCj -18% -7% -5% -18% -1% -2% -12% -18% -7% . -23% 7%
Bben 10% -28% -29% 7% 3% 5% -9% 7% 15% 116% -59%
Sben 92% -49% -15% -37% 33% -47% 29% -37% 46% -69% 30%
-25%
qj -3% 0% 18% 0% -7% -8% 18% 0% 0% -3% 10%
TRCj -8% -3% -2% -8% -1% -1% -5% -8% -3% -6% 4%
Bben 4% -10% -11% 3% 2% 3% -3% 3% 7% 37% -28%
Sben 30% -19% -6% -14% 10% -21% 13% -14% 18% -13% 17%
25%
qi -3% 0% -13% -2% 2% 3% -13% -2% 1% -3% -6%
TRCj 7% 3% 2% 7% 1% 1% 5% 7% 3% 4% -4%
Bben -4% 7% 8% -3% -2% -3% 2% -3% -6% -24% 27%
Sben -24% 13% 2% 8% -16% 15% -12% 8% -19% 7% -17%
50%
qi -3% 0% -23% -2% 10% 12% -19% -2% 0% 0% -12%
TRCj 14% 5% 4% 14% 1% 2% 9% 14% 5% 5% -9%
Bben -7% 12% 14% -6% -3% -5% 4% -6% -11% -39% -60%
Sben -39% 30% 8% 15% -19% 35% -20% 15% -29% 15% 32%
60% -
A 50% - 
~ X . 40% - 
-  X .  30% - 
a) 20% -
cu
^  -60% -40% -20% -10%Q
-20% - 
-30% J
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i t ^ 2 e % ^ w ^ ^ 0 % ^  60%
jes in rb
Figure 4.2
The Relationship Between % Change in rb and % Change in qj
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The percentage change in the total relevant cost can be expressed in the 
regression equation:
TRCj% = 0.321 (As%) - 0.0087 (130)
with R2 = 0.997.
Q  20% - 
cr
t— 10% H _c
(10/ . a
O) ' ' '
S  -60% -40% -2 0 % ^  0
j i  -10% - 
^  -20% -
%chanc
% 20% 40% 60% 
je in As
Figure 4.3
The Relationship Between % Change in As and % Change in TRCj
Figure 4.4 illustrates how the changes o f production rate pr and the demand 
rate dr will change the buyer’s percentage benefits, Bben%. As production rate pr 
increases the Bben% is decreases where the change in the demand rate has the 
opposite effect.
The regression equations are:
Bben% =1.591 (pr %)2 - 1.42 (pr %) -  0.0261 (131)
with R2 = 0.995, and
Bben% = 1.1250 (dr %) -  0.009 (132)
with R2 = 0.9997.
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Figure 4.4
The Relationship Between % Change in pr and dr with % Change in Bben 
In regards to the supplier’s benefit, Sben, the ordering cost, shipping cost, 
and setup cost are the most significant cost parameters affecting the supplier’s 
benefits. As shown in Figure 4.5, the supplier’s benefits increase as the ordering cost, 
Ab, increases. The appropriate regression equations are:
Sben% = 0.769 (AB%) -  0.0568 (133)
with R2 = 0.9899, and
Sben% = 1.096 (As%)2 -  1.227 (As%) -  0.024 * (134)
with R2 = 0.996.
4.2.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis for Model 2 Using Two Level Fractional 
Factorial Designs
In this section, the effects o f the parameter changes on the joint optimal 
solution are investigated. Specifically, we evaluate the effect o f the cost parameters 
and the effect of the production and demand rate on the four most important output 
characteristics o f our Model 2:
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
As
Ab
Figure 4.5
The Relationship Between % Change in Ab and As with % Change in Sben
- the joint optimal shipment size, qj,
- the total relevant cost for the joint optimal policy, TRCj, 
the buyer’s benefits, Bben% , and
- the supplier’s benefit, Sben% .
For Model 2 we cannot use the same simple technique that we used in 
implementing sensitivity analysis for case o f no JIT supply (Section 4.2.1.) because 
we have integer variables and the solution of the model is the result of a numerical 
solution procedure. We have to apply experimental design. Since the number of the 
relevant parameters is large (11), it is quite elaborating computational task to run 
factorial design. We were able to reduce the number o f cost parameters to seven and 
we use two level factorial designs. To reduce the number o f experiments we apply
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partial factorial design that requires only a fraction of the complete factorial 
experiment.
For the sake o f comparison, we use the same values for the base case as 
presented in Section 4.1. We modify the base case, for each parameter we use two 
levels, the increased high level and the decreased low level with the base case in the 
center. The following variables have been considered as the seven factors in our 
experiment with the low and high values described next:
(1) Ab/Rb where
Ab is the buyer’s ordering cost and Rb= rBCB (rB: buyer’s annual carrying 
cost rate and CB: the selling price)
(2) Zg/ Rb where
ZB: the receiving cost for the buyer
(3) Lb/ Rb where
Lb: the buyer’s cost o f losing flexibility as a percentage o f  selling price
(4) Rs/Rb where
Rs = rsCs ( rs: is the suppliers annual inventory carrying cost rate and Cs: is 
the supplier’s production cost)
(5) As/Ab where
As: is the supplier’s setup cost
(6) Zs/ZB where
Zs: is the supplier’s cost related to each shipment to buyer
(7) D/P where
D: is the expected annual demand of the product considered
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P: is the annual production quantity
For the sake o f comparison, we use the same values for the base case as 
presented in Section 4.1. We modify the base case, for each parameter we use two 
levels, which are -1  for low value for the parameter and +1 for the high value for 
the parameter. The table o f the high and low levels applied (plus and minus signs) 
for this experiment is shown in Table 4-12. The high and low value for each factor 
is presented in Table 4-13
Table 4-12
High and Low Levels (Plus and Minus Signs) for the Experiment
Run Ab/RB Zb/RB Lg/RB RS/RB As/Ab Zs/Zb D/P
1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
2 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1
3 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1
4 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
5 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1
6 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
7 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.13
High and Low Value for the Seven Factors
Factor Low (-1) High(+1)
Ab/RB 18.75 56
Z b/RB 0.25 0.75
Lb/RB 0.0025 1.0075
RS/RB 0.04 0.13
As/Ab 0.665 2
Z s/Zb 0.75 2.25
D/P 0.2 0.6
Once we implement the experiment, we will be able to identify the cost 
parameters that have the most significant effect on the joint optimal solution. For the 
base-case parameters, the values for the optimal solution are q* = 38, TRC* = 1476,
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and the percent benefits are Bben* = 44% and Sben* = 10%. The experimental 
results reveal that the ratio between the buyer’s ordering cost and inventory holding 
cost for the buyer, Ab/ Rb. and the ratio o f shipping and receiving cost for the 
supplier and the buyer, Zs/Zb, are the most influential factors on the joint optimal 
shipment size, qj. The two cost factors have almost the identical effect on the 
shipment size. If  we increase either one o f them, the shipment size qj will increase. 
These results are summarized in Table 4-14.
Table 4.14
Estimates of Effects on the Joint Optimal Shipment Size, qj,
Run qj Ab/RB Zb/RB Lb/RB RS/RB As/Ab Zs/Zb D/P
1 38 i CO 00 i CO 00 -38 -38 38 38 38
2 46 46 -46 -46 46 -46 -46 46
3 47 -47 47 -47 47 -47 47 -47
4 40 40 40 -40 -40 40 -40 -40
5 26 -26 -26 26 26 26 -26 -26
6 46 46 -46 46 -46 -46 46 -46
7 41 -41 41 41 -41 -41 -41 41
8 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Total 60 53 23 35 4 58 47
Total/4 15 13 6 9 1 15 12
Also, we find that the ratio between the setup cost for the supplier and the 
ordering cost for the buyer, As/Ab, and ratio o f inventory holding cost of the supplier 
and inventory holding cost for the buyer, Rs/Rb, are causing the highest positive 
changes in the joint optimal value o f the total relevant cost, TRCj. This is illustrated 
in Table 4-15.
Next the effect o f parameter changes on the cost savings achieved by using 
the joint optimal policy are investigated. The buyer’s benefits, Bben% , expresses the
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Table 4.15
Estimates of Effects on the Total Relevant Cost for the Joint Optimal Policy, TRCj,
Run TRCj Ab/RB Zb/RB Lb/RB RS/RB As/Ab Zs/Zb D/P
1 1295 -1295 -1295 -1295 -1295 1295 1295 1295
2 1287 1287 -1287 -1287 1287 -1287 -1287 1287
3 1098 -1098 1098 -1098 1098 -1098 1098 -1098
4 1148 1148 1148 -1148 -1148 1148 -1148 -1148
5 1580 -1580 -1580 1580 1580 1580 -1580 -1580
6 1113 1113 -1113 1113 -1113 -1113 1113 -1113
7 1001 -1001 1001 1001 -1001 -1001 -1001 1001
8 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231
Total 805 203 1097 1640 1755 720 875
Total/4 201 51 274 410 439 180 219
percentage cost improvement achieved by the buyer (after compensating the 
supplier’s loss) by switching from the supplier’s optimal policy to the joint optimal 
policy. Similarly, the supplier’s benefit, Sben%, expresses the supplier’s percent 
cost improvement by switching form the buyer’s optimal policy to the joint 
optimum. Table 4-16 shows that how the changes in the ratio o f inventory holding 
cost for both supplier and buyer, Rs/Rb, have the largest positive effect on the 
buyer’s benefits, Bben%. On the other hand, the ratio between the buyer’s demand 
rate and the supplier4 s production rate, D/P, has the largest negative effect on the 
buyer’s benefits, Bben%.
In regards to the supplier’s benefit, Sben%, the results reveal that the ratio 
between the buyer’s ordering cost and inventory holding cost for the buyer, Ab/ Rb, 
have the largest positive effect. In contrast, we find that the ratio between the setup 
cost for the supplier and the ordering cost for the buyer, As/Ab, have the largest 
negative effect on the supplier’s benefits. These results describe in Table 4-17.
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Table 4.16
Estimates of Effects on the Buyer’s Benefits, Bben%,
Run Bben% Ab/RB Zb/RB Lb/RB RS/RB As/Ab Zs/Zb D/P
1 -4% 4% 4% 4% 4% -4% -4% -4%
2 40% 40% -40% -40% 40% -40% -40% 40%
3 64% -64% 64% -64% 64% -64% 64% -64%
4 74% 74% 74% -74% -74% 74% -74% -74%
5 75% -75% -75% 75% 75% 75% -75% -75%
6 55% 55% -55% 55% -55% -55% 55% -55%
7 13% -13% 13% 13% -13% -13% -13% 13%
8 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total 22% -13% -30% 41% -27% -87% -219%
Total/4 6% -3% -7% 10% -7% -22% -55%
Table 4-17
Estimates of Effects on the Supplier’s Benefit, Sben%
Run Sben% Ab/RB Zb/RB Lb/RB RS/RB As/Ab Zs/Zb D/P
1 10% -10% -10% -10% -10% 10% 10% 10%
2 30% 30% -30% -30% 30% -30% -30% 30%
3 16% -16% 16% -16% 16% -16% 16% -16%
4 3% 3% 3% -3% -3% 3% -3% -3%
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6 19% 19% -19% 19% -19% -19% 19% -19%
7 3% -3% 3% 3% -3% -3% -3% 3%
8 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Total 36% -24% -24% 25% -43% 23% 17%
Total/4 9% -6% -6% 6% -11% 6% 4%
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4.3 Numerical and Managerial Analysis for the Case o f  Uncertainty
One o f the major assumptions under JIT supply is that the buyer and supplier 
operate in a deterministic environment and neither the buyer nor the supplier has to 
hold safety stock. However, in most practical cases, this assumption is not realistic. 
There are two options to maintain the required service level and to reduce 
uncertainty. The first option is that the supplier has flexible resources and the short 
production and supply lead-time enables to maintain the required service level 
without keeping safety stock. This option may not always feasible, especially in a 
short term, because o f the high investment in flexible technology, machines, and 
workers. The other option is that either the supplier or buyer holds a safety stock to 
protect against uncertainty. In this case, however considerable additional holding 
cost may occur.
The first section will focus on the effect of increasing demand uncertainty on 
the producer’s costs. It provides a sense o f  how economic or costly it is to invest in 
flexible resources. Next we will address the second option, where the buyer or the 
supplier has to hold safety stock.
4.3.1 The Effect o f  Demand Uncertainty on the Production Costs
First, we examine the effect o f increasing demand uncertainty on the cost of the 
producer based on the model described in Section (3.3.1). We decrease the rate o f the 
fixed contracted annual demand, Dc, relative to the random part o f the annual 
demand, D r. In our numerical example, Dc is decreased from 300 to 100 while the 
expected value o f the random demand, p. is fixed as 50. The annual production 
capacity o f  dedicated production resources level, Rd = Dc+ p. The annual production
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capacity o f  the flexible production resources is chosen to be large enough to satisfy 
the demand with a high service level. For the flexible resource Rf = ka, where we 
choose k=2 and k= 1.67 that correspond to a service level o f 97.72% and 90% , 
respectively. Also for comparison, we choose to have the same total resource level, 
Ra+Rf, so the resulting a  values vary between 100 and 0. For larger Dc values, a  is 
smaller.
The numerical results revealed the following tendencies. The unit cost o f 
production and unused resources increases with the increase o f demand uncertainty, 
as we expect. The marginal cost increase is not linear. An increasing marginal cost is 
observed as it is illustrated on Table.4.18 and Figure 4.6 As long as the a /p  rate 
(coefficient o f variation) is less than 1, the cost increase is within 10% range, but for 
a/p. = 2, the cost increase can be in the area o f 200%. The cost increase is influenced 
by the cost rates Vf /vd and u/vd (where vd denotes the unit production cost with 
dedicated resources, Vf denotes the unit production cost with flexible resources and u 
denotes the unit cost of unused dedicated production resources). The effect o f the 
cost rate u/vd seems to be larger based on the numerical results. Moreover, for lower 
service level (as k decreases), the cost saving will be larger as it illustrated on 
Table.4.19. and Figure 4.7. These quantitative results show that in the case o f high 
demand uncertainty and high cost of unused capacity, a particularly large cost 
increase can be expected with the increase of demand uncertainty. Appendix B 
contains further illustration.
The above model provides a quantitative tool to evaluate the option of 
investing in flexible resources or rather rely on safety stocks. Certainly, the
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production costs are only one of the factors considered in the decision, still 
quantifying them provides a major decision support in the above decision.
4.3.2 Error Analysis and Correction o f  the Safety Stock Approximation 
In the next two sections, we summarize our numerical results o f error 
analysis and correction o f safety stock approximations. First, we discuss the situation 
when the buyer is responsible for the safety stock. Then, we discuss the case when 
the supplier takes the responsibility o f holding safety stock.
4.3.2.1 The Case When the Buyer Holds the Safety Stock
In Section 3.2.2.2, we introduced the model published in Kelle and Miller 
(1998) for the case when the JIT supply is not reliable and the buyer needs to hold 
safety stock. For a given safety stock, M, expression (45) gives the (exact) service 
level, which we denote by a e, while formula (51) provides a simple approximation, 
we denote by a a. It is known that the approximation, a a, is quite inaccurate for a 
small number o f shipments, n, since it is based on an asymptotic relation which is 
true as n goes to infinity. Since the relative error is high even for moderately large n, 
we provide a simple correction formula based on a regression model to minimize the 
error. Corrections o f  this approximation were not considered in the literature before.
If the target service level is given, the required safety stock, Me, can be 
calculated by using numerical methods, based on expression (45). Using the simple 
approximation (51), the required safety stock can be approximated by the simple 
formula (51), which also has a high relative error. Here, we also provide a correction 
formula based on a regression model.
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Table 4.18
Effect of Decreasing Demand Uncertainty on the Unit Production Cost
Dc = 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
DR=n+k*a= 250 230 210 190 170 150 130 110 90 70 50
Rd=Dc+n.= 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 310 330 350
Rf=k*cr= 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Rate of increase n expected unit production cost, V:
Cost rates a  = 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Vf/vd=1.2 u/vd=0.2 1.33 1.22 1.13 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.2, u/vd=0.4 1.63 1.41 1.23 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/Vd=1.2, u/vd=0.6 1.93 1.60 1.34 1.17 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/Vd=1.5 u/Vd=0.2 1.38 1.27 1.17 1.11 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
V(/Vd=1.5, u/Vd=0.4 1.68 1.46 1.27 1.16 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.5, u/vd=0.6 1.98 1.65 1.37 1.21 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00
K=2,Rd+ R f =350
2 30
2 . 2 0
2.10
2 . 0 0
1 90
1 .8 0
1 .7 0
1 .6 0
1 .50
1 .4 0
1 .3 0
1 .20
1 . 0 0
— vf/vd = 1.2 . u/vd = 0
vf/vd = 1.2 u/vd = 0 .2
vf/vd = 1.2, u/vd = 0 .4
vf/vd = 1.2 . u/vd = 0 .6
X vf/vd = 1.2 , u/vd = 0 .8
1 00  90  80  70  60  50  40  30  2 0  10  0De ma n d  U ncerta  in ty, S igm a
Figure 4.6
Rate o f Increase in Expected Unit Production Cost, V: 
Service Level = 97.5%
111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 4.19
Effect of Decreasing Demand Uncertainty on the Unit Production Cost
Dc  = 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
D R = n+k*a= 215 199 182 166 149 133 116 99.5 83 66.5 50
Rd= D c+ M-= 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 310 330 350
R r=k*a= 165 149 132 116 99 82.5 66 49.5 33 16.5 0
Rate of increase in expected unit production cost, V:
Cost rates a  = 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Vf/vd=1.2, u/vd=0 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.2 u/Vd=0.2 1.46 1.34 1.22 1.12 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/Vd=1.2, u/vd=0.4 1.88 1.64 1.40 1.21 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/Vd=1.2, u/vd=0.6 2.30 1.95 1.59 1.31 1.15 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.2, uA/d=0.8 2.72 2.26 1.78 1.40 1.20 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00
K=2, Rd+ Rf =350
2 .3 0
2 . 2 0
2 . 0 0
1 .9 0
1 .8 0
1 .7 0
1 .6 0
1 .5 0
1 .4 0
1 .3 0
1 . 20
1.00
1 0 0  9 0  8 0  7 0  .60 5 0  4 0 t 3; 20  10  0
— vf/vd= 1 .2 , u/vd = 0
—m— vf/vd=1.2 u/vd = 0 .2
— vf/ vd=1. 2, u/vd = 0 .4
—* — vf/vd=1.2, u/vd = 0 .6
—* — vf/vd= 1 .2 . c '—.
 
< Q.
 11 o CD
Figure 4.7
Rate of Increase in Expected Unit Production Cost, V: 
Service Level = 90%
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First, we consider the relative error o f approximation a a, based on formula 
(51) by using different M and n values. The numerical results reveal that by 
increasing M, the relative error o f a a decreases. For larger n, small changes in M  do 
not have much influence on the relative error. An illustration is shown in Table 4.20 
and in Figure 4.8. Further results for different values o f M and n are presented in 
Appendix B.
Table 4.20
Relative Error in the Approximation of Alpha for n=10
M/n 10 10 10
exact Approx. error
0.15 0.417 0.362 -13.1%
0.2 0.603 0.551 -8.7%
0.25 0.755 0.713 -5.5%
0.30 0.865 0.835 -3.5%
0.35 0.933 0.914 -2.1%
0.40 0.971 0.959 -1.2%
0.45 0.989 0.983 -0.6%
0.50 0.996 0.993 -0.3%
0.14 
0.12 
_ 0.10 
0.08 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02
LU
CDS»
V S
iS0)DU
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
M
Figure 4.8
Relative Error in the Approximation o f a  for n=10
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The speed o f the convergence o f the asymptotic expression (42) is quite slow 
as it is shown in Table 4.21 and Figure 4.9. In general, the smaller the values o f M, 
n, and a, the larger the relative error o f a a (see Table 4.22, Figure 4.10, and Figure 
4.11)
Table 4.21
Relative Error in a  for Different n Values
M/n 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0.15 -13.1% -8.4% -5.8% -4.2% -3.1% -2.4% -1.8% -1.3% -1.1%
0.2 -8.7% -4.9% -3.0% -1.9% -1.3% -0.8% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3%
0.25 -5.5% -2.7% -1.4% -0.8% -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% - -
0.3 -3.5% -1.4% -0.6% -0.3% -0.1% - - - -
0.35 -2.1% -0.6% -0.2% - - - - - -
0.4 -1.2% -0.3% - - - - - - -
0.45 -0.6% - - - - - - - -
0.5 -0.3% - - - - - - - -
0.1
a ce -
0.08- 
2 0.07-
fo .0 6 -
0.05- Ffeiative Error in Alpha
0.04-
0.03-
0 .0 2 -
0.01 -
Figure 4.9
Relative Error in a  for M=0.2
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Table 4.22
Relative Error in Alpha for Different n and a  Values
oc/n 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0.8 -4.62% -3.98% -3.32% -2.97% -2.72% -2.52% -2.36% -2.23% -2.12%
0.85 -3.81% -3.04% -2.61% -2.33% -2.14% -1.98% -1.84% -1.74% -1.65%
0.9 -2.82% -2.19% -1.95% -1.63% -1.54% -1.42% -1.23% -1.26% -1.18%
0.95 -1.66% -1.40% -1.21% -0.94% -0.89% -0.85% -0.68% -0.72% -0.67%
0.03
0.025
0.02ui Relative
&ror0.015
0.01
0.005
10 15 20 25 30
0.035
0.03
0.025
0.02 Relative
E rror
0 .0 1
0.005
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
A lpha
Figure 4.11
Relative Error in a , for Alpha = 0.9 Relative Error in a , for Alpha = 0.9
The exact expression (38) requires tedious computation. The large error of 
the simple approximation makes it important to use some type o f correction. We use 
regression analysis. In order to minimize the relative error in a , we used the Least 
Square Method (LSM) and developed the following correction formula:
Corrected (a) = 0.1442 + Approximate (a) -  0.0653 (Log (n)) -  0.1685 (M) (113)
The range of relative error between the predicted value of a  and the exact 
value o f a  is between 0% and 1.1%. An illustration is shown in Figure 4.12.
Next, we analyze the relative error in the approximation (43) o f  the required 
safety stock by using different values o f a  and n. Our numerical results reveal that 
with the decrease o f a , the relative error in safety stock increases. These effects are
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Figure 4.12 
Comparison o f  Relative Error in a
illustrated in Table 4.23 and Figure 4.13.
Table 4.23
Relative Error o f Safety Stock Estimation, Ma (for n=20)
aJn 20 20 20
Me Ma Me-Ma/Me
0.8 0.193 0.200 -4.0%
0.85 0.210 0.217 -3.7%
0.9 0.231 0.240 -3.5%
0.95 0.264 0.273 -3.4%
0.042
0.04
0.038
0.036
0.034
0.032
0.03
R elative Error
A lpha
Figure 4.13
Relative Error o f Safety Stock Estimation, Ma (for n=20)
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Since the approximation is based on asymptotic results (when n goes to 
infinity), the relative error in safety stock approximation decreases as the value o f n 
increases. An illustration of this tendency is shown in Table 4.24 and in Figure 4.14.
Table 4.24
Relative Error in Safety Stock for Different m and a  Values
n= 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
alpha
0.8 -8.4% -5.8% -4.8% -4.0% -3.6% -3.3% -3.0% -2.7% -2.7% -2.5% -2.4%
0.85 -7.9% -5.5% -4.6% -3.7% -3.5% -3.1% -2.9% -2.7% -2.5% -2.4% -2.3%
0.9 -7.4% -5.2% -4.0% -3.5% -3.3% -2.9% -2.7% -2.5% -2.3% -2.3% -2.2%
0.95 -7.3% -5.1% -3.9% -3.4% -2.9% -2.6% -2.4% -2.3% -2.2% -2.0% -1.9%
Reative
Error
Figure 4.14
Relative Error in Safety Stock, Ma, for Alpha =0.8
Since the exact value o f the safety stock, Me, can only be calculated with a 
numerical search procedure based on expression (38), it is critical for the application 
to have a simple approximation. The large error o f the simple approximation, Ma,
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makes it important to use some kind of correction. We use regression analysis. In 
order to minimize the relative error, we used the Least Square Method (LSM) and 
developed the following correction formula:
Corrected (M) = Me -  0.02803 + 0.0184(Log (n)) -  0.0061 (a ) (135)
The range of relative error between the corrected safety stock and exact 
safety stock is between 0% and 3% as is illustrated in Figure 4.15. The new 
regression function in (135) can provide a good approximation .
0.04
Error Before Correction 
Error Ater Correction
N
Figure 4.15 
Relative Error in Ma and in Corrected M
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4.3.2.2 The Case When the Supplier Holds the Safety Stock
This section considers the case when the supplier is responsible for keeping a 
safety stock of finished goods to meet the buyer's shipment request on time, 
according to the JIT delivery agreement. In Section 3.3.3, we introduced a new 
model for the safety stock requirements o f the supplier if the supplier’s capacity is 
not flexible enough to meet the buyer’s request without holding safety stocks. For a 
given safety stock, M, expression (72) gives the (exact) service level, we denote by 
etc, while formula (74) provides a simple approximation, which we denote by a a. 
The service level depends on the number of shipments of an order, denoted by n, and 
also on the number o f setups per customer order, denoted by k. First, we check the 
accuracy o f this approximation (74), which is based on an asymptotic relation that 
holds as both n and k go to infinity.
If the target service level is given, we want to find the required safety stock. 
The exact value o f the safety stock, denoted by Me, can be calculated by numerical 
methods, based on expression (72). Using the asymptotic relation (74), the required 
safety stock can be approximated with the simple formula (75). We compare the 
exact value o f the safety stock with the approximation, Ma.
First, we consider the relative error in a  by using different values o f M, n, 
and k. The numerical results reveal that if  we increase M, the relative error in a  
decreases. For larger n, or k values, small changes in M do not have much influence 
on the relative error. An illustration is shown in Table 4.25 and Figure 4.16. The 
effect of changing the parameter k is also interesting. The relative error in a
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decreases as k increases assuming other parameters remain unchanged as it is shown 
in Figure 4.17.
Table 4.25 
Relative Error in the Approximation of ,a
k=l
M/n 10 20 30 40 50
0.1 -70.1% -49.1% -36.6% -28.6% -22.9%
0.2 -43.2% -22.2% -12.9% -7.9% -5.1%
0.3 -24.9% -8.5% -3.3% -1.3% -0.5%
0.4 -12.9% -2.4% -0.5% -0.1%
0.5 -5.7% -0.5% ,
0.6 -2.1% -0.1%
0.7 -0.6%
k=2
M/n 10 20 30 40 50
0.1 -73.4% -55.4% -42.0% -34.1% -28.0%
0.2 -50.8% -28.9% -18.5% -12.6% -8.9%
0.3 -32.0% -14.3% -7.1% -3.7% -2.0%
0.4 -20.5% -6.1% -2.1% -0.7% -0.3%
0.5 -11.6% -2.1% -0.4% -0.1%
0.6 -6.2% -0.6% -0.1%
0.7 -2.9% -0.1%
0.8 -1.2%
k=3
M/n 30 60 90 120
0.1 -47.7% -27.5% -18.5% _ -13.4%
0.2 -22.9% -9.3% -4.5% -2.3%
0.3 -10.5% -2.3% -0.6% -0.2%
0.4 -4.5% -0.4%
0.5 -1.4%
0.6 -0.3%
R d a t i v e  E r r o r
Figure 4.16
Relative Error in ,a, for n=20
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Figure 4.17 
Relative Error in ,a, for k=2, k=3 and n=30
For the supplier safety stock model we cannot develop a regression model for 
correcting the error o f the service level approximation, like we did in the previous 
section for the buyer’s case, because the service level, a  is a step function o f M. 
There are jumps at the values of c/n, where c is an integer (1 < c < n). However, the 
approximation is quite accurate also for relatively small k and n values at the jumps 
as it is shown in Figure 4.18.The error is less than 1% if the a  value is larger than 
0.8, which is the case in practice for the required service level, a . Thus, we can use 
the simple approximation for a  in the practically important cases.
Next, we analyze the relative error o f the safety stock expression (75) by 
using different values o f a , n and k. The numerical results reveal that as we increase 
k, the relative error in safety stock decreases as shown in Figure 4.19. In regards to 
changes in a  and n, there is no specific trend. These scenarios are described in Table 
4.26, Figure 4.20, and Figure 4.21.
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Figure 4.18
Exact Value and. Approximation of ,a , for n=k=10
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Figure 4.19
Relative Error in Safety Stock for k=2, k=3, and n=30
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Table 4.26 
Relative Error in Safety Stock
k=l
a/n 10 20 30 40 50
0.8 0.2% 13.6% 15.9% 0.2% 12.0%
0.85 8.8% 2.6% 7.7% 8.8% 8.2%
0.9 19.8% 12.9% 3.8% 6.5% 7.3%
0.95 9.4% 10.5% 5.3% 9.4% 2.0%
k=2
a/n 10 20 30 40 50
0.8 22.8% 15.9% 6.6% 9.2% 9.9%
0.85 6.6% 7.7% 2.6% 6.6% 8.4%
0.9 17.4% 3.7% 1.7% 6.7% 9.3%
0.95 11.7% 5.3% 5.7% 3.1% 7.0%
k=3
a/n 30 60 90 120
0.8 9.2% 7.2% 6.8% 3.7%
0.85 7.7% 7.9% 2.6% 1.5%
0.9 6.9% 4.0% 1.7% 2.4%
0.95 3.2% 5.3% 5.5% 3.1%
0.25
0.2
0.15
LLi
Relative Error
0.05
20 30 40 50
n=m
Figure 4.20
Relative Error in Safety Stock when n=k=30
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Figure 4.21
Relative Error in Safety Stock when ,a  = 0.9 
Similar to the service level approximation of the supplier’s case, we cannot 
develop a regression model for correcting the error o f the safety stock approximation 
(75), because the safety stock, M, is a step function o f a . There are jumps at the 
values of M = c/n, where c is an integer (1 < c < n). However, the approximation is 
quite accurate also for relatively small k and n values in at the jumps as it is shown in 
Figure 4.22. The error is less than 1% if the oc value is larger than 0.8, which is the 
case for the required service level, a . Thus, we can use the simple approximation for 
a  in the practically important cases. If  the safety stock M=c/n is used with integer c 
values, this is equivalent to holding integer multiple o f shipments size as a safety 
stock.
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Exact Safety Stock and Approximate Safety Stock 
when n=50 and k=50
4.3.3 Numerical and Managerial Analysis When the Buyer is Holding 
Safety Stock (Model 3)
In Section 3.4.3, we introduced Model 3 for the case when the JIT delivery is 
not reliable and the buyer needs to hold safety stock. In this section, first, we provide 
the numerical solution for the base-case set of parameters introduced in Section 4.1 
and used previously also in the other models for comparing the different scenarios. 
Next, we give a sensitivity and managerial analysis o f Model 3.
If the buyer is strong, we can find the optimal values for the shipment size, q, 
and the number of shipments, n, respectively using expression (114) and expression 
(115). The optimal number of shipments for the buyer is n=26 and the optimal
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shipment size, q, is 14. The numerical and cost results are summarized in the first 
column o f Table 4.27. The buyer’s total cost is $ 1100 and using the buyer’s optimal 
the supplier total cost is $ 1137.
Table 4.27
Optimal Ordering Policies and Relevant Costs
Policy Buyer's
Optimal
Supplier's
Optimal
Joint optimal
K - - 1
Number of shipment 
per order n
26 - 26
Number of shipment 
per lot size m
- 26 26
Shipment size q 14 20 17
Order quantity Qb 364 - 442
Production lot size Qs - 520 442
Buyer’s TRC 1100 1165 1116
Supplier’s TRC 1137 1073 1089
Overall TRCJ 2237 2238 2205
Buyer's Loss 0.00 6% 1%
Supplier’s loss 6% 0.00 2%
Similarly, if the supplier is strong, then the supplier can chose its best lot size 
as an integer multiple o f the shipment quantity, Qs = mqs. The numerical and cost 
results are summarized in the second column of Table 4.5. It shows the optimal 
shipment size for the supplier is 20 and the supplier’s total cost is $ 1073. I f  the 
buyer must accept the optimal lot size of the supplier, Qs = qs as the shipment size, 
the buyer’s total cost is $ 1165.
For the joint optimal policy o f the two parties, we use the results o f Section
3.4.3. From expression (99), we find the optimal values for the shipment size, q, and 
the value o f n, and m, respectively, using an iterative calculation. The optimal value 
o f n and m is the same, 26. The optimal shipment size q /  = 17. If  the two parties
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accept the joint shipment size, the total costs for the buyer is TRCeCqj*) = $ 1116, for 
the supplier, TRCs(qj’) =  $ 1089, and the total system cost is the minimum, $ 2205. 
Thus, the total system cost can be decreased by $ 32 (2%) if  the two parties are ready 
to switch from the buyer’s optimal policy to the joint optimal policy. Similarly, the 
total system gain is $ 33 (2%) by switching from the supplier’s optimal policy to the 
joint optimal policy.
As in the previous section, we examine the three different scenarios in 
negotiation, now considering the JIT supply case.
a.) I f  the supplier is strong, the buyer is willing to negotiate with the supplier for 
acceptance o f the joint order quantity in order to minimize the loss that is 
incurred by using the supplier’s optimal lot size as the shipment quantity. The 
buyer could have a cost decrease up to $ 16 (3%) after compensating the 
supplier for its loss. The costs are summarized in Table 4.28.
Table 4.28
Moving from Supplier’s Optimal to Joint Optimal
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 1165 1073 2238
Joint Optimal 1116 1089 2205
Cost Improvement 50 -16 34
Compensation -16 16 0
Buyer Benefit 34 0 34
Bben% 3% - -
b.) Similarly, we examine the case where the buyer is stronger than the supplier. 
In this case, the supplier is willing to make some sort o f concession, such as 
price discount, to the buyer to encourage the latter to accept the joint order
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quantity. The supplier could have a cost decrease up to $ 16 (3%) after 
compensating the buyer for its loss. Table 4.29 summarizes this result.
Table 4.29
Moving from Buyer’s Optimal to Joint Optimal
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 1100 1137 2237
Joint Optimal 1116 1089 2205
Cost Improvement -16 48 32
Compensation 16 -16 0
Supplier Benefit 0 32 32
Sben% - 3% -
c.) If the buyer and supplier are  willing to coordinate, and adjust their policy to 
the optimal joint shipment size, only a very small gain (2%) can be achieved 
relative to the buyer’s optimal policy in this numerical example. We will 
explore this issue later in more detail considering several different parameters.
Similarly, as in Section 4.2.2, we evaluate the effect o f the cost parameters on 
the joint optimal solution. We use the cost information from the previous example 
with the base-case parameter values used in each comparison. The values for the 
optimal solution are q* = 17, TRC* = 2205, Bben* = 3% and 'Sben* = 3%. Table 4.30 
shows the percentage increase or decrease in the optimal solution at different of 
values o f cost parameters.
From Table 4.29, we can see that the buyer’s inventory holding inventory 
cost, rb, and the selling price, Cb, are the most influential cost parameters and have 
almost the identical effect on the shipment size q.
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Table 4.30
The Effect o f Cost Parameters on the Outcome Variables
As Ab rb Rs Zb Zs Cb Cs Lb pr dr
-50%
Qj 5% 4% 55% l 0
) >p o'* -14% -21% 54% 1 0) nP o'* -1% -12% 6%
TRCj -11% -8% -14% -11% -3% -5% -17% -11% -2% -15% 6%
Bben -75% 177% -85% 250% 17% -66% -96% 250% -25% 402% -51%
Sben -81% 236% -82% 168% 32% -67% -95% 168% -22% 244% -46%
As Ab rb Rs Zb Zs Cb C s Lb Pr dr
-25%
Qj 2% 2% 20% -3% -7% -10% 19% -3% 0% -4% 3%
TRCj -5% -4% -7% -5% -1% -2% -8% -5% -1% -4% 3%
Bben -35% 71% -47% 01% 7% -33% -57% 84% -13% 63% -30%
Sben -43% 86% -42% 63% 13% -34% -52% 65% -11% 50% -26%
As Ab rb R s Zb Zs Cb C s Lb Pr dr
25%
Qj -2% 2% -13% 2% 6% 10% -12% 2% 0% 2% -3%
TRCj 5% -4% 6% 5% 1% 2% 7% 5% 1% 2% -3%
Bben 28% 71% 49% -47% -6% 32% 63% -47% 13% -25% 44%
Sben 42% 86% 39% -42% -10% 33% 49% -42% 11% -22% 35%
As Ab rb Rs Zb Zs Cb C s Lb pr dr
50%
Qj -4% -3% -22% 5% T3% 19% -21% 5% 1% 4% -6%
TRCj 10% 7% 12% 10% 3% 4% 14% 10% 2% 4% -7%
Bben 51% -76% 98% -73% -10% 62% 127% -73% 26% -38% 111%
Sben 82% -79% 75% -68% -17% 64% 94% -68% 21% -33% 83%
If  we increase either n> or C b, the shipment size q will decrease. Also, we can 
see that the production rate, pr, has the largest effect on the total relevant cost TRC 
and on the buyer’s benefits Bben. Ordering costs have the most significant impact on 
supplier benefits.
Further investigations have been made to find the best value for k which 
provides the minimum total relevant cost. The results reveal that this is when k=l is
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the optimal, which means that the optimal lot size and shipment size are equal. 
Figure 4.23 shows how the total relevant cost depends on the value o f  k.
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Figure 4.23
Total Relevant Costs with Different Values of k
Figure 4.24 shows the effect o f the customer service level, a , on the optimal 
total relevant cost TRC and the optimal shipment size q. The larger the value o f a , 
the larger the total relevant cost and the smaller the shipment size.
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Figure 4.24
Total Relevant Cost and Shipment Size with Different Values of a
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4 .3 .4  N um erical and Managerial Analysis when the Supplier is Holding 
Safety Stock (Model 41
In Section 3.4.4, we considered the situation where the supplier relies on a 
safety stock o f finished goods to meet the buyer's shipment request on time, 
according to the JIT delivery agreement. This is typical in the transition state to JIT, 
when the supplier may have capacity, flexibility, quality, or scheduling problems 
preventing on time delivery. In this section, first, we provide the numerical solution 
for the base-case set o f parameters introduced in Section 4.1 and used previously in 
the other models to compare different scenarios. Next, we give sensitivity and 
managerial analysis o f  Model 4.
If the buyer is strong, we can find the optimal values for the shipment size, q, 
and the number o f shipments, n, respectively, using expression (20) and expression 
(26). The optimal number of shipments for the buyer is n=7 and the optimal 
shipment size, q, is 76. The numerical and cost results are summarized in the first 
column o f Table 4.25. The buyer’s total cost is $599 and using the buyer’s optimal 
the supplier total cost is $2015.
Similarly, if the supplier is strong, then the supplier can chose its best lot size 
as an integer multiple o f the shipment quantity, Qs = mqs. The numerical and cost 
results are summarized in the second column o f Table 4.31. It shows the optimal 
shipment size qs = 28, and the number of shipments per lot size, m=7, for the 
supplier, using expression (65) and expression (68). The supplier’s total cost is $ 
1613. If the buyer must accept the optimal lot size o f the supplier, Qs = qs as the 
shipment size, the buyer’s total cost is $ 748.
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Table 4.31
Optimal Ordering Policies and Relevant Costs
Policy Buyer's
Optimal
Supplier's
Optimal
Joint optimal
K - - 1
Number of shipment 
per order n
7 - 7
Number of shipment 
per lot size m
“ 7 7
Shipment size q 76 28 46
Order quantity Qb 532 - 322
Production lot size Qs - 196 322
Buyer’s TRC 599 748 675
Supplier’s TRC 2015 1613 1643
Overall TRCJ 2614 2361 2318
Buyer's Loss - 25% 13%
Supplier’s loss 25% - 2%
For the joint optimal policy o f the two parties, we use the results in Section
3.4.4. From expression (120), we find the optimal values for the shipment size, q, 
and the value of n, and m, respectively, using an iterative calculation. The optimal 
value of n and m is the same, 7. The optimal shipment size is q /  = 46. I f  the two 
parties accept the joint shipment size, the total costs for the buyer is TRCe(q/) = 
$675, for the supplier TRCs(qj’) = $1643, and the total system cost is the minimum, 
$2318. Thus, the total system cost can be decreased by $296 (13%) if the two parties 
are ready to switch from the buyer’s optimal policy to the joint optimal policy. 
Similarly, the total system gain is $43 (2%) by switching from the supplier’s optimal 
policy to the joint optimal policy.
As in the previous section, we examine the three different scenarios in 
negotiation, now considering the case when the supplier holds safety stock.
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a.) If  the supplier is strong, the supplier will urge the buyer to agree to order the 
supplier's optimal lot size as the shipment size. In this case, the buyer is willing 
to negotiate with the supplier for the acceptance o f  the joint order quantity in 
order to minimize the loss that is incurred by using the supplier’s optimal lot 
size as the shipment size. The buyer could have a cost decrease up to $ 43 (6%) 
after compensating the supplier for its loss. The costs are summarized in Table 
4.32.
Table 4.32
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 748 1613 2361
Joint Optimal 675 1643 2318
Cost Improvement 73 -30 43
Compensation -30 30 0
Buyer Benefit 43 - 43
Bben% 6% - -
b.) Similarly, we examine the case where the buyer is stronger than the supplier. 
In this case, the supplier is willing to make some sort o f concession, such as a 
price discount, to the buyer to encourage the latter to accept the joint order 
quantity. The supplier could have a cost decrease of up to $296 (3%) after 
compensating the buyer for its loss. Table 4.33 summarizes this result.
Table 4.33
Moving from Buyer’s Optimal to  Joint Optimal
Buyer's
Cost
Supplier
Cost
Total
Cost
Supplier Optimal 599 2015 2614
Joint Optimal 675 1643 2318
Cost Improvement -76 372 296
Compensation 76 -76 0
Supplier Benefit 0 296 296
Sben% 15%
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c.) I f  the buyer and supplier are willing to coordinate, and adjust their policy to 
the optimal joint shipment size, a gain o f 15% can be achieved relative to the 
supplier's optimal policy in this numerical example. We will explore this issue 
later in more detail considering several different parameters.
Similarly, as in previous sections, we evaluate the effect o f the cost parameters 
on the joint optimal solution. We use the cost information from the previous 
example with the base-case parameter values used in each comparison. The values 
for the optimal solution are q* = 46, TRC* = 2318, Bben = 6% and Sben = 15%. 
Table 4.34 shows the percentage increase or decrease in the optimal solution for 
different o f values o f the cost parameters.
From Table 4.34, we can see that the buyer’s inventory holding cost, rb, the 
purchase price, Cb, and shipping cost for the supplier, Zs, are the most influential cost 
parameters on the shipment size q. The first two parameters have almost an identical 
effect on the shipment size q. The same results were revealed in Model 3. If  we 
increase either rb or Cb, the shipment size q will decrease. In the opposite, as we 
increase the shipping cost for the supplier, the shipment size, q, increases. Also, we 
can see that the unit production cost, Cs, and inventory holding cost for the supplier, 
rs, have the largest effect on the total relevant cost TRC. The ordering cost, Ab, and 
the setup cost, As, have the most significant impact on buyers benefit Bben% but in 
opposite directions. As the setup cost increases, the buyer’s benefit decreases. In 
contrast, an increase in ordering cost provides a reduction in the buyer’s benefit. 
Finally, the set up cost and the purchase price, Cb, have the largest effect on supplier 
benefit.
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Table 4.34
The Effect of Cost Parameters on the Outcome Variables
As Ab rb rs Zb Zs Cb C s Lb pr dr
-50%
qj -4% -3% 15% 8% -8% -18% 16% 8% 1% -11% 5%
TRCj -10% -7% 3% -24% -4% 0% 1% -24% -2% -8% 7%
Bben 127% -73% 36% -53% -8% 23% 57% -53% 19% -6% 7%
Sben 64% -63% 60% -63% -6% 26% 103% -63% 28% -9% 10%
As Ab rb rs Zb Zs Cb Cs Lb pr dr
-25%
qj -2% -1% 7% 7% -4% -6% 7% 7% 0% -2% 2%
TRCj -5%
vOO'*
C
O1 1% -13% -2% -3% 0% -13% -1% -5% 3%
Bben 47% -37% 17% -28% -4% 4% 26% -28% 9% -6% 4%
Sben 28% -28% 26% -36% -3% 3% 41% -36% 13% -9% 6%
As Ab rb rs Zb Zs Cb Cs Lb pr dr
25%
qj 2% 1% -6% -6% 4% 5% -6% -6% 0% 2% -2%
TRCj 4% 3% -1% 12% 2% 3% 0% 12% 1% 3% -3%
Bben -30% 36% -15% 20% 4% -4% -22% 20% -8% 3% -5%
Sben -22% 22% -20% 31% 2% -2% -28% 31% -12% 4% -6%
As Ab rb rs Zb Zs Cb Cs Lb pr dr
50%
qj 3% 3% -10% -10% 7% 10% -11% -10% -1% 3% -3%
TRCj 8% 6% -1% 23% 4% 5% 1% 23% 2% 5% -7%
Bben -51% 71% -26% 36% 7% -7% -39% 36% -16% 5% -10%
Sben -39% 39% -33% 59% 5% -4% -49% 59% -22% 7% -14%
Further investigations have been made to find the b'est value for k which 
provides the minimum total relevant cost. The results reveal that k=l is optimal, 
which means that the optimal lot size and shipment size are equal. Figure 4.25 shows 
the relationship between the total relevant cost and the value o f  k.
Figure 4.26 shows the effect o f the customer service level, a , on the optimal 
total relevant cost TRC and the optimal shipment size q. The larger the value o f a , 
the larger the total relevant cost and the smaller the shipment size.
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Figure 4.26
Total Relevant Cost and Shipment Size for Different Values o f ,a
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Further analyses have been made to identify the cost parameters that have the 
most significant effect on the joint optimal solution. The numerical results reveal that 
the inventory holding cost for the supplier, rs, is the most influential cost parameter 
on the joint optimal value o f the total relevant cost, TRCj. As we increase the 
inventory holding cost for the supplier, rs, the total relevant cost TRCj will increase. 
The relationship is nearly linear and is expressed in equation (136) with R2 = 0.999. 
The form o f the relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.27.
TRCj % = 0.4869 (rs %) - 0.007 (136)
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10%  -
o
-40% -20% 20%-60% 40% 60%
- 10%  -
- 20%  -
-30% J 
% Change in rs
Figure 4.27
The Relationship Between % Change in rs % Change in TRC
Also, we find that the shipping cost for the supplier, Zs, and selling price, Cb, 
cause the highest incremental changes in the joint optimal shipment size, qj. The 
shipment size increase is close to linear with the decrease o f the cost parameter Cb. 
The regression line (137) describes this relationship where R2 = 0.995. The shipping 
cost, for the supplier, Zs, has opposite effect on the shipment size as it is described by 
the linear regression line, (138). Figure 4.28 shows these relationships.
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qj % = 0.0119 -  0.2685 (CB %) 
qj % = 0.2516 ( Zs%) -  0.0119
(137)
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The Relationship Between % Change in Zs and Cb with % Change in q
Figure 4.29 illustrates how the changes in the setup cost, As, and the ordering 
cost, Ab, will affect the buyer’s percentage benefits, Bben%. As the setup cost, As, 
increases, Bben% decreases whereas the change in the ordering cost yields the 
opposite behavior. The relationship between the setup cost and ordering cost with 
buyer's benefit is expressed in equations (139) and (140), respectively. Figure 4.29 
describes these relationships.
Bben% = 1.5568 ( As %)2 - 1.698 (As%) - 0.0107 (139)
Bben% = 1.45398 (Ae %) - 0.008 (140)
In regard to the supplier’s benefit, Sben, the purchase price, Cb, and the 
production cost for the supplier, Cs, are the most significant cost parameters 
affecting the supplier’s benefit. As shown in Figure 4.30, the supplier’s benefit 
increases as the supplier price, Cs, increases and the supplier's benefit decreases as
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the buyer price, CB, increases. These relationships can be expressed with the
regression lines (141) and (142), respectively:
S ben% =  1.2787 (Cs%) - 0.0255 (141)
with R2 = 0.997 and
Sben% = 1.0889 (CB%)2-  1.4723 (CB%) (142)
with R2 = 0.999
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% Change in As and Ab
Figure 4.29
The Relationship Between % Change in As and AB with % Change in %Bben
4.4 Comparison o f  the Four Models
In this section, we compare the costs, benefits, and the optimal decision 
variables o f the four basic models. These models are:
a.) Deterministic case with the same number o f setups and deliveries, 
hence, n = m (Model 1, described in Section 3.4.1)
b.) Deterministic case with different number o f setups and deliveries 
(Model 2, described in Section 3.4.2)
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c.) Transition to JIT when the buyer is holding safety stock (Model 3, 
described in Section 3.4.3)
d.) Transition to JIT when the supplier is holding safety stock (Model 
4, described in Section 3.4.4)
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Figure 4.30
The Relationship Between % Change in Cb and Cs with % Change in %Sben
Numerical results reveal that the optimal number o f deliveries is the largest 
and the optimal shipment size is the smallest for Model 3. Since Model 3 and 
Model 4 include the necessary safety stock required to meet the customer service 
prescribed, they have largest joint total cost compared to Model 1 and Model 2, 
which do not include safety stocks. Model 4 has the largest total joint cost compared 
to the other models, and Model 2 offers the largest saving for the buyer when the 
buyer and supplier accept the joint optimal policy. In contrast, Model 4 offers the 
largest saving for the supplier when the buyer and the supplier in this case. An 
illustration of the numerical results is shown in Table 4.35.
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In examining the cost parameters involved for the buyer and the supplier in 
the four models, we recognize some common tendencies. Each party has the lowest 
cost for their optimal order quantity, and each party, also, has the highest cost if the 
other party’s optimal solution is applied. I f  the joint optimal solution is agreed upon, 
it provides the best compromise. Each party does not benefit as much as they would 
if  their optimal values are adopted, however, the joint total cost is lower than if the 
other party’s optimal order quantity is ordered or any other policy is applied. This 
fact is the basis o f  negotiations and motivation for JIT Partnership.
Table 4.35 
Comparison of the Four Models
Policy Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4
K - - 1 1
Number of shipment per 
lot size m
16 12 26 7
Number o f shipment per 
order n
16 23 26 7
Shipment size q 34 38 17 46
Order quantity Qb 544 874 442 322
Production lot size Qs 544 456 442 322
Buyer’s TRC 510 494 1116 675
Supplier’s TRC 1010 983 1089 1643
Overall TRCJ 1520 1477 2205 2318
Bben% 40% 44% 3% 6%
Sben% 6% 10% 3% 15%
Next, we compare Model 1 with the new extension Model 2. The optimal 
number of deliveries and the delivery size is larger for Model 2 than model 1. It also 
offers a larger savings for both parties if either party accept to move from the 
optimal policy o f the other party to the joint optimal than model 1. An illustration of 
this is given in Table 4.36.
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Table 4.36
Comparison Between Model-1 and Model-2
Policy Model-1 Model-2 Rate o f change
Number o f shipment per lot size m 16 12 -25.0%
Number of shipment per order n 16 23 43.8%
Shipment size q 34 38 11.8%
Order quantity Qb 544 874 60.7%
Production lot size Qs 544 456 -16.2%
Buyer’s TRC 510 494 -3.1%
Supplier’s TRC 1010 983 -2.7%
Overall TRCJ 1520 1477 -2.8%
Bben% 40% 44% 10.0%
Sben% 6% 10% 66.7%
In regard to comparisons between Model 3 with the new extension, Model 4, 
the results show that the total joint cost under Model 3 is smaller than in Model 4. 
This result can be justified by the fact that the supplier can hold safety stock more 
economically to meet the demand of several buyers rather than the buyer can hold 
safety stock for every supplier. The optimal number o f deliveries is smaller for 
Model 4 and the delivery size is larger than in Model 3. Model 4 offers larger 
savings for both parties than Model 3 if either party accepts the move from the 
optimal o f  the other party to the joint optimal. An illustration of this is given in Table 
4.37.
The effect o f changes in cost parameter values on the total joint cost is also o f 
interest. We examine the parameter effects on the percentage total joint cost changes 
between Model 1 and Model 2 together, and then between Model 3 and Model 4 
together.
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Table 4.37
Comparison Between Model-3 and Model-4
Policy Model-3 Model-4 Rate of change
k 1 1 0.0%
Number of shipment per 
lot size m
26 7 -73.1%
Number of shipment per 
order n
26 7 -73.1%
Shipment size q 17 46 170.6%
Order quantity Qb 442 322 -27.1%
Production lot size Qs 442 322 -27.1%
Buyer’s TRC 1116 675 -39.5%
Supplier’s TRC 1089 1643 50.9%
Overall TRCJ 2205 2318 5.1%
Bben% 3% 6% 100.0%
Sben% 3% 15% 400.0%
In Model 1 and Model 2, the setup costs for the supplier and the cost 
per unit for the buyer has the largest effect on the percentage change of the total joint 
cost. The results reveal that as we decrease the setup cost for the supplier or the cost 
per unit for the buyer, the percentage change in the total joint cost between Model 1 
and Model 2 increases. The latter provides the smallest increase in the percentage 
change in the total joint cost. Also, the demand rate and production rates have an 
inverse effect on the percentage change in the total joint cost. An illustration is 
shown in Table 4.38. The new extensions always have the lowest total optimal joint 
cost; however, there is a smaller difference than we expected. This can be the result 
of the low sensitivity to changes of the EOQ type order quantity models. The robust 
model results in small cost differences.
We now examine the effect o f changing the cost parameter values on the total 
joint cost using Model 3 and Model 4. Table 4.39 shows that the inventory holding 
cost for the supplier has the largest effect on the percentage change in the total joint
143
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cost, as we would expect. As the inventory holding costs increases, the percentage 
change in total joint cost decreases.
Table 4.38
Savings Achieved in TRC by Model 2 Compared to Model 1
As Ab Rb rs Zb Zs Cb C s Lb pr dr
-75% 11% 0% 3% 0% 3% 1% 6% 0% 7% 0% 5%
-50% 6% 1% 3% 1% 3% 2% 4% 1% 5% 1% 4%
-25% 4% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 4% 2% 4%
25% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2%
50% 2% 4% 3% 4%. 3% 3% 2% 4% 2% 3% 1%
75% 1% 4% 3% 4% 2% 3% 1% 4% 1% 4% 1%
Table 4.39
Comparison Between Model 3 and Model 4 with respect to TRJC
As Ab rb rs Zb Zs Cb Cs Lb pr Dr
-75% 0% -7% -25% 38% -9% -8% -26% 38% -5% -13% -6%
-50% -7% -6% -21% 11% -4% -9% -21% 11% -5% -12% -6%
-25% -6% -5% -13% 4% -4% -4% -12% 4% -5% -5% -5%
25% -4% -4% 2% -11% -5% -6% 2% -11% -5% -5% -5%
50% -4% -4% 8% -15% -6% -6% 8% -15% -5% -5% -5%
75% -9% -4% 7% -19% -6%. -7% 7% -19% -5% -5% -11%
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CHAPTER 5 
JIT PARTNERSHIP WITH THE USE OF AN ELECTRONIC DATA  
INTERCHANGE AND ACTIVITY BASED COSTING
5.1 Introduction
This chapter intends to lay the theoretical groundwork for the integration of 
ABC and EDI with JIT partnership. Therefore, this chapter is divided into two 
sections: the first section reviews and compares the concept o f ABC to JIT 
partnership and the second section covers the use o f EDI in a JIT environment.
In the first section, we will outline the major differences between a traditional 
costing system and an activity-based system. Using a numerical example, we 
demonstrate that ABC can provide management with more accurate information than 
the traditional costing system concerning the costs and benefits o f implementing JIT 
partnership. Next, we specify the cost activities, cost drivers, and traceable costs in 
order to examine the effect of using ABC in evaluating the costs and benefits of 
using JIT to buyers and suppliers.
In the second section, we will address the following issues: definition o f EDI, 
the importance of sharing information to a JIT Partnership, the economic feasibility 
of implementing such technology, and the benefits of adopting EDI in a JIT 
environment.
5.2 Activity Based Costing System and JIT Partnership
One of the major problems associated with JIT models that are developed in 
operations management is that companies lack the appropriate data to quantify the 
costs and benefits o f implementing JIT partnerships. In the past, a traditional costing 
system has typically has been applied to collect such data. Since this method is
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unable to keep track o f all cost items that are associated with inventory costs, a new 
method emerged in the early 1990s, called Activity Based Costing accounting 
system (ABC). CAM-I (the Consortium for Advanced Manufacturing-International) 
defines ABC as a method recognizing the causal relationship o f cost drivers to cost 
activities by measuring the cost and performance o f process-related activities and 
cost objects (Holmen, 1995). We apply this method in our study, since we believe 
that ABC overcomes most o f the shortcomings of traditional costing systems and, 
also, accommodates the changes in the cost structures o f the inventory costs.
5.2.1 Traditional Costing System versus ABC System
A traditional costing (TC) system defines the cost o f a product as including 
those elements that constitute the dollar values assigned to manufacture products for 
inventory valuation and external reporting. Under this definition, product cost 
consists o f three major elements: direct material, direct labor, and manufacturing 
overhead. Direct materials and direct labor costs are considered to be traceable 
directly to the product. But, manufacturing overhead o f both production and 
management service departments is treated as an indirect cost o f the product and is 
charged to the product by use o f  predetermined overhead rates (e.g., direct labor 
hours) (Harris, 1990). The traditional cost accounting method assumes that all 
overhead resources are used at the same rate proportionally with the driver costs by 
all products. Therefore, many experts believe that the amount o f overhead cost 
allocated is inaccurate (Homgren, et.1994). The assumptions o f traditional costing 
usually are inaccurate because, for example, some products, relative to others, 
require more or less engineering support, setup time, or data processing, etc. When
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the cost system, either the one used within the accounting department or the one 
embedded within an MRPII system, allocates overhead this way, the result is 
distorted costs. For example, frequently low-volume and specialty products are under 
cost and high-volume and standard products are over cost (Cooper, 1988).
In an ABC costing system, the focus is on measuring the costs o f activities 
that consume resources. Once the activities’ costs are identified, the activities are 
traced to the products that caused the activities. Costs are then assigned to the 
products based on their share o f the activities generated. More accurate product costs 
are the result of an ABC costing system. Therefore, the company is in a better 
competitive position because it can determine more accurately its products’ costs. 
Parenthetically, it might be noted that this development could be used to their 
advantage by purchasing negotiators in cost analysis work.
Under the JIT philosophy, there are some unnecessary activities like 
inspecting parts when they are delivered by the vendor, and placing them on shelves 
on in the stockroom. Eliminating these activities reduces the overall cost and the cost 
of the products that no longer required such activities. ABC provides a good estimate 
of the cost of eliminated unnecessary activities. The cost o f inspection activity, for 
example, is likely to be identified separately. If  inspection activity is eliminated, the 
ABC system will reveal both the overall reduction in cost and the specific source of 
the cost reduction. On the other hand, a traditional cost system is unlikely to reveal 
the potential cost saving that comes from eliminating activities. The cost savings are 
typically buried in large overhead pools that do not reveal the source behind cost 
reduction. Finally, cost control is also improved because costs are identified with the
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activities that incurred the costs. Better-cost control is facilitated by use o f an ABC 
costing system. These factors clearly can lead to increased profitability and 
competitiveness.
5.2.2 The ABC Method o f  Determining Unit Costs
The process that ABC follows in allocating manufacturing overhead to actual 
units produced differs from that used under TC. ABC divides manufacturing 
overhead into four different levels o f activities: unit-level activities, batch-level 
activities, product-level activities, and facility-level activities (Cooper, 1990). 
Unit-Level Activities: Unit level activity changes in proportion to the number of 
units produced. Usually, TC takes into account unit-level activities, but ABC often 
includes many new unit-level activities that typically are not identified separately in 
TC. For example, the number of inspection times and the pounds of material handled 
are unit-level cost drivers for inspection and material handling.
Batch-Level Activities: Batch-level activities are performed for each batch of 
product processed. The amount of batch-level activity performed depends on the lot 
size. For a given product, if a lot size is small, more batches will have to be 
processed to meet a given level o f demand. Therefore, a product produced in shorter 
runs will require more batch-level activity. The common batch-level activity is a 
machine setup. Once a machine has been set up for a production run, it can be used 
to produce one, 1,000 or 10,000 units. As a result, the total setup cost varies with the 
number o f setups or batches and not with the number of units produced. Many other 
examples o f batch-level activity exist in different operations, such as, the schedule 
time and the assembly setup time.
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Product-Level Activities: Product-level activities are those that are performed for 
specific product types. These activities and associated costs do not vary with respect 
to the number o f units produced or the number o f batches run. Some examples 
include the number o f raw material shipments received, number o f  finished goods 
shipments made, number o f purchased orders received, and number o f part numbers 
(Sherrad and McEwen, 1997).
Facility-level activities: Any costs that do not vary with unit-level, batch-level, or 
product-level activity are considered to be true facility-level activities. Examples 
include plant supervision, and building occupancy, providing utilities, and providing 
space for inventory. These costs are common to a variety o f products and are the 
most difficult to link to product-specific activities.
5.2.3 Implementation o f  the ABC
Activity-Based Costing, as the name suggests, traces the cost to the cost 
objects (products, customers, etc.) through activities. This is in contrary to traditional 
cost accounting, which traces costs directly to products. Activities, rather than 
products, consume resources and the demand for_ those activities in the 
manufacturing process determine how the costs are allocated to the individual cost 
objects. Resources include all the costs recorded by the accounting system in 
carrying out daily business, such as salaries, materials and, overhead (rent utilities, 
insurance, advertising, etc.). Activities are procedures that are carried out in order to 
manufacture a product or provide a service.
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The business process can be broken down into several activities. Typically, 
these activities are grouped by function and each group is referred to as an activity 
center. Cost objects are the final result o f the business process.
The two-stage cost assignment, from resources to activities and then from 
activities to cost objects, is based on multiple cost drivers, such as number o f setups, 
square footage o f warehouse space, number of purchase orders, machine hours, 
number o f parts, number o f  defects, etc. Cost drivers are the bases used to make cost 
assignments and can be resource drivers or activity drivers, depending on whether 
we are allocating resource costs to activities or activity costs to products, 
respectively. Cost drivers are selected to reflect the cause-and-effect relationships in 
the manufacturing process. While traditional cost accounting allocates costs to 
products using volume cost drivers, ABC recognizes that costs may be driven by 
other factors, such as complexity.
Direct labor and direct materials can be allocated the same way under either 
traditional cost accounting or ABC, but overhead allocation is much more 
sophisticated under ABC, since it allows for multiple cost drivers. As a result, the 
ABC product costs can be radically different from those of the traditional cost 
accounting system. For example, traditional cost accounting will undercost a 
complex, low volume product, subsidizing its cost by allocating most o f the 
overhead to high volume, standard products. The result can lead to incorrect 
decisions about product mix, pricing and process improvement. ABC is able to 
provide a more refined and “ accurate” view of process costs helped by the 
widespread use o f computer technology in manufacturing environments. This
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enables companies to economically compile the multiple cost driver information 
needed for the ABC system.
If we look at the allocation rates used in any cost accounting systems 
(including ABC) we note that they are stated in terms of dollars per unit. The 
numerator is the cost o f resources or activities (in dollars) and the denominator is a 
measure o f how the resource or activity is consumed (for example, time, number of 
parts, dollars, etc.). In ABC, the denominators used to allocate resource dollars to 
activities are called resource drivers, and those used to allocate activity dollars to 
products are called activity drivers. Figure 5.1 illustrates the ABC allocation of costs 
to products (or cost objects).
Let the dollar amount of each resource cost pool k be Cri<. Then, the total cost
of resources to be assigned to products (or any other cost objects) will
= C . The actual amounts are usually obtained from the accounting
k
records, such as the general ledger, or the operating budget for each department. The 
first step is to assign the resource dollars in each department to the activities 
performed in that department.
Each cost pool within the department uses a different resource driver or
allocation base in order to distribute Crj;. For example, if we want to allocate fuel
costs, we might use number o f gallons as our allocation base. Let rkj be the amount of 
resource k driver (allocation base) consumed by activity j (the number o f gallons 
consumed by each activity).
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Resources (k) CR
Resource
Drivers
Activity Drivers
Activities (j)
Products ( i )
CP
Figure 5.1 
Activity-Based Cost Allocation
Then, the total allocation base for resource k is: = rk (The total number of
gallons used by the department) and the allocation rate for resource k will be Crr/ tr 
(dollars /  gallon). The dollar amount allocated from resource k to activity j is
Next, we will allocate the cost o f each activity to the products that demand 
that activity. Suppose the activity is material transfer, which included fuel costs, as 
well as other resource costs then we might choose to allocate the costs o f this activity 
based on the number of trips. Let ay be the amount o f activity j driver (trips) 
consumed by product i (for simplicity, assume each trip can only accommodate one 
type o f product). Then, the total activity driver (total number o f trips) for activity j is 
= aj and the allocation rate for j is CAj/ aj (dollars / trip). The cost of activity j
j
calculated as CRk = Crkj. We do this for all the resources to arrive at the cost
of the activities. Thus, each activity j has a total dollar cost of = CAJ.
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aJ
= CAJi and the total cost o f productallocated to product i is calculated as Caj 
i will be ^ j C Aji = Cpi .
j
Note that it is possible (and often necessary) to allocate the cost of one or 
more activities to other activities, rather than directly to products. This will be the 
case for support activities or departments such as maintenance or personnel. In this 
case, the total cost of some activities would include not only CRkj dollars, but also 
some CAji dollars (where the cost of activity j had been allocated to activity i)
5.2.4 An Example o f ABC Application
A simple example can be used to (1) illustrate the difference between 
traditional costing and ABC, and (2) demonstrate a complete application of these 
new ABC methods in a product costing system. Suppose a company manufactures 
three products: A, B, and C. The products differ in batch sizes (volume). Assume 
that the company’s $ 10 million indirect manufacturing expenses (overhead 
resources) is to be allocated to the three products A  B, and C. (this example is 
limited to overhead resources, since direct materials and labor are assumed to be 
allocated directly to the product).
Table 5.1 shows the allocation o f these resources directly to each product 
using a traditional cost accounting system based on machine hours. Suppose that four 
activities consume the resources: purchasing, planning, receiving, and production 
inspection. Table 5.2 shows the activities and associated total costs and cost drivers.
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Table 5.1
Traditional Overhead Allocation ($ millions)
Product Volume Mach hours 
(hr)
O/H rate 
($)
Allocation 
($ Millions)
Cost/Unit
$/unit
A 2000 200 10000 2 $ 1000
B 2000 300 10000 3 $ 1500
C 4000 500 10000 5 $ 1250
Total 1000 10
Table 5.3 shows the assignment of the cost drivers (unit per cost object). In 
Table 5.4, the allocation of the costs of the activities to each of the products is given. 
Note the significant differences in the cost per unit o f products A and C. Such 
changes in product cost are typical when an ABC system is implemented and a more 
accurate allocation o f overhead is made.
Table 5.2
Activities and Associated Total Costs and Cost Drivers ($ millions)
Activities Total
Cost
Cost Driver
Purchasing 4 No. o f purchase order (P.O)
Planning 2 No. unit produced
Receiving 1 No. o f shipments
Production
inspection
3 (No. o f inspection per unit) x (No. of 
units produced)
$ 10 M
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Table 5.3
Activity Cost Drivers (Units Per Cost Drivers)
Activity Driver A B C Total
Purchasing No. o f  purchase order 
(P.O)
300 100 100 500
Planning No. unit produced 2000 2000 4000 8000
Receiving No. of shipments 20 60 20 100
Production
inspection
(No. o f inspection per 
unit) x (No. of units 
produced)
12000 20000 8000 40000
Table 5.4
Cost Allocation to Products ($ millions)
Product Purchasing Planning Receiving Production
inspection
Total Cost/Unit
A 2.4 0.5 0.2 0.9 4.0 2000
B 0.8 0.5 0.6 1.5 3.4 1700
C 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.6 2.6 650
Total 4.0 2.0 1.0 3 10
Looking at just product A, for example, the product required 300 purchase 
orders sent, 2000 units produced, 20 shipments received, and 12000 inspections 
performed, therefore the resulting overhead allocation (in $ millions) is as follows:
Purchasing (300/500) x $4 = $ 2.4
Planning (2000/8000) x 2 = 0.5
Receiving (20/100) x 1 = 0.2
Production Inspection (12000/4000) x 3 = 0.9
Total $ 4.0
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This example serves to illustrate that low-volume (relative to machine hours) 
products such as A and B can be under-priced by the traditional cost accounting 
system. The ABC analysis showed that these products, although requiring relatively 
little machining, still needed a significant portion o f the other activities. This could 
be the case if the product is very complex or requires special handling. The old 
accounting system was, in essence, subsidizing the low volume products by 
allocating the overhead based on machine hours, when in fact, much of the overhead 
was independent o f machine hours.
5.2.5 Specifying Cost Activities and Drivers from the Buyer’s 
Prospective
The major motivator underlying the introduction of JIT by the buyer is the 
expected cost savings in inventory investment, storage, personnel, and wastage. The 
extent to which JIT will decrease physical inventory levels and their value will drive 
at least some of these scenarios which are presented in (Table 5.5). Identifying the 
underlying cost activities and cost drivers will help purchase managers focus their 
attention on them. Moreover, a well-developed ABC system will put buyers in a 
strong position to make relevant costing decisions. With carefully selected cost 
drivers and cost functions, changes in costs resulting from a change in activity can be 
seen more clearly (Chwen, 1998).
From Table 5.5, we see that the buyers will be relieved from supplier 
selection and any other related costs. Such costs are clerical and administrative costs 
for personnel. In addition, buyers will have a reduction in bidding activity and 
manual repurchasing activity. A number of order processes can be considered as a 
cost driver for quantifying these cost savings as a result o f implementing JIT.
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Moreover, by implementing JIT, the buyers will benefit by a reduction in the 
costs o f storage, insurance, obsolescence and the opportunity cost o f money invested 
in inventory. Also, the expenses o f direct storage costs such as, rent, light, heat, and 
record keeping will be reduced. A pound o f material or square foot o f material 
occupancy can be considered as a cost driver for these activities. In addition to that, 
the buyers will not need to worry about the cost o f expediting orders, premium 
transportation and lost sales due to late deliveries and, holding and administrative 
costs related to early deliveries.
5.2.6 Specifying Cost Activities and Drivers from the Supplier’s 
Prospective
Implementing JIT causes additional costs for suppliers. The two major 
sources of cost increase are the increased setup cost and transportation cost due to 
frequent setups and shipments. Table 5.6 identifies the cost activities and cost drivers 
for the supplier that describe these additional costs incurred by implementing JIT. 
Using number o f setups or hours of setup time and number o f orders processed as 
cost drivers can quantify these additional costs for the supplier. Additional 
warehouse space may be necessary to maintain adequate inventories in order that 
reliable service can be guaranteed. As a result, the supplier will realize an increase in 
warehouse cost, insurance, taxes, and holding cost. In order to obtain high-quality 
materials or products in larger quantities to receive the best prices and guaranteed 
deliveries, the supplier must be financially secure. Hence, the cost of capital and 
opportunity cost will increase under JIT. It is worth mentioning that the buyer can 
reduce the burden o f the additional cost on the supplier by encouraging the supplier
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Table 5.5
Cost Drivers from Buyers Prospective
Cost Activity Cost Driver Under JIT 
Partnership
Level of 
Activity
ORDERING COSTS (AB)
Vendor selection, contract 
preparation, writing, 
recording, inspecting and 
receiving the order, processing 
of invoices and preparing of 
payment.
Number of orders 
processed, Number of 
vendors, Number of 
products.
Decreased Product -level 
Activity
Inspecting the order Number of inspections 
or hours of inspection 
time or number of tests
Decreased Batch-level
Activity
Placing the order in storage Pound of material 
handled or number of 
material receipts
Decreased Batch-level
Activity
Transportation Number of orders 
processed or pounds of 
material handled
Increased Batch- level 
Activity
HOLDING COSTS (r,,)1
Warehouse cost, insurance, 
taxes, spoilage, obsolescence, 
storage and handling cost, cost 
of capital, and opportunity 
cost
Pound of material 
handled or square foot 
of material occupancy 
or value of material
Decreased Unit- level 
Activity
STOCK OUT COSTS:
No Backorder Situation:
Loss of customer goodwill, 
current sales, future sales, and 
loss of contribution to 
overhead.
Number of customers 
lost or value of lost 
customer's sales
Decreased Unit- level 
Activity
Backorder Situation:
Loss of future sales (customer 
inconvenience), cost of paper 
work to track the order, and 
emergency shipping costs.
Number of backorders 
or amount on 
backorder or period of 
Shortage
Decreased Unit- level 
Activity
'Stock holding cost represents a percentage of cost per unit. Warehousing, spoilage, 
obsolescence, and other factors can be considered in calculating the stock holding cost 
factor.
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to schedule their output runs in response to the buyer's needs and maintain a constant 
communication link to coordinate production and distribution schedules.
On the other hand, the suppliers chosen are relieved o f the necessity of 
constantly bidding for work and can focus their time and attention on meeting the 
short run and long run delivery schedule. By implementing JIT, suppliers receive 
two major cost reductions through the process. As a result, the product flows into 
several tasks such as milling, cutting and assembly and these tasks are performed 
consecutively as the product moves from machine to machine. We recognize saving 
in two ways. First, material handling cost is minimized. Second, it becomes 
unnecessary to store partially completed units. Thus, work in process inventories is 
minimized since partially completed goods move smoothly from machine to machine 
along the flow line.
Finally, in choosing a cost driver for an activity center, managers must be
sure that it accurately measures the consumption o f  activity for the various products
o f the company. I f  a high degree o f correlation does not exist between the cost driver
and actual consumption, then inaccurate costing will result.
5.2.7 Mai or Processes and Their Activities from the Buyer and the 
Supplier Prospective
The accuracy of ABC lies in using activities and cost drivers that accurately 
quantify the resources consumed or utilized by cost objects. To keep it simple, the 
following discussion summarizes the major processes and their activities from the 
buyer and supplier perspective, respectively. Generally, the number o f activities in 
an ABC system would be much larger than those in the traditional system. The actual
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Table 5.6
Cost Drivers from Supplier’s Prospective
Cost Activity Cost Driver Under JIT 
Partnership
Level of 
Activity
SETUP COSTS (As)
Equipment setups Number of setups or 
hours of setup time, 
number of schedule 
changes.
Increased Batch-level
Activity
Maintenance cost that 
connected to setup
Machine hours or labor 
hours
Batch-level
Activity
HOLDINGCOST (rs)
Warehouse cost, insurance, 
taxes, breakage, obsolescence, 
storage and handling cost, cost 
of capital, and opportunity 
cost.
Pound of material 
handled or square foot 
of material occupancy 
Value of inventory, 
Number of Parts 
Received, Number of 
Employees
Decreased Unit-level
Activity
number depends on what is necessary to accurately trace costs and to provide 
comprehensive information that is easy to interpret.
Buyer Perspective 
1. Material Acquisition:
11 Vendor Selection
111 Qualify potential vendors
112 Obtain bids on materials
113 Select vendors
114 Contract preparation
12 Issue purchase order
13 Purchase order follow up
14 Receive/inspect materials
15 Issue payment to suppliers
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16 Put material into storage
17 Handle stockout/backorder
18 Handle restock and scrap 
Supplier Prospective
1 Manufacturing
11 Set up machine
111 Schedule jobs
112 Issue material requisition
113 Set up machine
114 Load material into machine
115 Operate equipment
2 Sales and Shipping
11 Pick and assemble order
12 Load order into carrier
13 Ship to customer
14 Handle return and damages
15 Sales order entry
16 Managing receivables
17 Sales order follow up
5.3 JIT Partnership with the Use o f  an Electronic Data Interchange 
System
As the business environment becomes increasingly competitive, companies 
look for ways to distinguish themselves from their competitor. Their focus is to 
ensure that the “final customer receives the right product, at the right cost, at the
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right time, in the right condition, and in the right quantity”. Several authors 
(Bowersox et al., 1990,1992; Capacino and Britt 1991;Ellarm 1992; Langley and 
Holcomb) have suggested that JIT partnerships have the potential to enhance a firm’s 
competitive position. Others (Bowersox et al. 1988,La Londe and Cooper 1989) have 
suggested that applying state-of-the-art management information systems and 
information technology applications to JIT partnership functions are vital to a firm’s 
success. More specifically, EDI has become vital to many manufacturers engaged in 
JIT delivery because o f the speed and data accuracy capabilities that are provided. In 
addition, EDI has given companies competitive advantage by “improving on time 
performance and lowering error rates” (Cook, 1994).
5.3.1 Definition o f  EDI
“EDI is the inter-computer to computer communication of a standard 
business transaction in a standard format that pennits the receiver to perform the 
intended transaction”(Kekre and Mudhopadhyay, 1992). In other words, EDI is a 
way to automatically exchange data between computer systems, thereby eliminating 
the duplication o f manual data entry, increasing accuracy and speed, and eliminating 
process delays.
Under the above definitions, the concept o f EDI does not include the 
transmission of electronic mail or other free form messaging activities. The 
information transmitted by EDI is in a specific format that will allow the receiver’s 
computer application programs to directly perform standard business transactions on 
the data. For example, EDI can be used to electronically transmit purchase orders,
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invoices, shipping notices, financial and payment information, and any other types of 
standard business information.
5.3.2 The Importance o f  Sharing Information in JIT Partnership
Information sharing refers to the extent to which critical, often proprietary, 
information is communicated to one’s partner (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Many 
researchers consistently recommend various channels o f communication for 
successful JIT partnerships (Coyle, Badri, and Langley, 1996, Carter and Ferrin, 
1995). These include open and frequent sharing of sensitive and confidential 
information, and information concerning the supplier’s production related issues.
Newman (1988) argues that the sharing of information with suppliers should 
be the same as it would be shared internally, because suppliers are regarded as an 
extension o f the JIT Manufacturer’s operation. Discussions and sharing information 
in the areas of delivery schedule, usage o f purchased parts, quality, design, 
production process, and production .activities are essential for JIT working 
partnerships. In this way, suppliers are able to coordinate their production planning 
processes with JIT manufacturers. By sharing information and being knowledgeable 
about each other’s business, partners are able to act independently in maintaining the 
relationship over time" (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Information sharing between 
buyers and suppliers is important to develop and maintain trust. Sharing this type of 
information requires trust between the firms. If  distrust or conflict is present, open 
communication might convey coercive power, which leads to deleterious 
relationships (Mohr and Nevin, 1990). Empirical studies have shown that poor 
communication and feedback is one of the biggest barriers in JIT working
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partnerships, and many JIT implementation problems can be overcome by improving 
communication between JIT suppliers and buyers (Celley et al., 1987; Lascelles and 
Dale, 1989).
5.3.3 The Economic Feasibility o f  Implementing EDI in a JIT
Environment
The cost of setting up an EDI program can be substantial. The upfront 
expenses include the development, purchase or lease of hardware, protocol 
software, application and translation software, as well as, education and training 
costs. In addition, man-hours for evaluation and meetings can also be 
substantial. These can be offset, somewhat, by phased implementation, which 
can mitigate expenses. Operational costs stem from communications, 
maintenance and network charges. A cost/benefit analysis involved in 
evaluating an EDI investment requires that a company weigh the potential 
benefits and market factors against the costs o f implementation and maintenance 
o f a system. EDI requires that purchasing, sales, accounts receivable and 
payable, traffic, finance information systems, legal and auditing functions 
evaluate the cost-benefit equation separately. This requires a high level o f 
executive commitment to the project, from the beginning. The executive must 
have a wide vision to see the workings o f the various departments and the 
benefits to the entire company. When EDI is viewed from several functional 
areas, the start up costs can be distributed over several areas. At the same time, 
elevating EDI to a corporate level reduces duplicative efforts, improving 
implementation coordination and training. As an EDI program develops, 
communication and document content standards must be addressed.
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Communications standards permit computers to talk to each other. To 
accomplish this, computers must send and receive data at the same rate of speed. 
Communications protocols enable computers to identify and speak with each 
other. Third party network services provide the ability to receive and send 
electronic documents between partners, even if they utilize different EDI 
formats.
5.3.4 The Benefits o f  Adopting EDI in a JIT Environment
One of the main tools that facilitate work under the environment o f JIT 
partnership is Electronic Data Interchange. EDI must be viewed not just as a 
technological issue, because the technology is not new, but also as a business 
issue. A successful EDI program will improve the relationship between buyers 
and suppliers. Information must be precisely formatted to enable a computer to 
process information without human assistance. Determining this precise format 
requires extensive cooperation between trading partners and internal 
departments. The amount o f mutual trust and cooperation between trading 
partners in developing a successful EDI program results in the development o f 
true partnerships. Moreover, one of the driving forces behind the implementation 
o f EDI is that it promises to reduce costs by improving efficiency, accuracy, and 
reducing time. Within the JIT partnership context, EDI offers many potential 
benefits, such as, an increase in the efficiency o f  managing inventory where it 
can be gained by reducing the inventory cost and the associated cost o f carrying 
and storing inventory.
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From the buyer’s perspective, the ordering activities become more 
efficient since the transmission of order requests is faster and more accurate. For 
example, using automated transmission via EDI, instead of using (paper-based) 
labor-intensive transactions, can reduce of document-processing task times and 
related costs. Other benefits associated with the reduction of paper work are 
automatic reconciliation, reduced clerical workload and phone time, and 
automated ordering and verification. In the traditional course of business, paper- 
based systems have slowed communication, increased errors, and added costs. 
Improved order entry results in fewer personnel and errors, as well as a reduced 
need for equipment and facilities.
In addition, EDI can lead to a reduction in inventory levels by reducing 
the lead time and uncertainty during lead-time. Since communication between 
the buyer and supplier is faster and is sent through a more reliable and faster 
medium o f  electronic communication rather than alternate method there is a 
reduction in ordering costs, lead time, and the uncertainty o f the actual arrival 
date. Therefore, gaining control over the transportation chain allows the total 
amount o f inventory to be reduced. The orders can be placed in smaller quantities 
and more frequently.
Therefore, the improvement in time performance resulting from the uses 
o f EDI can facilitate a movement toward JIT partnership. Moreover, 
implementing EDI in a JIT environment can reduce the transaction costs 
dramatically. Such reduction can be recognized in the ordering process, shipping, 
tracking, warehousing, spoilage and waste, stock outs, and excess inventory. The
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benefits o f implementing EDI from the buyer’s perspective are summarized in 
Table 5.7.
From the supplier perspective, implementing EDI can enhance production 
scheduling and quality assurance as a result o f reduction in lead-time and 
uncertainty during lead-time. These causes will decrease safety stock 
requirements, with an accompanying savings in freight and material costs. 
Companies that depend on customer service can develop a major competitive 
advantage with EDI. Customers find it easier to place and receive orders. In 
today's highly competitive business climate, the use o f EDI results in even more 
important benefits. The benefits of implementing EDI from the supplier’s 
perspective are summarized in Table 5.8.
Wal-Mart Inc., one o f the largest discount retailers in the U.S., was able 
to offer a greater selection of goods in a fixed amount o f floor space, since lower 
amounts o f inventory could be carried. The checkout registers are directly linked 
to the Wal-Mart computer systems, so those sales can be summarized and 
transmitted to suppliers very quickly. When a sales quota in a store is met, an 
automatic replenishment order is generated and sent to the supplier or 
manufacturer. The reduction in lead-time directly led to lower inventories in the 
store (McCubbrey, 1992).
There are indirect benefits accrued from sharing information on anticipated 
demand, orders, and production schedules. These may include decreased safety stock 
requirements, with the accompanying savings in freight and material costs. Reduced 
inventory and labor costs result in improved cash flows. Also, ustomer satisfaction
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increases due to improved information and quality o f service and overtimes and 
indirect benefits will be substantially greater than direct benefits.
Table 5.7
The Effect o f Using EDI on the Cost Activities from Buyer Prospective
Cost Activity Effect of EDI on the 
Cost Activities
Justification
ORDERING COSTS (A„)
Ordering activities (issuing 
purchase orders, processing of 
invoices and preparing of 
payment.
Reduced Transmission of order 
requests is faster and more 
accurate.
Fewer personnel.
Inspecting the order Reduced Fewer errors as a result of 
less human intervention
Transportation Reduced Faster communication
HOLDING COSTS (rB)
Warehouse cost, insurance, 
taxes, spoilage, obsolescence, 
storage and handling cost, cost 
of capital, and opportunity 
cost
Reduced Reduction in lead time and 
reduction of uncertainty 
during the lead time
STOCK OUT COSTS:
Backorder Situation:
Loss of future sales (customer 
inconvenience), cost of paper 
work to track the order, and 
emergency shipping costs.
Reduced The uncertainty of the actual 
arrival date and time can be 
reduced.
Table 5.8
The Effect of Using EDI on the Cost Activities from Supplier Perspective
Cost Activity Effect of EDI on the 
Cost Activities
Justification
SETUP COSTS (As)
Maintenance cost connected to 
setup
Decreased Enhance production scheduling 
and quality assurance as a result of 
reduction in lead-time and 
reduction in uncertainty during 
lead-time.
HOLDINGCOST (rs)
Warehouse cost, insurance, 
taxes, breakage, obsolescence, 
storage and handling cost, cost 
of capital, and opportunity 
cost.
Decreased A result of reduction in lead-time 
and reduction in uncertainty during 
lead-time.
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
JIT philosophy calls for frequent, small deliveries, which arrive on time, with 
the quantity and quality required. For JIT to be effective there should be a 
cooperative relationship between the buyer and the supplier. They should work 
together to enhance their competitive positions in the market place. This study 
extends the quantitative models published in the literature to provide more realistic 
models for JIT operations and evaluates the costs and benefits o f JIT partnerships to 
help in the negotiation process between the partners. In this chapter, we first 
summarize the four most important modeling contributions o f our study followed by 
a summary o f the most important managerial contributions. Finally, we discuss the 
limitations and future research directions.
First, we provided a new model (Model 2, described in Section 3.4.2) for the 
optimization o f the joint total relevant cost o f the buyer and supplier in the typical 
JIT scenario where the buyer’s order is delivered in multiple shipments and the 
supplier’s production lot size is an integer multiple o f the shipment size. We allow 
the number o f shipments per buyer’s order quantity to be different from the number 
o f shipments per production lot size. This new extension is more realistic model that 
can provide more flexibility and cost saving by choosing the appropriate production 
lot size for the supplier. The new model, for a deterministic environment, determines 
the optimal values o f the three decision variables, the shipment size q, the number of 
shipments o f an order n, and the number o f shipments per production lot size m.
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Second, we provide a new model (in- Section 3.3.1) to quantify the 
advantages and costs of maintaining flexible resources. The model shows the 
production cost increase that can be expected if dedicated resources cannot be 
applied due to increasing uncertainty in the customers’ demand. Under JIT supply, 
ideally, the buyer and supplier operate in a deterministic environment, thus, neither 
the buyer nor the supplier has to hold safety stock. There is always uncertainty in the 
customer’s demand, but flexible resources and short production and supply lead 
times enable the required service level to be met in this case without holding safety 
stock. In practice, however, the appropriate flexibility and capacity are not available 
or, as we show in our model, are too expensive to maintain.
To avoid the high cost of flexible resources, in several cases in practice either 
the buyer or the supplier holds safety stock to provide the appropriate customer 
service level. This is the stage of transition to real JIT supply. Only the case where 
the buyer is holding safety stock was examined previously. Our third contribution is 
Model 4 (Section 3.4.4) which considers the case where the supplier is holding safety 
stock. In the spirit of JIT, the study finds the minimum safety stock, under frequent 
small lot shipments, that is needed in order to protect against shortages that may be 
caused by delivery delays or excess demand. Our safety stock model provides a valid 
approximation without the knowledge o f the distribution pattern o f the random 
customer demand as long as the pattern o f production follows the demand pattern 
according to the JIT supply agreement. The procedure, based on the new safety stock 
model, determines the optimal values o f four decision variables jointly: the safety
170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stock o f the supplier, the order quantity, the shipment size, and the number o f 
shipments
One o f the major problems associated with the application o f JIT models is 
the lack of appropriate cost data in traditional accounting systems to quantify the 
costs and benefits o f implementing a JIT partnership. Our fourth contribution is to 
provide appropriate accounting data. We specify the cost activities, cost drivers and 
traceable costs o f the buyer and supplier using an Activity Based Costing System 
(ABC). Additionally, we explore the costs and benefits that are experienced through 
the exchange of information between the buyer and the supplier in a JIT 
environment.
In Section 2, the implications of the new models are summarized from a 
managerial point o f view. Section 3 presents the limitations o f our research and 
future research directions.
6.2 Managerial Implications o f  the New Models
Buyer-supplier cooperation is emphasized in JIT environments. Our models 
minimize the joint total relevant costs for the two parties in order to enhance this 
cooperation. Either party will have a lower total cost if their optimal policy is used 
rather the joint optimal policy. However, the joint optimal policy provides a joint 
total cost that is less than the sum o f the individual total costs for any other policy 
including the ones where one party’s optimal policy is used. This joint total cost 
improvement is considerable, it is typically in the range o f 5% to 30%, thus, it 
provides a strong economic motivation for cooperation and price negotiation.
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Extensive numerical and sensitivity analyses have been made to identify the 
cost parameters that have the most significant effect on the joint optimal solution. 
We find that the setup cost and inventory holding cost for the supplier are causing 
the highest incremental changes in the joint optimal value o f the total relevant cost. 
The two cost parameters have an identical effect on the total relevant cost. The 
relationship between the cost increase and cost parameters is close to linear. The 
numerical results reveal that the inventory holding cost for the buyer and the selling 
price are the most influential cost parameters on the joint optimal shipment size. The 
two cost parameters have an almost identical effect on the shipment size. I f  we 
increase either one o f them, the shipment size will decrease. The last results are 
published in previous research.
We suggest that these models can be used as quantitative tools to find the 
joint optimal policy and help in contract negotiations. The weaker party can 
encourage the other party to agree upon the joint optimal policy by offering 
compensation for the loss incurred by the stronger party by moving away from its 
individual optimal policy. This compensation can be in the form of a long-term 
contract, a price discount or increased unit price, or may be a premium paid to the 
other party. Our models can be used to estimate the fair amount o f compensation 
necessary.
Cooperation and compromise with the joint optimal policy will always result 
in enhancing or equaling the previous cost position o f both parties. Numerical 
examples imply that the buyer and the supplier receive considerable benefit from 
using the joint optimal policy rather than the optimal policy for the other party. The
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benefit that the buyer can typically achieve is in the range of 5% to 75%, after 
compensating the supplier for its loss. The benefit that the supplier can typically 
achieve is in the range of 3% to 30%, after compensating the buyer for its loss. 
Therefore, we believe that these new models promote cooperation between the buyer 
and the supplier, which provides a better working relationship and considerable cost 
savings in a JIT environment.
The two most significant factors influencing the buyer’s benefit are the 
production rate and demand rate. The buyers benefit is increasing with increase of 
the demand rate and with the decrease o f the production rate. The supplier’s benefit 
is influenced mostly by the supplier’s setup cost and the buyer’s ordering cost. The 
supplier benefit is increasing with the increase o f the ordering cost and with the 
decrease of the setup cost.
We compare Model 1 with the new extension, Model 2. The new extension 
always has the lowest total optimal joint cost; however, the cost difference is not 
large in many cases. This can be the result of the low sensitivity to changes o f the 
EOQ type order quantity models. The robust model results in small cost differences. 
For Model 2, the optimal number o f deliveries is larger and the delivery size is 
smaller, and there is a larger saving for the party that accepts the move from its 
individual optimal policy to the joint optimum policy than with Model 1. In regards 
to comparisons between Model 3 with the new extension, Model 4, the results show 
that the total joint cost under Model 3 is smaller.
Our study shows the importance o f timely and honest cost information 
exchange between the buyer and supplier in the JIT environment. It also
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demonstrates the usefulness of technologies such as Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI), which facilitate such communication.
In an Activity Based Costing system, the focus is on identifying and 
measuring the costs of activities that consume resources. Once the activities’ costs 
are identified, the activities are traced to the products that caused the activities. Costs 
are then assigned to the products based on their share of the activities generated. To 
provide appropriate accounting data, we specify the cost activities, cost drivers and 
traceable costs o f the buyer and supplier. More accurate product costs are the result 
o f an ABC costing system. Therefore, the company is in a competitive position 
because it can determine more accurately its products’ costs. Purchasing negotiators 
in cost analysis work can also use this development. Finally, cost control is also 
improved because costs are identified with the activities that incurred the costs. 
Better cost control is facilitated by the use o f an ABC system. These factors can 
clearly lead to increased profitability and competitiveness.
6.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions
Given the importance and complexities o f some of the issues involved in a 
JIT partnership, it is unlikely that a quantitative model can be developed that can 
consider all the possible variables. The relevant quantitative models, including our 
extensions of previous models, have several limitations and there are several other 
directions in which to extend the quantitative models and managerial investigations. 
Here, we try to summarize the most important limitations and future research 
directions.
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The quantitative models o f JIT cooperation, including our models, consider 
the connection o f one buyer and one supplier. JIT typically promotes single sourcing. 
Still, in practice, several companies have multiple sourcing for a significant percent 
o f their purchased items including Toyota and other pioneers o f JIT. Multiple 
sourcing under JIT production is a  very challenging extension possibility. Another 
possibility is the extension for multiple buyers o f a single supplier or to a network of 
multiple-buyers and multiple-suppliers. Under JIT supply no such quantitative model 
has yet been published.
We consider only a single product. Connections among products may require 
the multiple product case. Price discounts, constraints on shipment size, or number of 
shipments were not considered in our study. Future research can consider these 
factors in a JIT environment.
We assumed a continuous review, fixed order quantity system where orders 
and shipment requests can always be issued. In certain situations, periodic policies 
may be used, but, JIT typically advocates continuous ordering and shipment policies. 
We considered equal shipment sizes. The effect of varying shipment sizes can also 
be investigated.
In the determination of the safety stock, we considered the probability o f no 
stockout as a service measure. This service measure is appropriate in the case where 
the shortage cost is proportional to the number of shortages and doesn’t  depend on 
the length of the shortage. This is a valid assumption in a production environment 
where a stockout requires a changeover to a different product. In the wholesale or 
retail situation, this is also an appropriate assumption if  an expedited shipment with a
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fixed additional cost is necessary in case of a shortage. In these situations, the 
shortage cost usually does not depend on the length or quantity o f shortage. In other 
cases o f wholesale or retail, the shortage cost is proportional with the time or amount 
o f the shortage. For these cases, different service measures like the expected amount 
or time short should be considered.
We showed the costs and benefits from applying an EDI system between the 
buyer and the supplier in the JIT environment. Future work can be done to capture 
the changes in the cost parameters due to the implementation o f an EDI system and 
to determine how these changes affect the joint solution. A new challenge and 
excellent research area could be the evaluation of the effects of Internet connection 
and electronic commerce on the JIT partnership.
Beyond the monetary gain, there are several additional advantages o f JIT 
partnership which are difficult to quantify, such as higher quality levels, more 
flexibility, faster problem resolution, reduced paperwork, and more efficient 
planning which will result from negotiation and cooperation. We believe that the 
quantitative effects o f cooperation and negotiation should be combined with 
qualitative managerial considerations in making the final decision.
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APPENDIX A  
NOTATION
Ab = total fixed cost o f a purchase order
As = setup cost for the supplier (producer),
Cb = purchasing cost o f a unit of the considered product for the buyer
Cp = the expected total unit cost o f production, including unused
production
Cs = variable cost o f the finished product for the supplier
D = expected annual demand of the product considered
Dc = the fixed contracted annual demand
dL = random variable representing demand during lead-time.
dr = buyer’s demand rate
D r = random part o f the annual demand, with expected value |a. and
standard deviation a  
F(t) = cumulative demand of the customer up to time t where 0 < t < T
F*(u) = normalized cumulative demand up to time u where 0 < u < 1
Gn(t) = cumulative amount to be delivered up to time t where 0 < t < T
G*„(u)= normalized cumulative amount delivered up to time u where 0 < u < 1
and Q = 1
Hk(t) = cumulative amount produced up to time t where 0 < t < T
H*k(u) = normalized cumulative amount produced up to time u where 0 < u < 1
and Q = 1
k = number o f setups per customer order (n/m)
K = safety factor that depends on the customer service level,a
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L = known constant lead-time of the supply to the buyer
Lb = additional cost of losing flexibility per unit ordered but not delivered
m = the number of shipments per production lot size
Mb = the normalized safety stock held by the buyer
Ms = the normalized safety stock held by the supplier
n = the number of shipments o f an order in a contract period
P = the annual production quantity (the actual annual sales volume)
pr = production rate expressed on daily basis
Pa = the probability o f no shortage in the contract period (0,T)
q = shipment size
Q b = order size, or contract quantity, that is delivered in small shipments 
Qs = production lot size
rs = inventory holding cost factor, the proportion of dollar value of the
stock for the buyer
rs = inventory holding cost factor, the proportion of dollar value o f the
stock for the supplier 
r = inventory level at which order is placed (reorder point)
Rd = annual production capacity o f dedicated production resources
Rf = annual production capacity o f flexible production resources
S b = the quantity o f safety stock held by the buyer
Ss = the quantity o f safety stock held by the supplier
TRCb = total relevant cost for the buyer
TRCj = joint total relevant cost for the buyer and the supplier
TRCs = total relevant cost for the supplier
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u = unit cost o f unused dedicated production resources
Vd = unit production cost with dedicated resources
V f = unit production cost with flexible resources
ZB = receiving cost per shipment for the buyer
Zs = supplier’s costs related to each shipment to the customer
CfD = standard deviation of demand
= average lead-time from the supplier to the buyer
HLD = average demand during the lead-time
CfLD = standard deviation of the demand during the lead-time
CTl = standard deviation of the lead-time
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APPENDIX B 
EFFECT OF REDUCTION IN UNCERTAINTY ON THE UNIT COST
Table B1
Dc = 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
DR=p.+k*CT= 250 230 210 190 170 150 130 110 90 70 50
Rd=Dc+n= 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 310 330 350
R,=k*CT= 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Rate of increase in expected unit production cost, V:
Cost rates a  = 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Vf/vd=1.2 u/vd=0.2 
k=2
1.33 1.22 1.13 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.2, u/vd=0.4 
k=2
1.63 1.41 1.23 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
vf/Vd=1.2, u/vd=0.6 
k=2
1.93 1.60 1.34 1.17 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/Vd=1.2 u/Vd=0.2 
k=1.65
1.46 1.34 1.22 1.12 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.2 u/Vd=0.4 
k=1.65
1.88 1.64 1.40 1.21 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/Vd=1.2 u/vd=0.6 
k=1.65
2.30 1.95 1.59 1.31 1.15 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00
2.40 
230  
Z2D 
2. V 
2J00 
190 
180 
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160 
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140 
130 
120 
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100
0 0 9 0 8 0 7 0 6 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 2 0  D 0
♦  vf/vd=1.2 u/vd=0.2
k=1.65
—B —vf/vd=1.2 ii/vd=0.2
k=2
vf/vd=1.2 u/vd=0.4
k=1.65
- X—viyvd=1.2, u/vd=0.4
k=2
—X—vf/vd=1.2 u/wd=0.6
k=1.65
—» — vf/vd=1.2, u/vd=0.6
k=2
Demand Uncertainty, Sigm a
Figure B1
Rate o f Increase in Expected Unit Production Cost, V:
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Table B2
Effect of Decreasing Demand UncertaintyIIoO 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
DR=|j+k*a= 250 230 210 190 170 150 130 110 90 70 50
Rd=Dc+p.= 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 310 330 350
R,=k*a= 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Rate of increase in expected unit production cost, V:
Cost rates ct = 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
v(/vd=1.2 u/vd=0.2 1.33 1.22 1.13 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
vf/vd=1.2, u/vd=0.4 1.63 1.41 1.23 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.2, u/vd=0.6 1.93 1.60 1.34 1.17 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
Vf/vd=1.5 u/vd=0.2 1.38 1.27 1.17 1.11 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00
vf/vd=1.5, u/vd=0.4 1.68 1.46 1.27 1.16 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00
vf/vd=1.5, uA/d=0.6 1.98 1.65 1.37 1.21 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00
2.D
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180
170
160
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120
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100
0 0  90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 D 0
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Demand Uncertainty, Sigma
Figure B2
Rate o f Increase in Expected Unit Production Cost, V:
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